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 ASSOCIATION OF CHILDREN WITH CRIME
Dr F. W. Wright-Short, MB, 3.5., D.P.M., M.A.N.Z.C.P.
Consultant Psychiatrist to the University of Sydney
The young people with whom we are concerned are usually described
as delinquents. Delinquency is a legal concept, a chronological or
geographical accident and the ‘delinquent’ may have broken a trivial
regulation or committed a serious crime. The term is thus imprecise but
convenient. Further, whenever we contemplate the amount of delinquency
in a community it must of course be borne in mind that statistical increases
and decreases in the amount of delinquency are only vague guidelines
reﬂecting, as they do, variation in police activity in different areas and
community interest in particular sorts of behaviour at a given time. The
problem is, however, a formidable one. American statistics suggest that
twelve per cent of all young people and twenty-two per cent of boys are
likely to turn up in a juvenile court between the ages of eight and eighteen
years. Further, the delinquency rate among girls is increasing more rapidly
than that among boys. '
Australia and the United Kingdom generally tend to show the same
overall tendencies of social change but perhaps at different rates so perhaps
some conclusions about the probable Australian position can be drawn from
these ﬁgures.
In a private communication I am informed of a recent study in ‘
sydney covering ninety-seven young persons who voluntarily completed a
questionnaire anonymously. This revealed that detected offences in the
males in the group were 155 and the undetected 178, and for females 51
and 160 respectively.
Obviously effort must be directed to prophylactic measures which
requires the detection of those at risk at the earliest possible age and if
possible the institution of methods to prevent the actual occurrence of
unacceptable behaviour as time goes on.
The children at risk of becoming deliquent can be identiﬁed in the
middle classes of schools. The boys tend to be distractable, unable to
concentrate or to maintain attention, They are less likely to display interest
in work or hobbies, tend to be over-aggressive. They will be as a rule
under-achievers with poor work habits, attention seeking and frequently
disruptive in class. They show less regard for the rights and feelings of
others and relationships with their peers and authority ﬁgures is poor.
The characteristics of the girls are similar, they tend to be less well
adjusted socially and less likely to be cheerful and happy. There is the same
antagonism to authority, inability to plan effectively and relatively poor
peer relationships.
l___;
 Mussen er all say that the single most useful predictive indicator of
future adolescent delinquency is the young person’s relationship with his
parents.
Family Inﬂuence
Parental disciplinary methods are frequently faulty in families of
offenders. Discipline may be too lax, too severe or probably, worst of all,
inconsistent so that the child who is bewildered and not fully understanding
what is required of him will develop his own usually rebellious methods of
dealing with the situation. Obviously if there is violence in the home with
or without alcoholism, or extreme tension between the parents, this tends
to produce the unsatisfactory parent/child relationship which is destructive
of proper social adjustment. If no one takes the trouble to reason with the
child, explain the reasons for rules and make clear expectations, the child
does not understand his obligations and hence makes no effort to fulﬁll
them.
Poverty is a signiﬁcant factor. Questionnaires show that the children
of poor parents tend more often to have an unfavourable attitude toward
them than the children of more prosperous families. There is more tendency
to display hostility towards the parents or at least ambivalence and the
deprivation is to aspire to acquisitive crime.
The broken home is frequently the breeding ground of delinquency.
There is a signiﬁcantly high rate among boys living with the mother after
the loss of a father by death, divorce or separation. However, violence in
the home between parents or directed to the children or extreme tension
between father and mother, may produce a more damaging environment
than frank separation of the parties. Criminal parents or criminal siblings are
likely to induce the same behaviour in other members of the family.
It is sometimes difﬁcult to see where the familial relationships have
gone wrong when faced with the young person who has no complaints to
make about his treatment and who insists that his parents are warm and
loving. In these cases the offence as a rule will have been committed in
company in order to retain the regard of and membership in a particular
group, or there may be a rebellion against over—protectiveness on the part of
the parents, an attempt to assert freedom and independence.
The history of the offender and the nature of the crime may
sometimes suggest the presence of genetic defects or organic disease or a
deﬁneable psychiatric illness calling for investigation and if possible
treatment.
There has been little study of what-may be regarded as middle class
delinquents, meaning by that term they come from more prosperous
families whose parents are in the professional or managerial class. Many of
them are ‘one time’ delinquents and may come to the notice of the police
by accident, for example, as the result of a party getting out of hand.
1. Mussen, Congar & Kargen Child Development and Personality 4th Ed. (1974)
Harper & Rowe.  
There is in such families an implied contract between the parent and
the child which is probably better honoured than in the poorer groups. The
parents for their part take responsibility for the child’s nurturance and
material comforts offering warmth and love. The child accepts rules and
obligations to the parents and is willing to offer a considerable degree of
conformity unless it feels that the contract has been broken and as Elkind2
points out the breach of contract may occur in a number of ways.
1. The child may be used to satisfy vicarious needs and ambitions
of the parents. The child is forced into some occupation or
profession which father would like to have espoused but was
unable to do so.
2. The ‘child may be used to bolster the parents’ ego being urged
to sporting or academic achievement to the limits of or even
beyond his powers.
3. There may be undue demands for labour in the home or at a
family business.
4. There may be a broken home and the introduction of a partner
other than the parent and this is perceived as an improper
sexual relationship by the child.
5. The child may be used to display the moral rectitude of the
parents who imposed the strictest conformity and perfection of
behaviour on their offspring.
All these various factors will produce rejection of the parents by the
child with rebellion quite likely to be expressed through delinquent
behaviour.
The affluent society clearly has both favourable and unfavourable
effects in the community. The ever increasing range of attractive material
objects and more or less elaborate diversions together with economic
inﬂationary pressures result in there being a great ambition for monetary
income.
It is now taken for granted that the majority of women have some
sort of job in addition to the husband. This of course has been one reason
for the development of the ‘latch key’ child who may go home at night to
an empty house and is denied that extremely useful period when released
from the restraints of school, it returns to the warmth of home and
parental greeting. The parents frequently aware of the fact that their
preoccupation with ﬁnancial gain is depriving their children of their
company and support to an adequate degree endeavour to make up for it
by giving the child considerable licence and material objects. This does not
assuage the feelings of rejection and unworthiness on the part of the child
which may lead to antisocial behaviour.
2. Elkind Journal Mental Hygiene 1967 Vol. 51, pp. 80—84.
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 The necessity for rehousing or, indeed, of trying to ﬁnd any housing
at all may result in families ﬁnding themselves in a community which is
quite alien to their own upbringing and standards. Children may ﬁnd
themselves in a school where the standards of speech, dress and behaviour
are quite different from those which are inculcated by the parents at home.
The child is thus in a difﬁculty. He may retain his parents’ higher standards
and be isolated from the groups at school or he may join in with a group,
adapting to their speech and behaviour and if, as is frequently the case in
some of the new housing areas, there is a criminal element in the school,
he may become associated with it and thus led into crime in order to
retain his position and the regard of the group.
Young people today are placed ina‘double-bind’ situation in which
they are exhorted to conform to certain ideals and rules and see those
ideals ignored and the rules flouted on all sides. The use of marijuana is a
good example of this. It is forbidden by law but many young people see
the‘drug so widely used amongst their fellows and are aware of its use
among their seniors that they may not, on the one hand, even realise that
there is an enforceable rule against the smoking of cannabis or, if they do,
consider that what is good enough for others is good enough for them. The
drug is available from high school onwards and it is a glaring anomaly that
society unable to protect young people from obtaining drugs eases its
conscience by punishing them for doing so.
Australia has not yet suffered badly from the dreadful concrete rabbit
warrens which have been built to house families in such places as Singapore
and London and it would be wise before any more building of this kind is
undertaken to ponder carefully the social implications of it and consider
the amount of delinquency which has been generated by these conditions in
other cities.
Our community is one in which truth has little place. Advertising
claims particularly on the TV. based on sex and snobbery are clearly
mendacious; leaders and politicians are shown to be guilty of chicanery and
increasing permissiveness means lack of standards and hence lack of a secure
framework in which to function. These things may not necessarily lead to
wrongdoing on the part of young people, but they do make it increasingly
difﬁcult for young people to knoav what is right and what is wrong.
I am old fashioned enough to deplore the passing of the policeman on
the beat. It was probably a very satisfying life for the ofﬁcer who got to
know the people in his area well who, if he was wise, was friendly and
helpful towards them and whose sharp eye and experience could often see
when something might be about to go wrong whereas the occasional rapid
passage of a police car, however quickly and efficiently it may get to the
site of the crime, is only placing a very elaborate bolt on the stable door
after the horse has bolted.
 Motivation
classiﬁcation.
Anxiety over parents’ health 7
Parental quarrels 1'0
Desertion, threats and inferiority lO
Estrangement from parents 8
Estrangement from parents after evacuation 5
Feared desertion of parent 5
Emotional difﬁculties following loss of parent 13
Unwanted or abandoned in childhood 9
Unwanted or discriminated against during childhood 8
Unsatisfactory parents complete family unit 12
Unsatisfactory parents separated or remarried 8
Unsatisfactory parents, neurotic, hysterical etc. 7
102
The behaviour reactions are grouped as follows:
1. Avoidance k excitement (avoidance is the urgent yet
unconscious effort to prevent the mind dwelling on a distressing
anxiety or memory and this leads to a constant search for
excitement). Present in 53 cases.
2. Resentment against parents (the delinquency was directed as an
act of spite, retaliation and resentment against the parents). '
Present in 42 cases.
3. Delinquent — attention (testing out of parents resulting in
3.
Motivation always has unconscious as well as consciously realised
components. To the question ‘Why did you do it?’ the offender will often
answer, ‘I don’t know’, and this may be the real answer so far as he is
concerned. So far as the obvious desire for acquisition or gang approval or
sometimes revenge is concerned, the motive may be obvious.
It is interesting to look at a study by D. H. Stott3 of the
personalities and backgrounds of 102 boys aged fifteen to eighteen in an
approved school in England. He classiﬁed his cases according to what he
considered to be the cause of delinquency and I think it is a very useful
crime). Identified positively in 20 cases but almost certainly
present in more.
Stott Delinquency in Human Nature published by Carnegie U.K. Trust 1950.
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 4. Inferiority compensation (leading to acts of bravado). Present in
21 cases.
5. Removal from home (the boy wishes to be out of an intolerable
home situation although he will often not admit it to himself).
Present in 55 cases.
6. Delinquency encouraged or condoned by the parent. Present in 5
cases.
7. Intolerance of people, near psychotic violence. Present in 5
cases.
8. Miscellaneous, speciﬁed or unclassiﬁed motives. Present in 8
cases.
It may be commented that with regard to 1 above, anxiety and
depression can lead to a high state of excitation and relief may be sought
in delinquent action. In 2 the desire to punish the parents by humiliating
them may also be a cry for help from the parents, so also may be number
3. On several occasions number 5 is actually present in consciousness and
the delinquent act is a manipulative attempt to achieve this end.
The prognosis for the delinquent varies with the personality and with
the nature of the offence. Where the offence is a reaction to stress without
there being any settled pattern of antisocial behaviour, the prospects of
reformation will be good if the resources of the community are brought to
bear. However, if there is a character disorder by the age of eighteen the
prospects of resolving the internal conflicts are not good.
A percentage of offenders will be found to be feeble minded, they
may be easily led or initiate offences on their own including sexual offences
against young children.
The possibility of organic disease must not be overlooked since
epilepsy may be associated with explosive violence. Probably about ten per
cent of delinquents will be found to have some recognizable psychiatric
illness, and criminal acts may be associated with the acting out of fantasy,
for example, fire setting and rape.
Lastly, one must consider the possibility of offences committed by
psychopaths, by which I mean a person who has simply failed to learn to
live as a human being and is indifferent to the rights and feelings of others.
The motive for their offences will frequently be found that they committed
them just for the sake of the thrill or perverted pleasure which they derived
from them. Such offenders must be regarded as intractable.
It can scarcely be denied that when a young person falls foul of the
law his offence is not really his ‘fault’. He is the product of his hereditary,
family and community environment and if he has offended it is because of
6
 the effect of these educated forces. Nevertheless it is recognized that some
steps must be taken to protect society. If special courts and legislative
measures are directed to the handling of juvenile delinquency they can only
be justiﬁed if the emphasis is on reform and education rather than
punishment which unless those upon whom it is visited are not carefully
selected is more likely to lead to recidivism than act as a deterrent.
Case Summaries
A. F. is a seventeen year old girl of a rather gullible and naive type,
charged with possession of drugs, having been arrested in company
with a male companion at 5.30 am. in the Kings Cross district.
She lives at home, describes her relationship with her parents as
good, but however, during her younger years, her mother was
frequently in and out of hospital, so that A. F. was farmed out to
various families and as she became older, the father and mother
were both out working with the result that she would come home
to an empty house.
 
Such separations from the mother in earlier years can lead to later
disturbance because these are interpreted by the child as evidence
of rejection on the part of the parent and the effects that may
become apparent as in this case during adolescence, so that there
is rebelliousness, rejection of authority and a restless urge to seek
whatever distractions are available in the culture. In this case,
unhappily, she fell under the influence of a man many years her
senior and was induced by him to carry some drugs.
This is a neurotic girl and the need is for probation and strict
supervision of her associates until she attains more mature
adjustments.
C. F. aged fifteen, came under notice because he had been charged with
various sexual offences against small boys. A year previously, he
was accused of sexual assault on a six year old girl.
He adopts a remarkably cavalier attitude towards the whole thing.
There is no evidence whatever of contrition nor consideration for
the victims of his assaults, which fortunately were relatively minor.
He dismisses anything he does not want to discuss with the
assertion that he does not remember.
In July 1963, he was seen by a neurologist. There was a history
of six seizures, apparently of an epileptic type, and there were tits
at long intervals up to a date just prior to his offences. He is of
below average intelligence, and had been placed in a school with
primitive ideas of discipline and a degree of rigidity which made it
quite unsuitable for a boy of this kind.
7
 It may be inferred from his history, and it is conﬁrmed by his
conduct in the consulting room, that he lacks normal control over
his behaviour, and that the usual social constraints do not operate
for him.
It was judged wise to give him a course of aversive conditioning
against his homosexual tendencies.
aged seventeen, was accused of assault with others and as a result
at least two other boys of about their own age were seriously
injured.
P. E. is intellectually dull. He left school at the age of ﬁfteen
without having passed any public examination. He works for his ’
father and is known as a trouble maker about the factory. He is
however docile and obedient at home.
He presents a rather unhappy looking youth with a nervous tic. He
feels that everybody really gets a better chance in life than he. At
school he did not get on with his lessons, and he hated his
teachers. He is unable to do any arithmetic, his reading age was
slightly less than eight years, and he was somewhat inarticulate.
This is an example of a youth entirely without achievement in any
ﬁeld. His reading difﬁculty would seriously interfere with even a
limited understanding of what was going on at school and a child
in such a position becomes increasingly frustrated, hostile and
rebellious. Unfortunately, unlike some of his kind, he could not
make good academic failure by sporting achievement.
It may be safely assumed that he entered into this fracas in order
to gain the approbation of his undesirable companions. Drinking,
ﬁghting and other forms of misbehaviour would give him a feeling
of ‘belonging’ to the group of which he attempts to be a part.
He is unlikely to commit any serious offence single handed, but
will always be at danger of being led into various misdemeanours
by others.
aged fourteen, charged with malicious damage. This is a common
type of offence in which a school is entered, things stolen and
more or less vandalism perpetrated at the time. The offences are
usually committed in company. On enquiry as to what were his
feelings during the time they were in the school, he said that it
was not really pleasurable, not to be compared to swimming or to
motor bike riding. He is very interested in riding a miniature
motor bike, spends much of his evenings tinkering with it,
swimming or riding a skate board. He is of better than average
intelligence, but obviously has a certain weakness Of personality
which causes him to be easilyled and in this case probably only
accompanied the leader in which might be regarded as a ‘proving’
offence in order to avoid scorn or rejection by refusing to do so.
8
J.M.
The prospects for this boy are improved by the fact that he has
superior intelligence and hence is more likely to reflect on the
outcome of his misbehaviour and to be able to exercise a
sufﬁcient degree of foresight to realise that the game is not worth
the candle.
The case is of interest because this family, who may be regarded
as respectable, and apparently the parents are attentive and loving
to their children, has been compelled in order to get a house, to
move into one of the outer suburbs of Sydney, where, unhappily,
there is a considerable delinquent population, so that this probably
quite respectable youth is thrown into the company of boys at
school to whom conﬂict with the police is commonplace. If on
the one hand he declines to associate with them, he may be
bullied and victimized, on the other hand, if he attempts to adjust
to the new cultural standards as he did in this case, he is liable to
ﬁnd himself in the hands of the law. This is a common and
serious social problem.
aged sixteen, was charged with indecent assault, and assault and
robbery.
He forced a woman into a ﬂat by threatening her with a knife, he
then assaulted her sexually in various elaborate ways, but did not -
actually rape her but forced fellatio on her.
A few days later, he attacked a woman and robbed her.
This boy had a father who was alcoholic and repeatedly assaultive
toward J. M. and his siblings. He ran away from home and from
school and was declared uncontrollable at the age of eleven. He
stole money from his mother; this is often indicative of the fact
' that the child is unloved, and it is love rather than money that he
really seeks. He graduated to minor shop lifting, and in 1969 he
was placed on one year’s probation, He spent the years from
eleven to ﬁfteen in an institution.
He was a bed wetter, of poor intelligence, left school early, and
has been unable to keep a job.
This lad will probably prove to be intractable; he has little sense
of the rights of others, he is impulsive, his judgement is poor, and
he is the product of his genetic endowments and early
environment.
aged sixteen years, charged with indecent assault, the circumstances
being that while playing truant from school, he was wandering
along the road when he saw an attractive woman standing in the
window of a ﬂat. She came down, as he stood and watched, into
the laundry and as she returned, he followed her upstairs. He
9
 
entered the room and there announced that he proposed to screw
her, telling her to remove her clothes; and having whipped a
dressing gown cord off its garment, he placed it around her neck
and threatened to strangle her if she made any sound.
Thinking that the lady was acquiescing, he crossed to the window
to pull down the blind, and she managed to make good her escape
from the room, shouting for help as she did so.
It will be noted that such was this young man’s conﬁdence that
the lady would submit to his attentions that he was willing to
cross the room and pull down the blind. In a sense this is a key
to an understanding of the whole affair. He was clearly convinced
that such were his masculine charms that he had only to make his
desires clear and any female would submit.
This case should be considered in connection with the next one.
J. L. aged sixteen, charged with murder. The victim was his mother.
J. L, accompanied by his mother, was hunting rabbits. A rabbit 1
had disappeared by the roots of a tree; he commenced to dig for ‘
it, telling his mother to catch the animal if it attempted to escape.
The rabbit shot forth, his mother missed it, the boy abused her ‘
and presenting his riﬂe, shot her dead. After the act, he did not ‘
approach his mother’s corpse, nor did he endeavour to ascertain ‘
whether she was dead or not. He took his riﬂe back to the house, ‘
went to the house of a relation a mile or so away, there procured \
another and more efficient weapon, and escaped into the bush.
After some hours of wandering, he decided to give himself up to
the police and did so.
l
l
The interest in these latter two cases is that there would appear to
be the acting out of fantasy by two youths. In the ﬁrst case
obviously adolescent sexual wishes and desires were quite
unrealistically pursued; in the second case, deeper and normally
repressed unconscious hostilities toward the mother suddenly
became effective in initiating action.
The occurrence of this type of a break with reality probably
indicates that both these boys will prove to be schizophrenic,
although a long period may pass without any further occurrence of 1
a bizarre behaviour. \
l
R. M. aged seventeen, convicted of driving a motor vehicle whilst
diSqualifled and a variety of other trafﬁc offences.
Two years earlier, he ﬁrst came before the Children’s Court as
l
being an accessory to the theft of a motor vehicle. A few months
later, he was driving a motor vehicle without a licence, uninsured ‘
l
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 and unregistered. Shortly afterwards, he was an accessory to an
offence of break, enter and steal. Later he was charged with
having stolen goods in his possession.
It may be conﬁdently expected that as time goes on, he will be
involved in bigger and better crime. It is not infrequently the case
that when a person comes to notice for some major offence, there
will be found a history of a succession of minor infringements of
the law which should alert those dealing with the miscreant to
recognise that unless steps are taken the probability is that an
habitual criminal is in the making.
is charged with shoplifting. She is seventeen and it is her ﬁrst
offence. S. H. has wealthy and inﬂuential parents. There is no need
whatever for her to steal from shops, nor anywhere else. The
thefts were made from three shops, there was no attempt whatever
to avoid detection and the contents of her bags when she was
ﬁnally challenged, comained the result of all her previous efforts,
although she might quite easily have put the proceeds of each
theft into her car before going on to the scene of her next theft.
S. H. Spent most of her life at boarding school, has always been
aware that her parents did not get on, and while she enjoyed
every material advantage, received little in the way of love and
security and understanding, such as good parents should show to
their children.
It would seem that as in so many shoplifting offences, there is a
desire to punish either the offender or some other person closely
related. In this case, it was quite obvious that her behaviour would
bring disgrace and expense to her father and mother, and in
another sense, it was a cry for help since it would force
recognition of her needs upon them.
In consultation, she was sullen and scornful in her attitude, and
verbally rejected any insight into the situation. However, having
made her demonstration, it is unlikely that there will be a
repetition.
 PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Dr F. W. Wright-Short
My thought on seeing a juvenile delinquent, a child offender or any
young person accused of crime is that I am seeing him too late; too late
because the parents have failed, the family has failed or society has failed.
It is a basic assumption, as I see it, that behind the machinery of dealing
with young persons as contrasted with adults we admit some diminished
responsibility on their behalf.
It is over a hundred years since some people developed a philosophy
that the aim of dealing with offending minors is primarily reform and
treatment rather than punishment. As long ago as 1846 there was a
childhood asylum in Aberdeen; industrial schools and reformatories followed
in the early years of this century. They were grim places of uniforms,
silence, discipline, the inculcation of calvinistic morals and compliance with
the then rules of society; but they were better than gaols. We have moved
beyond this now in form, although I think if you look at some of the
other papers prepared in connection with this seminar, some of the spirit
still lingers.
It is immanent in the principle controlling the handling of young
people, arbitrarily defined as under eighteen years of age, that their future
welfare as well as their present misbehaviour should be considered. Leaving
aside genetic factors (we do not know how important these are in
connection with personality disorders), the obviously defective and the brain-
injured, it may be said that sociopathy in a young person is the result of
environmental factors many of which are capable of modiﬁcation by
parents, society and specific authorities. 1 ﬁnd powerful arguments for the
compulsory inclusion of parents or guardians in judicial and reformatory
processes: not to punish the parents but to compulsorily involve both the
mother and the father. The younger generation is largely incomprehensible
to parents. Their manners and mores cause bewilderment; there is a
breakdown in communication which can only be repaired if all the parties
are brought together and receive expert advice and guidance.
The object of research into children and crime must surely be to
consider how best the offender may be classified, referred, placed and
trained to the greatest advantage of society and himself. It may be that we
should make more use of voluntary bodies as they do in Holland; institute
special staff training courses as in Belgium; look at the Swedish system of
voluntary placement in families and their operation ‘Wilderness’ which places
four or ﬁve boys with a house father in primitive conditions undertaking
forestry, game preservation and similar pioneering activities. Australia has
the resources, the ﬁnance and the terrain to use the best of overseas
experience.
I have said nothing about drug offences in my paper because I do not
know what to say. We deal with marijuana by massive hypocrisy and the
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 establishment of a ‘double-bind’ situation which is reminiscent of the
prohibition era in the USA. The responsibility for heroin and cocaine
addiction lies ﬁrmly on the shoulders of authority, which is not clever
enough to stop it getting on to the Australian market. I think punishing
users is a futile exercise but, of course, I say nothing/about those who
market the drug.
To return to my ﬁrst point about seeing these youngsters too late.
Obviously, the younger the potentially delinquent groups or individuals are
recognised the better. Eight to thirteen-year-olds respond favdurably to
interested and concerned adults. In later adolescence, contact is much more
difﬁcult. School teachers can be enormously useful in detecting those likely
to become criminals, and they should receive training to help them do so.
There is no doubt that juvenile delinquency is a serious problem but
when we deplore it i think it is salutary to read what Mary Carpenter],
one of the 19th-century founders of reformatories, said in 1851. In practice
she recognised that perishing classes, those who had not yet fallen into
actual crime but are almost certain to do so:
Then there were those who unblushingly acknowledged that they can
gain more for themselves and their parents by stealing than by
working — whose hand is against every man for they know not any
man as their brother. These form the dangerous class. Look at them
in the streets, where to the eye of the wordly man they appear the
scum of the populace fit only to be swept as vermin from the face of
the earth. See them in their houses, if such they have, squalid, filthy,
vicious, or pining and wretched with none to help, destined only it
would seem to be carried off by some beneficent pestilence. Behold
then when the hand of wisdom and love has shown them a better
way in schools well adapted to themselves and you would hardly
believe them to be separated by any distinct boundary from the
children who frequent the British and National Schools.
and of course higher praise than that there could not be.
However, we are on better days and this seminar is evidence of it.
\
1' Mary Carpenter Rc/brmamry schools for the Children of lllt’ Pcrisllillx and
DU'ZL't'I‘Ous Classes and for Juvenile ofl'lbndcrs. ()ilpin, London, 1851. P. 3-
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 COMMENTARY
Dr J. S. Blow, MB, BS, D.P.M., MA.N.Z.C.P.
Consultant Psychiatrist to N.S.W. Department
of Youth and Community Services
I would like to congratulate Dr Wright-Short on his paper — l have
lived with it at intervals for the last two or three weeks and at no stage
did I ﬁnd that its interest for me was diminishing. As a psychiatrist myself
I shall, of course, be examining it from that viewpoint, but in this ﬁeld of
delinquency it is quite impossible to work effectively without drawing upon
the substance of sister disciplines such as criminology, sociology and
psychology, and this I shall also do to some extent.
I come ﬁrst to the question of what it is we generally mean by the
term ‘delinquency’ and the associated question of which young people may
be at risk. The main point I would like to make is that, for most purposes,
we are interested in detected or ofﬁcial delinquency. Many studies have
shown that the incidence of actual delinquency is very high, especially
among boys. I know that criticisms can be made of those self-reporting
studies in which people are asked to record the offences they committed as
young people, whether or not they were detected. In spite of these
criticisms of the studies themselves and of their methodology I feel that the
consistent results obtained and the support that these results received from
commonplace experience suggests that the ﬁndings cannot be ignored.
It does seem that young people, particularly boys, at some time in
their lives generally commit one or more delinquent acts. Hence, if we want
to speak meaningfully of those who are at risk, we are really referring to
those who are at risk of being detected and apprehended and so joining the
ofﬁcial statistics of delinquency. It has always seemed to me that the study
of the differences between those detected and those undetected is one of
considerable importance. It is of great interest to me that some young
people from the same environment, even from the same family and
presumably exposed to the same temptations, may differ greatly in the
degree of detected delinquency. Some distinguishing factors are of course
very obvious, for example in differing abilities and competences which make
life in some ways a different experience for the individual. But in my view
there is still much to be explained. West and Farrington', in a major study
published in 1973, noted a kind of continuum in a population of boys with
approximately one-ﬁfth at one end having a very high probability of
becoming detected delinquents and with about one-ﬁfth at the other end
having a very high probability of not becoming detected delinquents, and
West and Farrington referred to this latter group-as ‘delinquency resistant’.
However, it seems likely from a commonsense and other viewpoints that a
major factor contributing to becoming a detected or ofﬁcial delinquent is
1. D. J. West and D. P. l-‘arrington ‘Who Becomes Delinquent?’ Second Report of
the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development. Heinemann, London 1973.
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 surely the number and frequency of offences committed. Hence, the young
person at risk that we really need to identify is the one who will
persistently offend, not the one who will once or twice or very occasionally
offend.
Dr Wright-Short mentioned the role of the teacher in predicting or
discriminating those that need additional help. It is quite interesting that
several studies, one by Stott2 and again the West and Farrington study,
both indicated that school teachers’ ratings of bad behaviour in class, even
at the eight—year-old level, are signiﬁcantly related to later ofﬁcial
delinquency without the teachers being trained in any way. Dr Wright-Short
did suggest that perhaps additional training might reﬁne their skills in this
direction, but already apparently they do quite well in predicting the
likelihood of delinquency.
The peer group also seems to be able to make similarly reliable
predictions when asked about their classmates. Perhaps we should use these
sources more than we do in determining where preventive efforts should be
applied.
Dr Wright-Short has written at some length of the question of family
inﬂuence and has highlighted a number of those issues which are widely
regarded as signiﬁcant. In his introduction to this topic,~ however, he has
stated that fairly good verbal communication between child and parent is an
important factor in establishing good parent—child relationship and therefore
a sound basis for avoiding later problems such as delinquency. I am not
sure whether he really meant this in the exclusive way which I read it in
the paper. If he does I would certainly have to point out that many
effective lower class parents would ﬁnd it difﬁcult or impossible to achieve
the kind of state which he has described. However, I notice that he has
mentioned later in his paper an implied contract between the parent and
child, and this suggests to me that in fact he did not mean to state it so
exclusively, and that he does recognise the important part that non-verbal
communication plays in families.
I would like to comment on his reference to high-rise housing. 1‘
think it should be mentioned that there is evidence that some or many of
the problems which appear in these concrete rabbit warrens arise from the
personal characteristics of the populations who have to move into such
dwellings. In other words, some of their problems come with them, making
the whole issue much more complicated than simply one of poor design of
building, poor development of services, poor foresight as to what may be
needed in that area.
» Dr Wright-Short has also discussed fairly extensively the question of
the young offender’s motivation and to those interesting results from Stott
which he quotes I would like to add some of the ﬁndings from a local
2. D. M. Stott Delinquency in Human Nature published by Carnegie U.K. Trust
1950.
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 study made by Dr John Kraus3, Senior Research Ofﬁcer in our Department
of Youth and Community Affairs. Dr Kraus took avpopulation of 266 boys
between the ages of thirteen and ﬁfteen years. One hundred and six of
these were from a deﬁned low delinquency area in the metropolitan area of
Sydney. One hundred and ten were from a deﬁned high delinquency area in
the same city and ﬁfty were recidivists currently resident in one of the
delinquent institutions of this Department. In all cases he asked them to
write down what they thought were the three most important reasons why
boys did things that got them into trouble with the police. He has
produced a paper which goes a long way beyond what I am discussing here
_and which will be presently published in the International Journal of
Offender Therapy, but I would just like to make some points in relation to
Stott’s ﬁndings and a comparison with those ﬁndings of Kraus.
In both cases the parental factor is highlighted very strongly. It tops
the list in all three groups, from the low delinquency area group,
non-delinquent; the high delinquency area group, non-delinquent; and ﬁfty
recidivists in a delinquent institution. All highlighted parental inadequacy or
parental discipline as important underlying reasons for young people getting
into trouble. However, they did throw up some other very important ones.
They all agreed on peer inﬂuence as signiﬁcant. They all saw thrill-seeking
as quite an important factor in delinquency, and this is one that I think
does need to be added to the discussion arising from Stott. One can argue,
of course, that the thrill-seeking is a secondary matter based on a need to
compensate for the deﬁciencies that are described. This may be so.
Nevertheless, these boys have reached the stage where thrill-seeking is
important to them, and it is doubtful whether we can undo the dynamics
lying behind that. One has to recognise that it is an important factor.
Another factor was ‘proving oneself' and another was boredom. Factors like
material gain and so forth came rather further down.
There are a couple of interesting differences between the three groups.
Those who gave most weight to parental problems were those from the low
delinquency area, which suggests to me that they were repeating a
stereotype. Kraus argues strongly in his paper that ‘parental inadequacy’ and
‘peer influence’ reporting relates partly to the realities of their lives and
partly to repetition of a stereotype. The delinquents in the institution gave
a much lower rating to parental problems than did the group from the low
delinquency area. They gave very great weight to peer inﬂuence and they
also gave great weight to boredom. These may be secondary factors, and
the psychiatrist may say that beneath this need for a thrill or to prove
oneself or this boredom lie other things. As Dr Wright-Short has said, by the
time the young person is ﬁfteen or sixteen it does become problematic
what one can do about those basic dynamics, and perhaps one has to look
more at what one can do in terms of these superﬁcial ﬁndings.
 
3. John Kraus ‘Causes of Delinquency as Perceived by Juveniles’ [ﬁfernational
Journal of Offender Therapy (in press).
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 Finally, I would like to take issue with Dr Wright-Short in that very
important statement of his about it not being the fault of the young
person. Certainly one sees many young offenders who excite one’s deepest
sympathy because of the extremes of ill-fortune to which they have been
exposed. At a deeper philosophical level I think the statement may well
have much in its favour, but in practice in trying to help young people I
fear that I must put the View that for many of them one of our objects in
treatment and management must be to try to get them to accept some
responsibility for their own behaviour rather than do as they are very
skilful in doing —- rationalise it away or project the blame on some other
person or thing. Many of the modern treatment programmes in other States
and overseas and beginning here, have this as a cardinal principle in their
approach to the persistent young offender, but not to all offenders. One
has/to distinguish between cases but this approach does apply to many.
Unfortunately we cannot, with present methods in psychiatry, sociology and
psychology undo the effects on personality of many of these earlier adverse
eXperiences by the time they come to us. Possibly if Dr Wright-Short’s
thesis can be followed through and something is done younger, well and
good, but by the time we see them I fear not. We have to try and help
.them live more comfortably with the world as it is, perhaps become,
according to West and Farrington, ‘more delinquency resistant’. In fact, there
is one community treatment centre in Adelaide where on a visit I saw a
boy present himself and give a heart-rending tale, quite true I think, of his
background,and the senior therapist said: ‘Yes, son, that is pretty dreadful,
isn’t it? Life’s rough. What are you going to do about it? If you come here
what are you going to do about it?’ Pretty tough, but many people believe
that for quite a lot of young delinquents this is the beginning of real help.
On a ﬁnal slightly optimistic note, the evidence seems to be that by
late teens or early twenties a great many of even our persistent young
offenders that are dealt with in the juvenile correctional system seem to
have ceased offending, or at least ceased getting caught. It seems perhaps
that juvenile delinquency may be, to a considerable extent, a problem of
adolescence and of a short period thereafter.
l7
 DISCUSSION
Ron Poison, The Young People’s Refuge
I would like to ask Dr Wright-Short with reference to the comment
on case study CF aged ﬁfteen (p.7) ‘it was adjudged wise to give him a
course of aversive conditioning against his homosexual tendencies’ who
judged it ‘wise’, what the ‘aversive conditioning” consisted of and what is
his opinion of that particular course of action?
Dr Wright—Short
I judged it wise, and I make no apologies for it. The method of
aversive conditioning consists of presenting a homosexually stimulating
picture and simultaneously or within two-ﬁfths of a second giving an
electric shock through the ﬁngers. I do not pretend that this is really the
treatment for homosexuality. The majority of homosexuals are intractable
but when you are in the adolescent period where homosexuality in some
degree is almost a norm, further where you have got obvious paedophiliac
tendencies as well and where it may well be that not only will he continue
to be a danger to society but he may very well ﬁnish up with a lengthy
prison sentence, then it seems to me that whatever your philosophical views
may be about aversive conditioning it is a worthwhile procedure from a
purely pragmatic view.
Ron Polson
But if I am reading it correctly the conditioning was given against his
homosexual tendencies not against just paedophilia.
Dr Wrigh t—Short
In this particular case that is quite true and it may well have been a
defect in my treatment of him that that also was not done, but I think
that you have to limit your aims. I should observe that I have not seen
him since. So far as I am aware he has not had any more trouble.
Warren Simmons, Social Worker, Centrecare, Catholic Family Welfare Bureau
1 was interested in the Stott study about the accuracy of teachers
picking up children’s behaviour at an early stage. It seems to me that it is
important that we have in our society as many alternatives for treatment as
we can. I think it is very unfortunate that we usually only have two
streams, those children who can go to clinics and be labelled ‘sick’ or those
who come under Youth and Community Services Department notice and
the courts and be labelled ‘bad’.
It is interesting in America where they have had school social work
programmes since 1916 that there are a number of treatment programmes
within the school where nobpdy gets labelled, and where teachers in fact do
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 the referring of families into group work programmes. This is usually only
with mothers, and these are usually aggressive children (usually in the
primary stages) or very withdrawn children. A group programme working
with mothers only resulted in an 80 per cent success rate in improvement
in the children’s behaviour. That would seem to me to be a very impressive
outcome and one that would suggest that we need to build in more
alternatives such as schools. Parents were quite happy to attend the school;
there was no stigma about that, and I think we need to turn our attention
to similar alternatives.
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  PROTECTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW IN
NEW SOUTH WALES FOR CHILDREN*
R. C. Chisholm, B.A., LLB. (Syd), B.C.L. (0x0n.)
Senior Lecturer in Law
University of New South Wales
Introduction
The Child Welfare Act 1939 does not stand alone. It forms part of a
complex and not altogether coherent set of laws which may be described as
being involved with the protection of children. These laws include the
Maintenance Act 1964, the Adoption of Children Act 1967, the Infants’
Custody and Settlements Act 1899, the Public Instruction Act 1880, the
Minors (Property and Contracts) Act 1970 and the Family Law Act 1975.1
But neither do these laws stand alone: they need to be understood in their
context, and this means examining our family patterns, economic and
political structures, and other aspects of our social organisation. It follows
that to reach an informed view on any particular law, such as the Child
Welfare Act, one would have to draw not only on legal sources, but also on
many other ﬁelds of knowledge—sociology, psychology, philosophy, history,
political theory, to name only the obvious. These rather daunting reﬂections
are intended to suggest that the task of understanding, evaluating and
improving the laws relating to children is a demanding and subtle one, not
likely to yield easy answers. They are also designed to point up the very
modest objective of this paper, which is to give an account of the proposals
for a new child welfare legislation, with enough comment to raise some of
the wider questions involved.
The present review of the legislation grew out of agitation for reform,
both inside and outside the Department of Youth, Ethnic and Community
Affairs (formerly Child Welfare). (Ed. Now known as the Department of
Youth and Community Services.) One of the main thrusts of the public
criticism was that the Department was unresponsive to the public, and rigid
and punitive in its operations. Whatever the truth of these charges, the
review itself involved a signiﬁcant effort to involve the community.
In 1974 the Minister appointed five committees of non-departmental
people to examine various aspects of the Act, and asked His Honour Judge
Muir of the District Court to report on the Children’s Court and related
* AUTHOR’S NOTE: Those fortunate enough to have better things to do than
read the whole of this paper will get the gist of it from the first and last
two sections, i.e. pages 20 - 23 and pages 60 — 65.
1. For a fuller list see Lynne Foreman, Children or Families? Social Welfare
Commission, 1975. '
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matters. After these reports were written a review committee under the
Chairmanship of Father Phibbs was established: the Phibbs Committee’s
Report, which was intended to draw upon the earlier reports, was published
late last year.2
For our purposes, three reports are significant: Judge Muir’s Report,
the Report of the committee concerned with Children’s Courts, under the
chairmanship of the Hon. J. W. Holt, M.L.C. (‘the Holt Report’) and of
course the Phibbs Report. There is substantial overlap, especially between
the ﬁrst two. All reports are published and available from the Department
of Youth, Ethnic and Community Affairs. This paper will be mainly
concerned with the Phibbs Report, which I understand will be the basis of
the new legislation. The Bill is now being drafted, and is expected to be
introduced in Parliament before the end of the year.
This is not the place for an evaluation of the review process.However,
it should be noted that the committees worked without pay. They had the
advantage of Departmental assistance, and of copies of submissions from the
public, and legislation in other jurisdictions. However, their members
(generally very busy with other affairs) worked on a part-time basis, and
there was no real opportunity to hear evidence, talk to children and their
families, or discuss the proposals with such bodies as the police, children’s
hospitals or educational authorities. Also, there was no lawyer on the
Phibbs Committee (or indeed on any of the others, except the Holt
Committee, which consisted only of lawyers!). It is only fair to mention
these matters as I will be offering some critical comments on the Phibbs
Report.
The Present Legislation: A Thumb Nail Sketch
The present law is contained in the Child Welfare Act 1939. The Act
has been amended a number of times since 1939, but not significantly for
our purposes. The 1939 Act itself is largely based on earlier legislation.
The Act establishes the Department of Youth, Ethnic and Community
Affairs, under a Director. The Department has a wide range of functions,
and a great deal of power. For our purposes, it is enough to note the
following functions. It has legal guardianship of all, and actual care of
some, of the children who are wards of State. There are about 6000 State
wards in New South Wales and about 70 per cent are in foster care. The
Department takes the view that ‘foster care in private homes throughout the
2. The Reports are:
His Honour Judge A. G. Muir, Q.C.
Report on the Child Welfare Act 1939 (N.S.W.): Department of Youth, Ethnic &
Community Affairs (Sydney, 1974),
Report of the Project Team on Children’s Courts: Department of Youth, Ethnic
& Community Affairs (Sydney, 1974), and
Child Welfare Legislation Review Committee Report: Department of Youth,
Ethnic & Community Affairs (Sydney, 1975)
referred to hereafter as the Muir, Holt and Phibbs Reports respectively.
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community is preferable to residential care for most of the children coming
into care’. Wards not in foster care are mostly in various forms of
residential settings run by the Department. In addition to State wards, there
are many children in residential care run by private organisations. These
home are licensed by. the Department, as are the foster homes for wards.
Thus it can be said that the Department is in charge of all dependent
children in New South Wales either indirectly or directly. It might be
helpful to categorise the children as follows:
1. Wards of State (whose legal guardian is the Minister) in
residential care administered by the Department (about 1500
children).
2. Wards of State placed in foster care. The Minister is their legal
guardian, but they are cared for by foster parents, under licence
from the Department (about 4500).
3. Other dependent children, whose legal guardian is not the
Minister, placed with private organisations, licensed by the
Department.3
In addition, the Department has a ﬁeld service which carries out a
variety of social work.services, and its ofﬁcers take cases to the Children’s
Court and report to the Court on request.
The Act establishes the Children’s Court: 85 11—20. This Court is
constituted by a Stipendiary Magistrate or two Justices of the Peace, and
exercises jurisdiction over children and young persons accused of offences,
or who are neglected or uncontrollable: ‘children’ are under sixteen years,
and ‘young persons’ are sixteen-eighteen years: S4. This distinction is not of
major importance and in this paper I will normally use ‘child’ except where
the distinction is relevant. The Act contains detailed provisions relating to
the work of the Children’s Court, which will be examined later.
The Act provides for institutions, administered by the Department, for
young offenders and other children sent there by the Children’s Court.
There are provisions for the trial in adult courts of children accused of very
serious offences like murder, and for the committal to prison of older
children in certain circumstances.
Looked at as a whole, the legislation has the following features:
1. The Department is given very great responsibilities and powers.
Broadly speaking the Department is not bound by a system of
accountability, except for the principle of Ministerial
responsibility to Parliament.
3. The information is largely based on the Department’s Annual Report for 1974
(the latest available).
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 2., The Children’s Court has a jurisdiction over children much wider
and vaguer than any Court has over adults: thus children can be
brought to Court on such grounds as ‘exposed to moral danger’
or being ‘under incompetent or improper guardianship’. Similarly
the Court has a wide range of dispositions, any of which can be
made in relation to any child coming within the jurisdiction.
3. There are few legislative provisions designed to protect the rights
of adults concerned with the children — for example, foster
parents, natural parents of State wards. Nor is there any real
provision for the rights of children themselves. The Act appears
to be based on the assumption that there is no need for
extensive judicial or other control of the work of the
Department.
Wardship
Under S9 of the present Act, the Minister is the guardian of every
child who becomes a ward to the exclusion of the parent or other guardian.
It has been held that the Minister’s guardianship is absolute and no Court
has jurisdiction to challenge anything he does relating to a ward.4 The cases
suggest the following paradigm case: a parent is unable to cope and
surrenders the child to the Department (or else the child is made a ward
through the Children’s Court). The parent overcomes the crisis, and seeks
the return of the child, perhaps two or three years later. By this time the
child has been placed with foster parents and has formed strong bonds with
them. Should the child be handed back? At present, the choice is the
Minister’s and his decision is unreviewable. Further, while the child is a
ward, the parent has no right to see him or receive any information about
him; all this is entirely within the Minister’s discretion.
Not surprisingly, this aspect of the present law was the object of
strong criticism by those who agitated for reform, and it has been dealt
with in some detail in the Report.
1. Becoming a Ward.
Under the present Act, a child can become a ward in one of two
ways: through an administrative procedure (‘admission’) or a judicial one
(‘commission’). The only provision relating to admission, is 323, which
provides: ‘(1) The Minister shall be the authority to 4 (a) admit a child or
young person to State control ...’. That’s it; no grounds, no procedure.
4. Minister for Interior v Neyens (1964) 113 CLR 411; Green v Minister for Child
Welfare [1972] 1 NSWLR 314; Ex parte Minister for Child Welfare, re Hancock
68 SR (NSW) 290; Compare Carseldine 12 Director of the Department of
Children’s Services (1974) 48 ALJR 344 (Queensland Legislation), and
DirectorvGeneral of Social Welfare v J [1976] VR 89.
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Indeed, the subsection is so laconic that one Judge thought that it failed to
give power to admit to wardship at all.5 The judicial procedure,
commission, is through the Children’s Court, which can make a wardship
order in relation to any child or young person who is an offender, or
uncontrollable, or neglected: Ss. 82, 83.
The Report recommends retention of both the administrative and
judicial creation of wardship, with some emphasis on the former:
‘The Committee felt that there should be wider use of admission
to wardship as an alternative to the appearance of the child or young
person concerned before a Court on a complaint alleging neglect. In
many cases these “technical” complaints are put before Courts in
circumstances which could much more appropriately be dealt with by
administrative action, always provided that the same safeguards as to
appeal and review are applied to wardship orders made by
administrative action as apply to those made in the judicial setting.’6
The relevant recommendations are as follows:
Recommendation 44
The legislation should provide that, in addition to the power of
a Youth Court in certain circumstances to make a
wardship order, the Director should have power also to
make a wardship order, either temporary or permanent, on
the application of:
I. a parent or guardian
2. a young person himself
3. such other person as the Director, in the particular
circumstances of the case, thinks ﬁt.
Recommendation 45
Before making a wardship order the Director should be
required by statute to ensure that every alternative
placement for the child or young person has been
explored.
It will be noted that these recommendations are limited to a general
direction that wardship is to be a ‘last resort’; Rec. 45, and to the
question who can apply for wardship: Rec. 44. It is not clear what criteria
the Director is to take into account, whether he may have a duty in some
5. Re an Infant K and the Adoption of Children Act [1973] 1 NSWLR 311, per
Mofﬁt J. A., dissenting.
6. Phibbs, p. 32.
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 circumstances to accept a child as a State ward, or what rights the child
himself has in the proceedings (presumably none). There are no provisions
for the parents or children to be notiﬁed of what wardship involves, or of
their rights, and no requirement that the Director provide them with any
information about his decision to accept or refuse to accept the child as a
ward. However, the Committee does indicate what it had in mind:
‘The inclusion of parents and guardians as appropriate persons to
make such application is obviously necessary. Consideration was also
given to a suggestion that children and young persons ought to have
the right 'to apply for their own admission to wardship but the
Committee felt that this should be limited to young persons, i.e.
persons over the age of ﬁfteen years and that, in their own interests
the initial application possible by them should be limited to an
application for a temporary wardship order. The Committee also felt
that it was necessary to give the Director power to permit other
persons to make applications of this kind. It has been Department
experience that sometimes children are left in the care of relatives,
both remote and immediate, and that in some of these instances, it
would be desirable for wardship to be effected by administrative
action rather than making it necessary for the child or young person
to appear before a Youth Court. It was also put to the Committee
that some single mothers, by reason of immaturity or intellectUal
handicap, are incapable of caring for their children and such a
provision would be an appropriate vehicle for protecting a child in
such cases.’7
2. The Nature of Wardshz'p
Under the recommendations, the legal guardianship of wards will
reside in the Director, not the Minister as formerly.8 In addition to
ordinary (permanent?) wardship, anew concept, ‘temporary wardship” is
introduced.9 However, we are told no more about it: the Report does not
disclose why it is desirable, or the situationsin which it will be preferred to
ordinary wardship.
A number of other recommendations are made. First,
Recommendation 39 states that: ‘The Director should be required to make
all reasonable efforts to promote and sustain contact between the child or
young person and his parents, brothers and sisters.’ .
Second, parents and guardians of wards will be required to keep the
Director informed of their address.10 This recommendation is followed by
the suggestion that Courts dealing with adoption or review of wardship
7. rbid, pp. 32—33.
8. ibid., Rec. 38.
9. ibid., Rec.‘ 46.
10. ibid., Rec. 40.
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 ‘might well take the view that, pn’ma facie, there was a lack of normal
parental interest in the child’, if the parent breaches this duty. There is
perhaps some irony in the fact that the only comparable provision in other
legislation is 844(2) of the South Australian Community Welfare Act 1972,
which requires the Director—General to inform the parents of the way
children have been dealt with.
Third, the Director should have power to place the child in a variety
of residential settings, ‘but not in any training school or remand centre
unless by due process of law’.11 For those unacquainted with this ﬁeld, it
may seem odd to deprive wards of training, but initiates known that
‘training’ is the current euphemism for punishment.12 This is not always
admitted, but is implicit in the following comments of the Committee:
‘There were some proposals that the distinction between “wards”
and “delinquents” should be removed and that the disposition of any
child or young person by the Director should be based upon his needs
rather than the immediate cause of his coming under care (but
the Committee) came down in favour of maintaining the existing
distinction as being essential to the rights of the child or young
person concerned, It is basic that no child should be detained in
facilities established for the training or detention of children and
young persons who have committed overt anti-social acts whether
criminal in character or otherwise, i.e. “delinquent” children, unless by
due process of law.’
Fourth, there is to be a provision that ‘no child should be subjected
to cruel, severe, unusual or unnecessary punishment inﬂicted upon the body
or to verbal abuse, threats or derogatory remarks made about him or his
family’.13
Fifth, the Committee thought that provisions about the management
of wards should be located in the regulations, not the Act, but
recommended that corporal punishment of wards should be prohibited. ‘4
Elsewhere, it recommended that corporal punishment of delinquent boys
over ten be retained, but not for girls.15 It thus prohibits foster parents
from giving small children a slap, but legitimates delayed, formal and
punitive physical violence against older boys.
11. ibid., Rec. 41.
12. See R. v David Dawson (Nov.—Dec. 1974) Petty Sessions Chronicle 37 (C.C.R.)
It is, of course, true that educational, vocational, and other programs are
available within the institutions, and there seem to have been considerable
advances in recent years. But this is consistent with children being sent to
institutions as punishment: after all, similar improvements have taken place in
adult correctional institutions.
13. Phibbs, p. 30.
14. ibid., p. 30.
15. ibid., p. 74.
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 A Comparison: South Australia
It is perhaps surprising that the South Australian legislation which
deals with a number of points left open by the Phibbs Committee was not
followed in this area.
It is worth setting out two sections in full:
Community Welfare Act 1972 (S.A.)
39. (1) A parent, guardian, or person having the custody, of a
child may apply in the prescribed form to the Minister for an order
that the child be placed under the care and control of the Minister.
(2) The Minister may, if satisﬁed that the child may otherwise
become neglected or uncontrolled, by order in writing, place the child
under the care and control of the Minister for any period expiring on
or before the day on which the child attains the age of eighteen
years.
(3) Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, no such
order shall be made — p
(a) with respect to a legitimate child, except with the consent
of both parents of the child;
or
(b) with respect to an illegitimate child, except with the
consent of the mother of the child.
(4) If the whereabouts of a parent whose consent is required
under subsection (3) of this section cannot after reasonable inquiry by
the Minister be ascertained, an order may be made under subsection
(2) of this section without the consent of that parent.
(5) An order shall not be made under subsection (2) of this
section with respect to any child over the age of fifteen years, except
with the consent of that child.
40. (l) The Minister may, upon receipt of a request under this
section, receive a child into his care and control where, in the opinion
of the Minister, it would be in the interest of the child to do so.
(2) A request may be made under this section by a parent or
guardian of the child or, where the child is of or above the age of
fifteen years, by the child himself.
(3) Where a child is of or above the age of ﬁfteen years, he
shall not, unless he has consented thereto, be received into the care
and control of the Minister under this section.
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(4) A child shall not be received into the care and control of
the Minister under this section for a period in excess of three months.
(5) A child received into the care and control of the Minister
under this section shall not be detained in a home for any period in
excess of three weeks except with the approval of the person upon
whose application the child was received into that care and control.
(6) The child shall be discharged from the care and control of
the Minister —
(a) at the expiration of the period for which he was received
into the care and control of the Minister;
or
(b) at any time prior to the expiration of that period where a
parent or guardian has applied for the return of the child,
or the Director-General has directed that he be discharged
from the care and control of the Minister, or the child, if
he is over the age of ﬁfteen years, has requested that he
be so discharged,
4. Review and Appeal
The Report recommends the establishment of no less than four types
of review.
First, Wardship Boards of Review.16 These are internal departmental
bodies which ensure that children do not get ‘lost’ in the system. The
model is S 47 of the Community Welfare Act 1972 (S.A.), providing for
‘such review boards as may be necessary, to keep under consideration and
review the progress and personal circumstances of children under the care
and control of the Minister’.
Second, the Wardship Review Tribunal:
Recommendation 48
A Wardship Review Tribunal should be established
consisting of from three to five members, but always
including a person qualiﬁed to practise as a barrister or
solicitor and drawn from the following classes of persons:—
(a) medical practitioner
(b) barristers 0r solicitors
(0) persons having knowledge of and experience in
administration
16. ibid., Rec. 43.
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 (all persons having knowledge of and experience in
education
(e) persons having knowledge of and experience in
psychology '
(f) persons having knowledge of and experience in social
work
(g) persons in the opinion of the Governor having other
suitable qualiﬁcations or experience.
‘The Committee saw the constitution of this proposed tribunal
in a similar way to that established under Part IX of the existing
Child Welfare Act, i.e., the lntellectually Handicapped Persons Review
Tribunal and considered that other provisions relating to the tribunal
should be similar to those applicable to the latter body, and the
operation of the tribunal should be governed by appropriate
regulations.’
Recommendation 49
Where any child or young person is subject to a wardship
order (not being a temporary wardship order) and the
Director has refused an application by a parent, guardian
or any person who had, immediately prior to the child or
young person coming into the care of the Director, the
care and control of that child or young person, he should
have a right of appeal to the Wardship Review Tribunal;
the tribunal should in such cases have power to discharge
the child or young person from wardship.
The Report goes on to recommend that the right of appeal to the
Tribunal commences three months after the child is made a ward,” and
twelve months must elapse between appeals.‘8
17.
18.
The Report adds:
‘The Committee here was seeking to give parents, guardians and
others speciﬁed above an early opportunity to appeal against a
decision by the Director not to grant prompt discharge of a ward
where the circumstances have altered dramatically quite soon after the
child comes into care. Again the committee understood that the time
a child remained in care was not a critical factor in the Departmental
assessment of whether he could safely be discharged or not but
nevertheless felt that this was an important provision which should be
included as an inducement to parents especially to understand that the
ibid., Rec. 51.
ibid., Rec. 50.
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 fact of a child becoming a ward did not mean that the wardship
order was irreversible thereafter. Nevertheless should that right of early
appeal be availed of the Committee then felt that appeals thereafter
should be limited to lZ-monthly intervals as set out above . . 319
Third, the District Court. After the last mentioned recommendation,
the Report continues:
‘ the Committee also emphasised that nothing in these
recommendations relating to the constitution of a Wardship Review
Tribunal or boards of review is intended to affect the ordinary right
of appeal to the District Court against a wardship order made by a
Youth Court. By the same token, in such circumstances there should
not be any right of appeal to the Wardship Review Tribunal at the
expiration of three months as mentioned in Recommendation 50, as
this would duplicate the ordinary right of appeal to the District Court
from an order made in a Youth Court. ’20
Fourth, the Youth Court (the old Children’s Court). Appeals from
temporary wardship go only to the Court, not the Tribunal:
Recommendation 46
A temporary wardship order should be subject to the
following conditions —
(2) where a child or young person becomes subject to a
temporary wardship order, any person who could
then have applied for such an order (not being the
person who did in fact apply) should have a right of
application to a Youth Court within 21 days of his
becoming aware of the existence of such an order
and the court in hearing and determining the matter
should have power to substitute for that temporary
wardship order, an order:~
(a) discharging the child or young person from
wardship; or
(b) any other order available to the court had it
found that that child or young person was in
need of care, control or protection.
While this section on review is one of the most detailed and valuable
parts of the Report, there are a number of matters left unﬁnished or
unclear:
Why is the appeal to the Court from temporary wardship, but to the
Tribunal from permanent wardship?
19. Vibid., p. 37.
20. ibid., p. 37.
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 If a child is made a ward on the application of a non-parent, why
must the parent wait three months before he can appeal?
Are the time limits subject to the Court’s or the Tribunal’s leave to
proceed in particular cases?
How realistic are these provisions for poor and inarticulate parents?
Why can’t the child himself appear, if he is ten or older?
5. Discharge
Recommendation 47
Where a child or young person is discharged from wardship
prior to his 18th birthday either by order of the Director
or by order of the Wardship Review Tribunal, the Director
or the Tribunal, as the case may be, should have power to
make such order as he or it thinks ﬁt as to the
guardianship of the child (i.e., not being a further wardship
order).
It seems strange that the Director can decide which adult is to be
guardian of the child on discharge. The person previously guardian should
become so again, unless a Court having jurisdiction orders otherwise.
6. Wardship — Concluding Remarks
The Report, to its great credit, establishes the crucial legal reform in
this area: that the Department’s control over wards should not be absolute,
but subject to review. However, the recommendations do not deal fully
with the difﬁcult task of promoting the welfare and rights of the child
while? respecting the rights of the various adults who have a relationship
with the child. Even more important, they do not ensure that the child be
involved in decisions about his own future. Nor do they rationalise the
grounds and procedures through which children become wards, or the
proper distribution of functions between judicial and executive action.
This is not the place for a detailed discussion of other provisions
which might, arguably, further improve the Phibbs recommendations. But I
would like to add one comment, about the legal guardianship of the
Department (whether technically the Minister or the Director). The Phibbs
‘ Committee has essentially done two things: ﬁrst, limited the powers of the
Department by a system of review, and second, established ‘temporary
guardianship’ as a possible alternative to permanent guardianship. But under
these recommendations, as at present, the Department will be legal guardian
of the child while he is a ward, and, as I understand it, will not provide
residential care for any children other than wards.
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 I suggest, with some hesitation, that the law and departmental practice
might be altered to include voluntary residential care by the Department,
where the child does not become a ward, and the parents remain the legal
guardians. Of course, this kind of alternative residential care is presently
made available informally through friends and relatives, and also through
private charitable organisations which provide residential care for children
without taking over legal guardianship, e.g. boarding schools, and church
homes. Further examples are homes for runaways overseas” and the Young
People’s Refuge in Sydney. I am suggesting that the Department might
involve itself in this kind of work, becoming a kind of ‘good neighbour’ for
those families who ﬁnd it temporarily impossible to manage with their
children, but for whatever reasons cannot use the resources available to
most families. Of course, the Department already does considerable social
work in the community, and it would not seem difﬁcult in principle to
extend this work to the provision of residential care.
The scheme would have to be worked out, but there do not appear
to be insuperable problems. The arrangement for the caring of the child
could perhaps be worked out as a contract between the parents, the
Department, and where he is old enough, the child. It would probably be
used in short term care, perhaps even weekends. ‘
ln caring for children in a residential setting without legal
guardianship, the Department would be dealing with families in a purely
voluntary way: they could return and take the child away whenever they
liked. This would fundamentally alter the relationship between them and
the Department, and perhaps this would be good. The Department might
beneﬁt in many ways from the opportunity to provide real help ‘with no
strings attached’, and the lack of legal authority would remove the need for
appeals and other confrontationist procedures. Further, the Department
would have to ‘sell itself’ to the client populations, and this might be a
good thing. Since it is armed with coercive powers, the Department
necessarily has an uphill battle to present itself to the public — or at least
its client population — as helping rather than punitive: perhaps this kind of
work would help its image and encourage people to seek help from it.
Panels 22
Panels are rather fashionable at the moment. There seems to be a
fairly generally held view around the world that children should not be
taken to Court for trivial offences, and not where other plausible measures
are available. In the U.S., the process of ﬁltering out children who need not
go to Court is called ‘diversion’ and involves a variety of techniques. In
Scotland, South Australia, and Western Australia the favoured system
involves the use of ‘panels’. In all systems, there are common objectives:
 
21. See, e.g. ‘California Runaways’ (1975) 26 Hastings L. J. p. 1013.
22. For a very perceptive and critical comment on the panel system see Helen
Gamble ‘Children’s Hearing Panels for N.S.W.?’ ALJ Vol. 50 Feb. 1976 p. 68.
32
 to spare children the experience of appearing in Court, to use less coercive
measures wherever possible, to use a forum more suitable for counselling
and discussion, and to reduce the workload of the Children’s Courts,
thereby enabling them to give more attention to the serious cases that do
come to them.
Existing Panel Systems
There are two models of the panel system. The most thoroughgoing is
the Scottish system, which has the following features:23
23.
1. It operates with an administrative staff headed by a ‘Reporter’
who is the key to the system. All cases are ﬁrst referred to the
Reporter, who has power either to take no action or refer the matter
to the panel. In about 50 per cent of cases (this ﬁgure is based on
the Edinburgh Panels) the Reporter takes ‘no action’ — i.e., no ofﬁcial
action; he may suggest some voluntary counselling or other available
services. The other cases go to the panel.
2. The panels are composed of teams of three lay people, as far as
possible drawn from the local community. They were selected after an
extensive publicity campaign and given some training in advance. The
Reporter arranges the business of the panels, and acts as general guru
and smoother of administrative hassles.
3. The panels deal with children referred for offences and also
those in need of ‘compulsory measures of care’. As for offenders,
there are restrictions on prosecution in the Courts, so that all children
under sixteen, except those charged with quite serious offences, go to
the panels — no children now appear before magistrates or Justices of
the Peace or special juvenile Courts. Thus the Scottish panels displace
the Children’s Court. As for non-offenders, the category of children
who may be brought before the panels is broadly similar to the
definition of children in need of care, protection or control, set out
earlier in this paper.
4. The proceedings are informal, and last an average of about forty
’minutes. They are often held at night, so that fathers can attend. The
family may bring a representative of their choosing with them. At the
commencement of proceedings, the grounds stated by the Reporter
are explained by the chairman,and the case can be continued only if
the grounds are accepted by the child and his family. If they are not
accepted, the proceedings can be adjourned pending a judicial ﬁnding
on whether they are established. '
5. The panels have extensive powers. They can make a ‘supervision
requirement’ which may be subject to conditions. The conditions
may, however, include a ‘residential requirement’ for out-of-home
Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 Part [[1, based on Children and Young, Persons
7 Scotland (The Kilbrandon Report, Cmnd, 2306, HMSO London 1964).
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 residence, possibly in an approved school (institution). Thus the
powers of the panels are comparable to those of our Children’s
Courts; in particular, to put it bluntly, they include the power to ‘put
the child away’. However, there are elaborate provisions for the review
of supervision requirements by the panel at the instance of the local
authority or the child or his family; and the requirement must in any
case be reviewed within a year. The scheme is thus to give the panels
wide powers without time or other limits, but to provide that the
child’s position be constantly under review.
6. The panels are known as ‘Children’s Hearings’.
The second model is the South Australian system.24 This is a much
more modest affair, as shown by the parallel features:
1. There is no equivalent to the Reporter, and no separate staff
available to the panel.
2. The panels are composed of two people, a police ofﬁcer and a ‘
social worker from the Department of Community Welfare.
3. The panel exercises jurisdiction over children under sixteen who
are alleged to have committed an offence, so long as the child has not
been arrested (in which case he goes to the Juvenile Court). It also
exercises jurisdiction over children who are ‘uncontrolled’ or ‘habitual
truants’, but not over ‘neglected’ children. Thus the panel’s jurisdiction
focuses on criminal or other misbehaviour of the child. The panels do
not displace the Children’s Court, but supplement it.
in operation were limited to one occasion, I cannot comment further.
However, the panel has the beneﬁt of a police or welfare report on
the offence and background of the child. There is no equivalent to
the Scottish provision that the child must admit the grounds of the
proceedings, but the panel must refer the matter to the Court if the
child or parent so requests, and they must be notiﬁed of their right
to request this.
4. Proceedings are informal. As my opportunities to see the panels
5. The panels have limited powers. They may ‘warn or counsel’ the
child and parents, or ‘request’ the child or his parents to undertake in
writing to comply with the panel’s ‘directions’ as to a training or
rehabilitative programme. However, the panel may refer the matter to
the Juvenile Court if such an undertaking is refused.
6. The panels are called ‘juvenile aid panels’.
 
24. Juvenile Courts Act 1971~72 (S.A.).
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 The Recommendations
The Report recommends that panels be established. 25 Some
characteristics of the Scottish system are adopted, but the model is closer
to the South Australian system. The Recommendations may be summarised
as follows:
1. Aid panels are to be ‘set up throughout the State, as a means of
ensuring that certain children and young persons who have committed
offences may be dealt with other than by Courts’. Thus the
jurisdiction is to be limited to offences, which is a narrower
jurisdiction than either the South Australian or the Scottish model.
The Report adds: ‘In creating a system_of Aid Panels, the goal is to
emphasize the counselling and advice aspects of the Panels, rather than
the punishment, to avoid the stigma and trauma of Court proceedings,
and to deal with cases through the family, involving the community,
and reducing thereby the number of cases in Youth Courts.’
2. The panels are to consist of three persons: an ofﬁcer of the
Department, a ‘member of the community’ and ‘a member with legal
qualiﬁcations, wherever possible, but otherwise another member of the
community’. The Report adds that police ofﬁcers and persons either
responsible for bringing the child to the panel, or having him under
supervision afterwards should not be members of the panel. As far as
possible, panel members should be people ‘representative of, and
familiar with, the locality and general circumstances of families in the
locality in which the panel is operating’.
3. Proceedings before the panels are to be based on a ‘report’, not
a charge, and children are to appear ‘separately, not collectively’. If
no panel member is legally qualiﬁed, the child must receive
independent legal advice that the offence has been properly‘admitted.
There is to be no legal representation, but before appearance the child
and his parents should be given a document ‘setting out in simple
language the nature of the Panel, its functions, powers, and the rights
of the child or young person and his parent or guardian, under the
Act’.
The panels should meet at ﬂexible hours, ‘to meet local needs’
and members are to be paid expenses, ‘including loss of earnings’.
25. Phibbs, pp. 76—80. Both Muir (pp. 22—27) and Holt (pp. 6—12) also
recommended panel systems, the latter leaning towards the Scottish model.
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 4. As in South Australia, the powers of the panels are restricted to
counselling and requiring an undertaking from the parent and/or child
‘or to accept supervision for a period of up to six months’, but the
panels have power to refer the matter to a Youth Court if ‘the
circumstances warrant it, or where an agreement made is not
subsequently honoured’.
5. The panels are to be under the Director of the Department of
Youth, Ethnic and Community Affairs: there is to be no Reporter on
the Scottish model, because ‘The committee felt that the notion of a
Reporter based on the Scottish system was impractical in New South
Wales’, although the impracticability was not further explained.
6. Which children go to the panel, and which to the Court?
(a) Where a child or young person is alleged to have
committed murder, rape or other offence punishable by
penal servitude for life, he may be charged with the
offence and will appear in the Youth Court, where he may
be committed for trial, in the same way as an adult. Such
children or young persons cannot be dealt with by Aid
Panels or the Youth Court, and the following paragraphs
do not apply to them.
(b) Where a young person (fifteen-eighteen years) is alleged to
have committed an offence for which the maximum
penalty for an adult is fourteen years imprisonment or
more, ‘an ofﬁcer in charge of police‘ may authorise
proceedings before an Aid Panel, or in a Youth Court by
way of either summons or charge.
(c) Where a young person is alleged to have committed any
other offence, the Director may determine in consultation
with' the police whether the young person is proceeded
against in an Aid Pane], or in a Youth Court by way of
either summons or charge. A committee of senior officers
of the Police Department and the Department of Youth,
Ethnic and Community Affairs is to be set up “to assist
the Director or his delegate in making decisions of this
kind’.
(d) Where a child (ten—fifteen years) is alleged to have
committed any offence (other than murder etc) he may be
proceeded against either by a complaint alleging that he
has committed an offence and brought before Aid Panel,
or by summons or charge in the Youth Court. if it is
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cintended to bring the child before a Youth Court, a
constable may apply to the Director for permission’ to do
so.
Comment on the Recommendations
First, I. think one should have modest expectations of what
panels can
do. In Scotland I saw one or two cases where it did seem that at th
e panel
hearing the child’s behaviour and its relation to family strains
were brought
out into the open for the first time; in another the child spoke a
t length
about his problems at school and arrangements were made to tran
sfer him
to a different school. But the counselling aspect should not be over
stressed;
certainly panels should not be hailed as ‘the new answer to the
problem of
juvenile delinquency’. Their main value is in diverting from th
e Court
children who should not go there, dealing leniently with first offend
ers, and
wagging fingers at parents. In practice, there is a tendency f
or panel
proceedings to degenerate into a session where righteous but self-consc
iously
indulgent panellists tell silent children and their embarrassed or
hostile
parents that the child’s misbehaviour has to be stopped, and
the dire
consequences in store if it continues (‘Well, Johnny, we’ve decided t
o let
you off this time, but next time, we’ll just have to send you
to the Court,
and you know what that means, don’t you? And you know too, do
n’t you,
Mr and Mrs Jones? Well, off you go, and don’t let us see you back
here
again . . .’).
Second, the question of power is not as simple as it might appear.
Any panel dealing with children and parents for the child’s misbehavi
our
will have considerable psychological power because of the whole situation —
the family under attack, unfamiliar with the rules of the game, the parents
feeling guilty and defensive, and so on. Further, the panel has great indirect
power because it can refer the case to the Court, which of course does have
direct legal power over the child. It is important not to take the limited legal
powers of the panels at face value; one must distinguish between real and
formal power. This point needs to be kept in mind when considering the
panel system as a whole. For example, lawyers might well worry about the
danger of faISe admissions of guilty. It may be argued, in defence of the
system. that because the (formal) powers of the panels are so limited no
great harm is done. But when one considers the real powers of the panels,
the lawyers’ worries become even more valid.
Third, the panel system can easily become simply an exte
nsion of
ofﬁcial power over children. In theory, children who would otherwi
se have
gone to Court will now be diverted to the panel. But in practice, police a
nd
welfare authorities may begin to pick up children in circumstance
s where
they would previously have let them off. on the basis that the matt
er was
not sufﬁciently serious to warrant Court proceedings. In other word
s, the
panel system may widen the net itself, rather than widen the holes i
n it to
let the small fry through.
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 In this connection it should be noted that the Report envisages that
the police caution system should be phased out as the panels are
introduced. This is surprising because Judge Muir reported that the police
caution system ‘has operated successfully but has not been developed over
the years’26 and the Holt Committee speciﬁcally recommended that it be
retained.27 It is regrettable that the Phibbs Committee should have made
such an important recommendation without discussion since the abolition of
police cautions may help to produce precisely the kind of overkill that
panel systems tend to encourage.
Fourth, in practice it is not possible to staff the panels with a
‘cross-section’ of society. In spite of a really enormous recruiting drive in
Scotland, the panels inevitably tended to be staffed by middle class people
who could afford the time, and had the articulateness, conﬁdence and other
qualities necessary for the job. Such people inevitably tended to come from
the upper middle classes, particularly professional sectors.28 I think we can
expect a similar situation in New South Wales.
Fifth, there is a danger of adverse public reaction in some quarters.
Attempts to reform children’s law in a ‘therapeutic’ direction often meet
with complaints that we are ‘going soft on kids’ who can ‘get away with
anything these days’ and so on. Particularly if it is encouraged by the
media, such a reaction tends to lower the tolerance of the community for
imaginative and risky programmes of all kinds for dealing with children in
ways that are less punitive and less separated from society: e.g. open
institutions, ‘delinquent’ kids attending community schools, etc.
Finally, I think the Phibbs Committee was unwise in not adopting the
Reporter system. One of the essential features of the Scottish system is that
the Reporter (who has very great power) is highly qualiﬁed and completely
independent both of the police and the welfare authorities, although there
is a close liaison with both. Under the proposed Phibbs system, the panels
will in practice be controlled and administered by the very Department
which is responsible for bringing cases before them and-also for carrying
out their orders (and those of the Youth Courts to which they can refer
cases). In this system it would be difficult to be confident either of the
real or the apparent independence of the panels: it is difﬁcult to see them
as other than an arm of the Department. Yet they have been given
functions which in substance if not in form may be characterised as
‘judicial’.
26. Muir, p. 23.
27. Holt, p. 12.
28. See the valuable paper by David May and Gilbert Smith, ‘Policy Interpretation
and the Children’s Panels: A case Study in Social Administration’ (1970) Vol 2,
Applied Social Studies 91.
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.M.’
 Youth Courts
1. Composition
‘Youth Courts’ will replace Children’s Courts, though the differences
are not substantial. The present Children’s Court is constituted by a
magistrate, who sits alone, and this will remain the case. Under the present
Act the Court may also be constituted by two Justices of the Peace, but
this will be stopped.29 Another change is that offences against children will
no longer be heard in Youth Courts, but in Petty Sessions, and such Court
will have ‘power to close the Court, or to suppress details in accordance
with current practice’.30
It is also recommended that a ‘Senior Youth Magistrate’ should be
appointed, to be ‘responsible for the co-ordination and administration and
direction of Youth Magistrates throughout the State’.31 There will also be
half yearly meetings of the Youth Magistrates to assess how the Youth
Court is going: a parallel to S 179 of the District Courts Act 1973. The
Senior Youth Magistrate is to have the status of Deputy Chairman of the
Bench of Stipendiary Magistrates, and should make himself familiar with the
relevant institutions and practices of the Department of Youth, Ethnic and
Community Affairs. He should report half-yearly to the Minister.32
These recommendations seem a straightforward and sensible way of
improving the status and quality of Youth Courts. They reﬂect a
world-wide trend to upgrade Courts dealing with family matters, the most
notable local example being the Family Court of Australia. There were some
submissions before the Committee that the process should be taken further,
and that the Youth Courts should be re-establjshed at District Court level.
Judge Muir, however had considered and rejected these submissions in his
report.33 He argued that if this step were taken, appeals would have to be
to the Supreme Court, and this would be undesirable and unacceptable.
The Phibbs Committee presumably accepted this reasoning.
2. Jurisdiction
A key issue in this area is the grounds on which children can be
brought before the Court. Under the present law, children may be brought
to Court if they are (a) accused of an offence, (b) neglected or (c)
uncontrollable: Child Welfare Act 1939, S78. These terms need some
comment.
29. Phibbs, Rec. 60.
30. ibid., Rec. 60.
' 31. ibid., Rec. 61.
32. ibid., pp. 44—45.
33. Muir, pp. 27—28.
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As to (a) the age of criminal responsibility is eight years: S 126, and
the Court exercises jurisdiction over all children above that age who are
accused of offences, except for those serious offences which-go to adult
Courts (see later).
The next ground, ‘neglect’ is elaborately deﬁned in the Act. Section
72 contains sixteen situations constituting neglect, including children who
are not provided with sufﬁcient and proper food and clothing, or are
ill-treated, who are under ‘incompetent or improper guardianship’, who are
suffering from untreated venereal disease, who are ‘falling into bad
associations or are exposed to moral danger’, who without lawful excuse do
not attend school regularly, or who are tattooed without the written
permission of their parent or guardian. These shambling, obscure and
outdated provisions were the subject of innumerable criticisms in the
submissions for revision of the Act. The third category, ‘uncontrollable’, is
defined as ‘is not being or cannot be controlled by his parent or by any
parent having his care’: S4, and also, inexplicably, any child who ‘solicits
any person for immoral purposes or otherwise behaves in an indecent
manner’: S79.
These categories have been considerably revised, and the age of
criminal responsibility is to be raised to ten.34 However, the Report is'
rather obscure in this area. It is recommended that Youth Courts should
have exclusive jurisdiction over ‘children and young persons who are alleged
to have committed offences or who are in need or care, control and
protection’.35 It is further recommended:
Recommendation 63
The following deﬁnition in respect of the jurisdiction of
Youth Courts is recommended:
‘A child or young person is in need of care and control or
protection (sic) if:—
(a) he is for whatever reason not being adequately
controlled by his parent, guardian or other person
having his care,
(b) there is inadequate provision for his proper care,
protection or normal development; or
(c) without reasonable excuse he does not attend school
regularly; or
(d) he is being ill-treated; or
34. Phibbs, Rec. 73.
35. ibid., Rec. 64.
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(e) his health is being avoidably impaired;
and it is unlikely that he will receive proper care and
control or protection as the case may be, unless the matter
is dealt with pursuant to this Act’.
This seems clear enough, but the Report also contains the following
passage:
‘Where a child or young person appears before a Youth Court,
the Court will ﬁrst determine whether the alleged offence has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. If the offence is not so proved, the
charged will be dismissed. If the offence is proved, the Court will
proceed to determine on the balance of probabilities, whether it is
established, the (sic) child is in need of care and control. If that is
not established, then the Court will dismiss the charge. If it is
established, the Court may then make such orders as .are available to
it under the Act, and are recommended elsewhere in this Report’.36
This passage suggests that the Court may exercise jurisdiction over
offenders only if they are also found to be in need of care and control,
whereas the previous passages suggest that, as under the present Act, the
commission of an offence is a sufficient ground. The confusion is
compounded by another passage:
‘Where a child of ten years or above, but under the age of
fifteen years, is alleged to have committed an offence, this should
cease to be sufﬁcient ground in itself, to bring him before a Youth
Court, and he should instead be the subject of a complaint before an
Aid Panel, alleging that he has committed an offence. in lieu of
making such a complaint, a constable may, if he considers the
circumstances of the case warrant it, apply to the Director for
permission to proceed against the child, by way of summons, or, if
that is not appropriate, to charge the child with the offence before
the Youth Court.’37
This degree of muddle over such a crucial issue, and the lack of’
discussion of the questions involved, is perhaps partly due38 to the Report’s
policy of leaving out material covered in the earlier reports. The
Introduction states that the report ‘deals in greater detail with those
proposals which are radical or contentious. The cases for some other
proposals have been well put in the Project Team Reports or in that of
Judge Muir.“9 Unfortunately, there is considerable disagreement between
36. ibid., p. 49 (original emphasis).
37. ibid., p. 79.
38. But it may also be due partly to the inherent contradictions of the system: see
below, pp. 43 ~ 44.
39. Phibbs, p. vii.
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 Judge Muir and the Holt Committee on this issue. It is therefore impossible
to say what view the Report takes on the jurisdiction of the Youth
Courts.40 In these circumstances, it seem necessary to describe brieﬂy what
was recommended in the two earlier reports.
Judge Muir recommended that for ‘children’ (between ten and
fourteen), jurisdiction must be based on the twin ﬁnding that the child has
committed an offence and is in need of care and control.41 For ‘young
persons’ (over fourteen), the offence alone is sufficient. His Honour’s
reasons may be summarised thus: Children sometimes seem to be dealt with
more harshly than adults, in that they may be given some drastic spell of
‘training’ because of their family and social circumstances, even when their
offence is quite minor. He cites an English report which mentions
‘complaints that a child has been sent away from home because he has
committed some particular offence which in itself is not at all serious’. In
His Honour’s opinion, this problem ‘results from a view formed that the
child or young person requires assistance and training’.
The Muir proposals are intended to justify the differential treatment
of the young, and to ‘provide a satisfying explanation to the Court and to
the Establishment for dealing with a child apparently more severely than an
adult in the case of a minor offence’.42
The Holt Committee (which had the advantage of the Muir Report)
considered but rejected this approach. They recommended that criminal
proceedings against both children and young persons should be separate
from proceedings involving children in need of care. They argued as follows:
‘We have taken the view that the attempt to include children
who commit offences in the general “care” jurisdiction is on the
whole a mistake. It tends to create conflicts in the objectives of the
Court and leads to a dangerous confusion between the need to
protect the public and to serve and protect the child or young person.-
The ambiguity can easily be seen as confusing or even hypocritical to
children who come before the Court expecting punishment for
offences and are dealt with, not necessarily more leniently, on the
claim that the proceedings are “for their own good” ’.43
40. The mystery is only deepened by such passages as the following: ‘Although
advantages in separating matters concerned with proceedings against children who
have committed offences or who are alleged to be in need of care and control
from those dealing with children in need of care and protection can be put
forward, the contrary view is more persuasive. The real difference between the
interests of children in need of care and control and those in need of protection
is not very great in practice’.
41. Muir, pp. 41—45.
42. ibid., p. 43.
43. Holt. p. 15.
42
 The above paragraphs deal with the question whether the commission
of an offence should be a sufﬁcient ground for jurisdiction, or whether an
extra element, an established need for ‘care’, ‘protection’, or ‘control’, is
necessary. The next question is what jurisdiction may be exercised over the
children now descirbed as ‘neglected’ or ‘uncontrollable’.
On this point the definition proposed in the Phibbs Report has
already been set out.44 Both the Muir report and the Holt Committee
suggested different formulations,45 which I will set out at length here. All
formulations share the following characteristics:
(i) Such expressions as ‘exposed to moral danger’ have gone.
(ii) There is still a category of children not under control.
(iii) The old deﬁnition of ‘neglect’ has given way to shorter, more
general provisions, relating to the lack of proper provision for
the child’s development, whether or not caused by parental
misconduct.
(iv) Truancy remains as a ground.
3. Powers of the Court
Under the present law, the Court has a range of possible orders both
for offenders and ‘neglected’ and ‘uncontrollable’ children. There is no tariff
system: once a child is within the definitions, any of the orders may be
made. In relation to offenders, the range of orders is:
(a) Summary Offences: SS3.
Dismiss the charge
Admonish and discharge child
Discharge on recognizance
Probation
Commit to the care of person on terms and conditions
Commit to an institution either generally or for a speciﬁed term
of up to three years
Suspend committal to an institution
Commit as a State ward (wardship has been dealt with above)
Deal with ‘according to law’ (i.e. the penalty prescribed for the
offence)
44. See p. 40 above.
45. Muir, pp. 82—83; Holt, pp. 17—18.
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 (b) Indictable Offences: 583,
(C)
Essentially the same, except no power to punish ‘according to
law’ .
Neglected 0r Uncontrollable: S 82.
Admonish and discharge
Probation
Commit to care of person on terms and conditions
Commit as a State ward
Commit to an institution
What powers will the new Youth Courts have? the Report contains
the following recommendations:
‘Powers in Respect of Offenders
Where a child or young person has been charged before a Youth
Court with any offence (other than homicide, rape of other offence
punishable by penal servitude for life) which the Court has heard and
determined in accordance with the Act and the charge has been
proved or the child or young person has pleaded guilty to the charge,
the Court shall have the following powers:
(3)
(b)
(C)
(d)
(8)
(f)
Dismiss the charge.
Release him on probation upon such terms and conditions as
may be prescribed or as the Court may in any special case think
fit for a period not exceeding 12 months (whether expiring
before or after the date upon which the young person attains
the age of 18 years).
Commit the child or young person to the care of some person
who is willing to undertake such care upon such terms and
conditions as may be prescribed or as the Court may in any
special case think fit.
Order him to pay a penalty not exceeding $200, and not
exceeding the maximum penalty prescribed for the offence.
Commit him to control for a speciﬁc period of 12 months, as set out
elsewhere in this Report.
Order him to pay costs in respect of either personal injuries or
damage to property or both, not exceeding in the aggregate
$600.
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The Court should have power to make each of the
abovementioned orders except in that mentioned in (a), with or
without convicting him.
Where a penalty is imposed or costs ordered to be paid as set
out above, the Court should have regard to the means and
circumstances of the child or young person.
Where the Court makes a probation order it should also have
power at the same time to ﬁne the child or young person.
Where a child or young person is charged with an indictable
offence which is heard and determined in a summary way by a Youth
Court, and if that offence were tried before a superior Court, that
Court would have power to record an alternative verdict to the
offence charged, the Youth Court may record an alternative verdict to
the offence with which the young person was charged.’46
‘Powers in Relation to Children in Need of Care and Control
or Protection.
Where a Court ﬁnds that a child or young person is in need of
care and control or protection it should have the following options:—
(a) Dismiss the complaint.
(b) Release the child or young person upon such terms and
conditions as may be prescribed or the Court may in any special
case think ﬁt.
(c) Release the child or young person on probation for a period of
up to 12 months, upon such terms and conditions as may be
prescribed or as the Court may in any special case think fit
(whether expiring before or after the date upon which the child
or young person attains the age of 18 years).
(d) Commit the child or young person to the care of some person
who is willing to undertake such care upon such terms and
conditions as may be prescribed or as the Court may in any
special case think fit.
(e) Commit the child or young person to the wardship of the
Director.
(f) Commit the child or young person to control for a specific
period of 12 months as set out elsewhere in this Report.
Where the Court makes an order committing the child to the
care of some person willing to undertake care, or to the wardship of
the Director, or to control there should be power similar to those
recommended elsewhere in this Report in relation to similar orders
made where a child or young person is found guilty of an offence.
Ph ihbs, pp. 55 7A56.
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 The legislation should speciﬁcally provide that where a child is
found to be in need of care and control or protection he is not guilty
of any offence.’47
The obscurities encountered above in relation to jurisdiction continue
to plague us here. It seems clear that the Youth Court will deal with at
least some children purely on the basis of their offence, and these powers
are titled ‘Powers in Respect of Offenders’. The only other set of powers
relates to ‘children in need of care and control or protection. Yet there
seem to be three not two types of proceedings contemplated.
(a) the new version of neglected and uncontrollable,
(b) proceedings alleging both an offence and the need for care and
control, and
(c) proceedings alleging only an offence.
It is unclear on what basis children will be allocated to categories (b)
and (c), and also which bundle of powers applies to (b).
We must therefore return to the Muir Report, which provides for a
coherent scheme based on three distinct categories:48
47.
48.
(a) Criminal Proceedings
Children over 14 will be dealt with on the basis of their offence,
either by a Youth Court or a Panel.
The powers of the Youth Court will be: Dismiss the charge; probation
up to two years; commit to fit person for twelve months; penalty of
up to $100; care and control of Minister for a period of twelve
months; damages compensation or costs up to $200.
(b) Care and Control Proceedings
Where a child between 10 and 14 is alleged to have committed an
offence, this in itself will cease to be a sufﬁcient ground to bring him
to Court. In his case, proceedings will be by complaint and must
allege (l) the offence and (2) that he is in need of care and control.
Both must be established before the Court can make an order.
The powers of the Court here are: Dismiss; probation up to two
years; committal to ﬁt person for twelve months; commit to care and
control of Minister for twelve months.
ibid., p. 51.
Muir, passim,‘ but see summary of recommendations at pp. iii—vi.
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 (c) Neglected and Uncontrolled Children
This corresponds to the present categories of ‘neglected’ and
‘uncontrollable’, and to the Phibbs deﬁnition of children ‘in need of
care and control or protection’, set out above.
The powers of the Court here are: Dismiss; release to care of parent
on recognizance; commit to ﬁt person; commit to care and control of
Minister until seventeen years. For truants: Dismiss; cormnit to
Minister for up to twelve months or school leaving age, whichever is
shorter.
It may be that the Phibbs Committee intended to adopt this scheme
in toto. But this is difﬁcult to reconcile with a number of passages in the
Report. Possibly some of the Holt recommendations were favoured, but 1
will not further complicate the matter by reproducing them here.
The above paragraphs are necessarily technical, and because of the
delphic qualities of the Phibbs Report, rather heavy going. However no
description of technical powers give a realistic view of what the Children’s
Court is doing or the Youth Courts are likely to do. I will therefore make
some comments on the signiﬁcance of the new proposals and the realities
of sentencing in Children’s Courts.
First, there is little change in the basic pattern. The new Court will
retain jurisdiction over kids who commit offences, or who are ill-treated, or
who are troublesome (‘uncontrolled’). The Court will have a range of
powers for all these children: the tariff principle remains absent. Essentially,
the powers are four: to dismiss, with or without a ticking off; to place on
probation or a bond; to commit to a ﬁt person (usually a private
institution such as Charlton Boys Home); and to commit to the ‘care and
control of the Minister’ by wardship or committal to an institution.
Some further points:
Committal to an Institution. There were many submissions objecting
to the ‘general committal’ (i.e. for an indeﬁnite period) under the
present law. In practice, most children committed to institutions in
‘recent years stayed there about four or ﬁve months. This issue reflects
the ambiguities of the Court’s objectives: the general committal is
consistent with a therapeutic approach (When he’s rehabilitated, you
let him go) but not with a punishment approach (You only subject
him to reasonable punishment, and indeterminate sentences are not
reasonable, certainly for children). The limit of twelve months will
therefore have little impact on the actual duration of most children’s
committals.
S_uspended Committal. This has been abolished.
Wardship_, Under the Phibbs Report, this will now be available only
for ‘children in need of care and control or protection’ (not for
offenders as well, as under the present law). Note the new provisions
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about wardship, discussed above. There may be problems ahead in the
relationship between the Court and the Wardship Review Tribunal.
‘EXposed to Moral Danger.’ This and similar phrases will be
eliminated, and a good thing too. But it is important to note the
limits of this reform. While most people objected to the language and
moral overtones of the present phrases, others took the more
substantial objection that the phrases were so vague that they gave
too much discretionary power to police and welfare authorities. It is
very difﬁcult to deﬁne these matters in a way which is both speciﬁc
and workable: 1 am not aware of any legislation that has solved the
problem. The new formulations too leave a great deal to the
interpretation of the Courts. Let us hope there will be some reported
cases laying down more speciﬁc guidelines.
 
Some Statistics. In 1973—74, there were 16 752 appearances by boys
and 3 544 girls in Children’s Courts in New South Wales. Of the boys,
7150 appearances were under the Crimes Act, 1641 under the Child
Welfare Act and 7961 under ‘other Acts’. Of the girls, there were
605 under the Crimes Act, 2067 under the Child Welfare Act, and
827 under other Acts.
The main disposition of boys under the Crimes Act were as follows:
probation 3 864
committed to an institution 1 113
suspended committal 462
admonished, discharged etc. 1 099
ﬁned 473
committed for trial 44
There is a similar pattern among the girls.
More girls than boys were dealt with under the Child Welfare Act;
2 067 as against 1 641 boys. Again, the pattern is similar for girls and
boys. For the girls, the numbers are:
probation 1 032
institution 276
suspended committal 8
admonished, discharged etc. 271
ﬁned 1 (—7—)
approved person 193
wardship 19849
These ﬁgures are based on the Department’s Annual Report (1974).
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Decision-making in disposition. In practice, the Department of Youth,
Ethnic and Community Affairs plays a major part in determining what
actually happens to the children. First, there is often a background
report prepared by departmental ofﬁcers. Research confirms the
commonsense impression that these reports have considerable inﬂuence »
on the magistrate. Second, the Department exercises enormous power
over children committed to institutions. It decides which institution
the child goes to; and they can vary from such humane and
innovative places as Talimba to Mount Penang (where Judge Muir
found ‘the facilities are0quite inadequate with the exception of the
dairy and the piggery’so) and the new Reiby School for Girls (which
Judge Muir found to be ‘a magniﬁcient structure ’but added that ‘this
type of accommodation fails to appreciate the real need of girls who
have been committed to an Institution of this type . The cabins
and cells provided for isolated detention might be moreappropriately
used as store rooms’.5) The Department can also decide how long
the child stays, and can move him from one place to another.
Committal for Trial for Serious Offences
The present Act provides that children charged with homicide, rape or
an offence punishable by death or penal servitude for life may be
committed for trial according to law, and as we have seen, this remains the
position under the recommendations. The present Act also provides that
where a child is charged ‘with any other indictable offence and is not dealt
with under S83 of this Act, the Court may commit the child to take
his trial according to law’. The Ph-ibbs Report, following Muir, makes some
more detailed recommendations for the committal for trial of children.
These recommendations are designed to implement the principle that where
a child is charged with an indictable offence which he denies, he is entitled
to trial by jury if he so elects. The recommendations are as follows:
‘Committal for Trial of Children and Young Persons Charged with
Indictable Offences.
Where a young person appears before a Youth Court charged
with an indictable offence which he denies, then the Court shall hold
a preliminary inquiry. lf satisﬁed that a prima facie case is made out,
then the Court shall inform the young person and his parent or
guardian (if present) that he or they may decline consent for him to
be dealt with summarily by the Youth Court and may elect to stand
his trial by jury.
50. Muir, pp. 107—108.
51. ibid., p. 106. It should be remembered that there have been major changes in
institutions in recent years, and these comments do not necessarily reflect the
present situation.
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If the young person or his parent or guardian consents to the
matter being dealt with summarily the Court shall then determine
whether it is a case appropriate to be dealt with in that way. In the
exercise of that discretion, the Court shall take into account the
nature of the allegation and the circumstances associated therewith
and without limiting the generality of this provision shall consider:—
(a) the seriousness of the alleged offence,
(b) whether the offence is alleged to have been committed in
company with a person charged with that offence before
an Adult Court.
(c) the number of indictable offences alleged in these
proceedings against the young person,
(d) whether the powers of the Youth Court are likely to be
appropriate to deal with the young person in the event of
conviction,
(6) any representation made by the prosecution or defence.’52
Stigma and the Destruction of Records
One of the main themes of critics of the Children’s Court system is
the allegedly stigmatic effect of the’proceedings. It is helpful to distinguish
three different strands in these arguments. First, the stigma is said to arise
because of the formal record of conviction. This may prejudice the child
later in life in employment and elsewhere, and may be taken into account
as part of his ‘antecedents’ if he is sentenced for an offence as an adult.
Second, it is argued that children dealt with in the Children’s Court system
suffer by ‘contamination’ — they mix with a ‘rough lot’ of other kids some
of them already hardened criminals, and the training institutions become
places where they learn new and more promising criminal techniques, and
become enmeshed in the ‘criminal sub-culture’. The third strand is one
developed by criminologists and sociologists who have been called ‘labelling
theorists’ or ‘interaction theorists’. I am thinking of such writers as Erving
Goffman, Howard Becker, Jock Young, Edwin Lemert and E. Schur. This
strand of thought suggest that (to put it crudely) people tend to
accommodate their behaviour and self-perceptions to the expectations of
other people, and thus children who are put through a process which labels
them ‘delinquent’ or ‘uncontrollable’ tend to see themselves in this way,
and to proceed to act accordingly. According to this view, these
assumptions and classiﬁcations become self-fulﬁlling prophesies, and the
Children’s Court system, far from bringing these children back to
‘normality’, actually reinforces the behaviour it is trying to eliminate.
52. Phibbs, p. 56—57.
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 The new recommendations are primarily concerned with the first'of
these three strands, that is, reducing or eliminating the prejudicial effect of
formal records. The second strand did not receive much attention, except
that the Report agreed with the present law and practice requiring wards to
be kept separately from ‘delinquents’. The thirdstrand did not surface in
the submissions and does not appear to have impressed itself on the authors
of the Report. (I hasten to add that it is of course highly controversial).
There was considerable agreement in the three reports on this topic,
and the recommendations of Judge Muir53 were accepted by the Holt
Committee54 and the Phibbs Committee.“
The general approach was that children should not be dogged by a
‘record’ in later life, except in cases so serious that the community’s
interest in protection outweighed the child’s right to start his adult life
‘with a clean slate’. For example, it was thought undesirable that a child
who had committed numerous serious offences, say of dishonesty, should be
able to represent himself to prospective employers as honest and should be
dealt with after age eighteen as a first offender.
This approach led to the following recommendations:
Recommendation 67
The term “finding of guilt” should no longer be used and
the term “conviction” should be used where the Court
records a conviction. The Committee recommended that no
conviction be recorded against any child (excepting where
he is found guilty of homicide, rape, or other offence
punishable by penal servitude for life). No conviction
should be recorded against a young person unless the
Court directs.
‘The Court should have power to make any available order
with or without recording a conviction. A conviction should,
generally speaking, be recorded where the public interest requires
and the Senior Youth Magistrate should be given power to set
guidelines for Youth Magistrates in that regard.
‘Where a Court makes an order without entering a
conviction, the ﬁnding that the offence had been committed and
the making of the order shall not be available to any Court,
except a Youth Court before which the child or young person is
brought or any other Court hearing an appeal from the original
proceedings or subsequent proceedings concerning that child or
young person in any Court.
53. Muir, pp. 59—60; 79—80.
54. Holt, pp. 35—36.
55. Phibbs, pp. 63~64.
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‘The same provisions should apply to any case where a
child or young person is brought before a District Court or
other superior Court.’
Recommendation 68
Where a child or young person has appeared before a
‘Youth Court, and it is either proved or admitted that he
has committed an offence, but no conviction is recorded,
then he shall be deemed for all purposes, not to have
appeared before such Court unless within a period of three
years, he appears before any Court and is found guilty of
an offence in which case the Court may order that such
deeming provision does not apply.
‘When a child or young person is brought before an Aid
Panel he shall be deemed, for all purposes other than
appearances before an Aid Panel or Court, not to have appeared
before such Panel unless within a period of three years he is
brought before a Court- and found guilty of an offence in which
case the Court may order that the deeming provisions shall not
apply«
‘Where a child or young person is convicted of an offence,
he may after a period of three years (or such longer period as
the Court shall order) apply to a Youth Court for an order that
he be deemed for all purposes never to have appeared before
such Court, or been so convicted, provided he has not been
found guilty of an offence within a period of three years or
such longer period as the Court shall order from such
conviction’.
‘Any fingerprints, palm prints, photographs, or other
reports, records or information held by the Police Department or
the Department in relation to children and young persons, shall
not be available to persons other than Police Ofﬁcers, Ofﬁcers
of the Parole and Probation Service and Ofﬁcers of the
Department, unless a court or the Director so orders.’
Punishing Parents
One of the difﬁcult questions in the area of child protection is the
use of criminal sanctions against parents who allegedly fail to come up to
some standard of child-rearing. This issue is to be distinguished from laws
simply providing for authoritative intervention into the child-parent
relationship. A law providing for a child to be taken away from his parents
need not require any ﬁnding of parental misconduct or ‘punishment’ of the
parents: conversely, legal action to punish the parents need not involve
taking the child away.
52
Broadly speaking, the present position is that the ordinary laws of
crime apply to parents and children. A parent who injures or kills a child
may be prosecuted for such offences as assault, manslaughter and murder.
Outside the limits of legitimate parental ‘discipline’, the criminal law
regulates physical violence between parent and child just as it does between
other citizens. There has been some development of criminal law principles
to accommodate the dependence of a young child on the adult having his
care. For example, a parent who deliberately starves a child may be guilty
of murder. These principles seem to deal only with physical injury. I am
not aware of any extensions of the criminal law to cover emotional or
psychological deprivation or harm.
Turning to Special statutory provisions designed to ‘punish’ parents for
poor child rearing practices, we find in the Child Welfare Act 1939 the
following provisions:
148. (1) Any person, whether or not the parent of the Child or
young person, who without reasonable excuse neglects to provide
adequate and proper food, nursing, clothing, medical aid, or lodging
for any child or young person in his care shall be guilty of an offence
against this Act.
148A. A person who in any manner tattoos any part of the body
of a child or young person shall be guilty of an offence against this
Act unless he has ﬁrst obtained the written permission of the parent
or guardian of the child or young person to tattoo the child or young
person in that manner on that part of his body.
149. (1) Any person who assaults, ill-treats, or exposes any
child or young person, or causes or procures any child or young
person to be assaulted, ill-treated ,or exposed, if such assault,
ill-treatment or exposure has resulted, or appears likely to result, in
bodily suffering or permanent or serious injury to the health of such
child or young person shall be guilty of an offence against this Act.
85. (1) Where a child or young person is, by the ﬁnding, order
or direction of a court liable to pay a penalty, or compensation,
damages or costs, in reSpect of an offence, and there is reason to
believe that his parent or guardian has contributed to the commission
of the offence by wilful default or by habitually neglecting to exercise
due care of the child or young person a justice may, on information,
issue a summons against such parent or guardian charging him with
contributing to the commission of the offence.
(2) If the court is satisﬁed that the parent or guardian has
contributed to the commission by the child or young person of the
offence by wilful default or by habitually neglecting to exercise due
care of him, the court may order that the penalty, compensation,
damages, or costs shall be paid by the parent or guardian instead of
by the child or young person and may also order the parent or
guardian to give security for the good behaviour of the child or young
person.
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 The Report recommends that these provisions be retained. But i
t
would go further:
‘CHILDREN LEFT ALONE IN HOUSES OR CARS
Recommendation 31
It should be an offence for any person having a child in
his care to leave that child for a time that is unreasonable
having regard to all the circumstances of a case unless he
makes reasonable provision for the supervision and care of
a child during that time, provided that no prosecution
should be brought against a person who is under the age
of I 7 years, not being the parent or guardian of the child
concerned.’
Recommendation 32
Where a child or young person is found in a brothel or
any place where a drug of addiction or prohibited drug is
being administered, consumed, used, smoked, distributed or
supplied the person in charge of that place should be
guilty of an offence against the Act.
A brief comment. My impression is that few competent social workers
would see punitive measures against parents as helpful to the child in the
majority of cases. It is also fairly clear that the existing sanctions in Ss 148
and 149 are rarely used: in many cases where children are committed as
State wards, charges against parents could probably be made out. Only in
the msgst serious cases, such as murder, are criminal proceedings actually
taken.
If the comments in the last paragraph are correct, then it is surprising
and regrettable that the Report’s approach is to extend punitive measures
against parents. My own bias would be the other way; I would look for
ways to limit the use of criminal measures where they would threaten the
possibility of helping the family as a continuing unit, or working with the
parent and child towards rehabilitation while the child is temporarily in
care. I would hestitate to repeal the criminal sanctions, but I would favour
restrictions on prosecutions. In particular, I would like to see a provision
requiring the permission of, or at least consultation with, the Director of
Youth, Ethnic and Community Affairs before any prosecution is launched.
56. John Foulsham, ‘Legal Sanctions and the Rights of the C
hild' Social Welfare
Commission 1975 p. 14: ‘In Western Australia where children ha
ve been abused
by their parents we now have a policy of treating the fami
ly rather than
prosecuting the parents.’
 
See also Duncan ‘Recognition and Protection of the Family’s Interests’ in Child
Abuse Proceedings (1973—74) 13 J. Fam. L. 803.
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The Philosophy of the Recommendations: The ‘Paramount’ Interest of the
Child
After examing some of the mairuecommendations of the Report, it is
worth asking what is the overall direction of the changes; in broad terms,
where is the Phibbs Report taking child welfare law?
The only explicit general philosophy is that the interest of the child is
the ‘basic theme’: p. 88. The new legislation is to include broad policy
directives to the effect that the welfare of the child is to be the paramount
consideration, although the formulations vary within the Report (p. 1:
‘prime con‘sideration’, ‘paramount interest must explicitly be the child’s’; p.
43: interests of the child to be the paramount consideration, but Courts to
‘have regard to the welfare of the child . ..' and the public interest’).57 The
Report also mentions that one result of the Committee’s working together
was a ‘sharpening awareness of how extraordinarily difﬁcult — indeed
frequepstly impossible — it is to predict what will be in the interests of the
child’.
The principle of the paramountcy of the child’s welfare is now
familiar in family law, and has for many years been the legislative guideline
for the resolution of custody disputes. More recently the principle has
found its way into adoption legislation. Its appearance in child welfare law
is still more recent; and when it does appear, it is given cautious, if not
always clear expression.
Legislative variations on the theme between the States are instructive:
VICTORIA
The Social Welfare Act 1970 (Vic) S41 provides that in dealing with
State wards, the Director shall treat the welfare of the child as 'the ‘ﬁrst
and paramount consideration’.
The Children’s Court Act 1973 (Vic) 825(4) provides that: ‘Where the
Court is .. satisfied that the child has committed an offence, or is in need
of protection or is uncontrolled the Court, in making an order in any case
shall ﬁrstly have regard to the welfare of the child but shall also, where
dealing with the child for an offence, have regard to the nature and
circumstances of the offence and to the child’s character history and
previous convictions (if any) . . .’.
57. See also above, p. 54 and footnote 56.
58. Phibbs, p. 88.
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SOUTH AUSTRALIA
Juvenile Courts Act 1971—72 (SA) S3:
3. In any proceedings under this Act, a juvenile court or a
juvenile aid panel shall treat the interests of the child in respect of
whom the proceedings are brought as the paramount consideration
and, with the object of ‘protecting or promoting those interests, shall
in exercising the powers conferred by this Act adopt a course
calculated to —
(a) secure for the child such care, guidance and
correction as will conduce to the welfare of the
child and the public interest;
and
(b) conserve or promote, as far as may be possible a
satisfactory relationship between the child and
other members of, or persons within, his family
or domestic environment,
and the child shall not be removed from the care of his parents or
guardians except where his own welfare, or the public interest, cannot,
in the opinion of a court, be adequately safeguarded otherwise than
by such removal. ' A
Community Welfare Act 1972 (SA).
The following guideline is applicable to the Director in dealing with
children in his care (compare S3 of the Juvenile Courts Act, above):
42. In exercising the powers conferred by this Division, the
Minister and the Director-General shall treat the interests of the child
in respect of whom the powers are to be exercised as the paramount
consideration and shall adopt a course calculated to —
(a) secure for the child such care, guidance and (where
necessary) correction, as will conduce to the
welfare of the child and the public interest;
and
(b) conserve or promote as far as may be possible a
satisfactory relationship between the child and
other members of, or persons within, his family
or domestic environment.
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 However, other provisions stress family welfare: S7, which deals with
the general objectives of the Department, and S37, which deals with the
principles to guide the administration of Part IV of the Act, ‘Family Care’.
These sections provide as follows:
7. Without limiting in any way the operation of this Act, it
is declared that the objectives of the Minister and the Department, in
the administration of this Act, include the following —
(a) to promote the well-being of the community by
assisting individuals, families and sections of the
community to overcome social problems with which
they are confronted and to promote the effective use
of human resources and the full realization of human
potentialities;
(b) to promote the welfare of the family as the basis of
community welfare, to reduce the incidence of
disruption of family relationships and to mitigate the
effects of such disruption where it occurs;
FAMILY CARE
DIVISION I—FAMILY CARE SERVICES
37. The administration of this Part by the Minister and the
Department shall be founded upon the principle that the welfare of
the family is the basis of the welfare of the community, and should
be protected and promoted as far as may be possible.
TASMANIA
Both South Australia and Victoria distinguish between the duty of the
Department in relation to children in care, and the duty of the Court; and
Victoria further distinguishes between offenders and non-offenders. The
Tasmanian provision is less discriminating, and adopts a classic formulation
of the ‘parens patriae’ doctrine.59
Child Welfare Act 1960 (Tas) S4:
4. The powers and authorities conferred on any court or any
person by this Act shall be exercised so as to secure that, as far as is
practicable and expedient, each child suspected of having committed,
charged with, or found guilty of an offence shall be treated, not as a
criminal, but as a child who is, or may have been, misdirected or
misguided, and that the care, custody, and discipline of each ward of
the State shall approximate as nearly as may be to that which should
be given to it by its parents.
59. Largely discredited since Re Gaul: (1967) 387 US 1.
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 NEW SOUTH WALES
There is no general guideline for the Courts. But an amendment in
1973 set out the objectives of the Department:
Youth and Community Services Act ,(1973) (NSW) S 6:
6. (1) This section shall be administered by the Minister
administering the Child Welfare Act, 1939.
(2) The objects of the Minister, in exercising or performing
any of the powers, authorities, duties or functions conferred or
imposed on him by or under any Act, shall be —
(a) to promote, protect, develop, maintain and improve
the well-being of the people of New South Wales to
the maximum extent possible having regard to the
needs of and resources available to the State; and
(b) without limiting the generality of paragraph (a) —
(i) to promote the welfare of the family as the
basis of community well—being and to mitigate
the effects of disruption of family relationships
where disruption occurs;
(ii) to promote the well-being of the community by
assisting individuals, families and groups of
persons to cope more effectively with social
problems confronting them;
(iii) to encourage the establishment of welfare and
other services and facilities as may be required
from time to time to advance the well-being of
children, young persons and other persons in
the community;
(iv) to assist and encourage collaboration among
organisations and individuals engaged in such
activities as are designed to promote the welfare
of members of the community;
(v) to promote and encourage research, education
and training in matters of youth and
community welfare;
(vi) to promote and facilitate the provision by any
Government Department, statutory authority or
other body or person, of other services
necessary or desirable to complement any youth
service or community welfare service; and
(vii) to encourage the making of donations for the
provision of youth and community services.
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 Lawyers will realise that these formulations are not simply different
ways of saying the same thing; and they need not be pious hopes, without
legal consequence. In custody law the phrases ‘paramount consideration’ or
‘ﬁrst and paramount consideration’ have received interpretations ranging
from the only consideration60 to merely the most important of a number
of considerations.“ In adoption law, at least in New South Wales, the
principle that the child’s interest is paramount seems to have the bizarre
result that if the Director sought to dispense with the consent of the poor
parents of a new born baby to its adoption by a loving and more
advantaged couple, the Court could be obliged to dispense with consent and
make the adoption order.62
These formulations show that child welfare law is not directed simply
at the child’s welfare, but that the policy issues are rather more complex.63
(It will be argued later that some of the objectives of the legislation are
incompatible, and that untangling them is the most promising approach for
reform).
Unfortunately, the Report does not explore the complexity of the
issue. In so far as it suggests that the whole legislation should be based on
the paramountcy of the child’s welfare, it is difﬁcult to accept. The new
law, like the old, will include a jurisdiction based on criminal offences such
as stealing and physical violence. This is fair enough; the system is bound
to respond to community feeling that children should be prevented, by
punishment, from doing these things. But it is totally misleading to claim
that a system which is designed to protect the public from children’s crimes
or other misbehaviour is for the children’s own good. (Even in such areas as
neglect, where there is no intention to punish the child, the formula offers
little guidance as to the subtly competing rights of such people as parents,
foster parents, and siblings). In relation to uncontrolled children the
deception is most dangerous, since the ‘protective’ law is often used to
punish children for non-criminal behaviour.
The paramountcy formula is therefore positively misleading about a
large part of the system (mainly the criminal part) and offers limited
guidance for the rest.
60. P. v P, (1964) 5 FLR 452 per Barry J: ‘... “paramount” should be given its
strict interpretation the Court shall concern itself only with the welfare of
the child and not with competing claims of parents.’
61. In Re L (Infants) [1962] 1 WLR 886 (C.A.) per Denning L. J.: ‘. .. whilst it is
the paramount consideration, it is not the sole consideration . .. . It is a matter
of simple justice between [the parents] that he should have the care and
control’.
62. David Hambly, ‘Balancing the Interests of the Child, Parents and Adopters: A
Review of Australian Adoption Law’, a paper presented to the First Australian
Conference on Adoption, February 1976.
63. For a recent study see: Lynne Foreman, Children or Families? Social Welfare
Commission, 1975.
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There is also a danger that it may be seen as something of an open
cheque for public authorities, both judicial and executive. Whatever they do
can be justiﬁed, as it is all ‘for the beneﬁt of the child’."4 Yet there is no
a priori reason why an enlargement of public authority over children should ‘
promote their welfare. Children’s welfare may be endangered by
well-meaning bureaucrats, social workers and Courts as well as by neglectful
parents and the wicked world.65 Of course, the Phibbs Committee realised
this, as can be seen in their recommendations for review of wardship. But
their apparently uncritical acceptance of the paramountcy principle may
have distracted attention away from the need for a hard-headed analysis of
the objectives of the system, and a thorough working out of such issues as
proper limits on public as well as parental authority, the balance between
executive and judicial functions, the concentration of services on the child
or the family as a whole, and many others.
The Basic Structure Remains
It is valuable to look at the Report from a bird’s eye view and ask:
What total effect will these recommendations have?
What will the new system be like?
Without wishing to underestimate the signiﬁcance of the reforms, I
think the answer is that in its basic structure, the system will be the same
as at present. By this, I mean that the system is now characterised, and will
continue to be characterised, by the following features:
1. The State Department of Child Welfare (however titled) is
responsible for child welfare, directly or indirectly. Directly,
through its services to children in their families and those in
residential care administered by the Department. Indirectly,
through its power to initiate Court proceedings, its licensing of
private agencies and foster care, and its general supervisory
functions in the welfare ﬁeld.
2. Children over about ten can be brought to Court and dealt with
if they commit offences. These children and their families will
see these proceedings as punitive. Some of the authorities
concerned will see some of these proceedings as helpful or
therapeutic.
64. See Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child
(Macmillan, London 1973) where the phrase ‘the least detrimental alternative’ is
preferred to the ‘best interests of the child’ for similar reasons at pp. 62—63.
65. For a ‘hands oft” approach see Schur Radical Non-Intervention (Spectrum, 1973).
60
 Children who are seriously disobedient, or run away from home
or school, even if they do not commit offences, may also be
brought to Court and dealt with (under such labels as
‘uncontrolled’). Most of these children and their families will
experience these proceedings as punitive. Most of the authorities
concerned will experience these proceedings as helpful or
therapeutic.
Children who are ill-treated or deprived of what the authorities
(Child Welfare and Police) regard as a minimum acceptable
standard of care may also be brought to Court and dealt with
under such labels as‘ ‘neglected’ or ‘in need of care’.
The legislation deﬁning categories 2 and 3 is in general terms,
forcing the- police and child welfare authorities to exercise
considerable discretion in deciding which children to bring to
Court, and in which category.
In relation to all three groups of children, the Court has wide
powers. In particular, it has power to supervise or direct their
life in the community (e.g. probation) or to remove them to
some form of residential situation. The Court may also have
power to penalize parents and to apply criminal penalties to
children who commit offences.
Court proceedings are instituted either by the police or the
Child Welfare. In most cases, the Court will have available to it
a report on the child and his family and social situation
prepared by welfare, police or other authorities (e.g. education)
and will take this report into account in deciding what order to
make.
Where a Court orders a child to a residential placement, that
place will be administered or supervised by the Child Welfare
Department.
Conclusions
I have suggested that while the Report proposes important reforms,
chieﬂy in the areas of wardship and panels, it does not change the basic
scheme. That raises the question: should the basic scheme be changed? I am
inclined to think it should, and I have argued this point of view
elsewhere.66 However, this is not the occasion for an elaborate discussion,
as it is clear that whatever happens to the Phibbs recommendations there is
66. ‘Reforming the Juvenile Courts‘ 1975 Law Society of N.S.W. Journal 75;'
Minority Report, Annexure B in Bolt 53
See also Ronald Sackville, ‘Poverty and the Law in Australia’ (Australian
Government Commission of Inquiry into Poverty, Aust. Govt. Publishing Service,
1975) Ch 11.
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 no chance that the kind of system I favour will be implemented. However,
it is beyond my resources of self-restraint to refrain from saying something
about it; hence the following paragraphs.
First, I think that the present system is chronically confused about
what it is trying to do. This is demonstrated particularly clearly in the
statutory objectives, set out earlier. In particular it is unclear how far it is
designed to help individual children and their families, and how far it is
designed to protect the public from the criminal and non—criminal
misbehaviour of children. This is, I think, the basic question, and there is
no clear answer to it. Many difﬁculties and controversies reﬂect this
uncertainty: Should delinquent children be placed with wards? Should the
Court have a power of general committal? Should the Court continue to
have jurisdiction over ‘uncontrollable’ children? Should proceedings be
formal or informal, criminal or civil?
Even if we were clear about this issue, further distinctions would have
to be drawn, and further questions raised. Insofar as the system is trying to
help, is it helping the child or the family?67 Who decides whether the
child/family needs help, and what kind of help is needed? How are the
procedures of the system — wardship, court proceedings, panels — relevant
to help? What is the overall impact of the system — do those most in need
of help get it? Are ‘the problems’ correctly identiﬁed? For example, are we
sure that ‘the problem of truancy’ is a problem of children, or parents,
rather than, say, the schools, or a social system that denies children any
useful role until many years after they reach physical and mental maturity?
What justiﬁcation is there to use coercion in the case of those children and
families who don’t know they need help? On what basis do we assert that
they need help, and the kind of help that the system provides? How could
we measure the effectiveness of the helping operation; on what basis could
we say it is doing a good job or a bad job?
Insofar as the public protection job is being done, are we or are we
not using the criminal law on children? If not, why not? Is it because
children do less damage, or are less responsible for their actions, or because
subjecting them to criminal penalties will harm them? If a child perceives
what happens to him as punishment, and the authorities perceive it as help,
which is it? By what criteria do we select one deﬁnition of the experience
rather than the other?
67. On this, see Lynne Foreman, Children or Families? (Social Welfare Commission
1975).
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This list could easily be extended, but 1 hope the substance of this
paper will support the claim that there is no clear answer to these
questions, and yet they seem eminently relevant to any evaluation of the
merits or demerits of the system.
If the confused objectives of the system could be teased out, what
would a coherent system look like? Here is a sketch of one approach:
1. There is a demand in the community that at least some children
should be punished for at least some conduct. This community
demand, however, is probably not very clear, so that there is a
fair amount of room for manoeuvre. It would be politically
acceptable to take the following line:
children should not be punished unless they commit what would
be a crime if committed by an adult.
Everyone would admit, however, that some children who commit
offences need not be punished or taken to Court. (There may of
course be differences about which children.) Further, children
may properly be punished less than adults, and certainly should
not be punished more severely than adults.
There should be, therefore, a system for the punishment of
children who commit offences. It should contain the procedural
safeguards applied in adult courts, because children are as
entitled to justice as adults. It should include a system for
ensuring that those children who should not be punished are not
brought to Court: police cautions, panels, Reporters are all
candidates for this function. It should not punish children more
severely than adults; on the contrary, it should provide a more
limited set of penalties, and perhaps different kinds of penalties
designed:
(a) to be less severe than adult penalties,
(b) to be more relevant to the child’s ability and resources,
and
(c) to avoid disproportionate harm to the child.
There should be a system for helping children and families
which need help, and are unable to obtain help from elsewhere.
This system should not include any form of misconduct as
eligibility criteria, especially not the commission of an offence,
and it should not involve any coercion or any diminution of
people’s rights. In general, the following principles should be
followed:
(a) The system should develop rather than substitute for
people’s own personal, family and community resources.
Social workers in particular should encourage the
development of self-help (such as baby-sitting clubs,
purchasing co-operatives, sharing of second-hand equipment
like babies’ cots, tenants’ associations).
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(b) It should include children and families in the deﬁnition of
their needs and the planning and administration of support
services. .
(c) There should be very open channels of communication
between the helpers and the helped: a large proportion of
resources should be directed to discovering and helping the
clients formulate their own problems and needs.
The above would be the bulk of the child welfare system: a
modiﬁed but frankly criminal system to deal with children who
commit offences as lightly as community feeling will allow; and
a community based, non-stigmatic, non-coercive helping system. I
hasten to add that the latter is not to be identiﬁed with any
diminution of the size of public assistance. I envisage a very
substantial helping effort.
Unfortunately, there will be some needs unmet by this system.
There will be some children at risk from neglectful or abusive
parents, or children so violent or retarded that they cannot be
cared for in the community.
In these cases, there may be a need for coercion, and therefore
the helping system is inappropriate. But the criminal system is
also inappropriate, because the need is not to punish the child.
There must therefore be a third element in the system, the most
difﬁcult and dangerous one: a civil coercive element. Our legal
system is not unfamiliar with this, of course, and it is a
necessary part of our mental health legislation. But that model
shows not only that it is necessary but that it is a very
dangerous jurisdiction, to be watched with great care.
I would therefore establish a third part of the system. It would
have judicial and administrative components. My strongest feeling
about it is that it must be completely separate from the other
two systems. I will not discuss its details here; I have by no
means worked them out. But it would have the following broad
features:
(a) There would need to be an initial judicial ﬁnding that the
system could be brought to bear. This would involve two
propositions:
(i) need for the system, i.e. that the criteria were
satisﬁed, and
(ii) that all other practicable measures had been
exhausted. The criteria would have to be very
carefully drafted, and would obviously be much
narrower than the ‘care’ jurisdiction ,of the Youth
Court envisaged by the Phibbs Report.
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(b)
(C)
(d)
(e)
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The judicial ﬁnding would be made by a Court, but not
the Youth Court. It would be either a special court,
perhaps composed of a Supreme Court Judge, or possibly
the Family Court, if one existed.
The administrative part of the system would be quite
separate from that administering-the ‘helping’ system. If it
were necessary to use the res0urces of the helping system,
they could be ‘purchased’: the idea of purchase of services
is familiar in social work.
There would be a kind of wardship for children dealt with
in this system.
There would be carefully drawn provisions for
representation of all parties, strict adherence to procedure,
and a full set of appeals.
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 PRESENTATION OF PAPER
R. C. Chisholm
I am conscious of a story James Thurber told about a small girl who
was given a _very large book on penguins and after a suitable period of time
she was asked by her mother what she thought of the book. She gave this
due consideration, you must appreciate it was a very small girl and a very
large book, and she said ‘Well, it told me more about penguins than I
wanted to know!’ I am afraid I may have told you more about the Phibbs
Report than you expected to hear at a seminar like this.
The Phibbs Report covers an enormous amount 'of ground. If its
recommendations are accepted there will be criminal sanctions against
parents who leave children for too long in motor cars; there will be a
system of compulsory reporting of abused children; ordinary people who
reasonably suspect that a child has been the subject of cruelty or abuse will
be obliged (presumably upon pain of criminal proceedings) to report it to
the Director and they will be protected from actions of defamation or
otherwise. There will be legislative guidelines designed to ensure that the
interests of children are taken into account; that bail is not unreasonably
refused and that children are not separated unnecessarily from their families.
The Minister will come under a statutory duty to carry out research; The
penalty for parents who do not send their children to school will be raised
from its present small amount (I think 50 cents) to $50.00 per day.
Children and families appearing in Youth Courts are to be given documents
explaining what it is all about. There will be restrictions on the
interrogation of children by police. Phrases like ‘exposed to moral danger’
and ‘uncontrollable’ will ﬁnally disappear, and be replaced by phrases such
as ‘being in need of care and protection and control’ or ‘being deprived of
care and protection and normal development’. Penalties for offences against
the Act will be increased. The age of criminal responsibility will be raised
from eight to ten years. As for children in Institutions, corporal punishment
is to be banned for State Wards and for girls but not for delinquent boys
over ten. Fatigue duties are to be abolished but they are to be replaced by,
and I quote, ‘duties of a constructive nature that promote the welfare of
the training school or remand centre’. Isolated detention is to be abandoned
but segregation is not, so that presumably children and others concerned will
appreciate it is not intended as punishment. Parents of State Wards must
keep the Director informed 40f their current address. If they fail to do so a
court dealing with an adoption application relating to the child (and I
quote) ‘might well take the view that prima facie there was a lack of
normal parental interest in the child’. Further there will be a system of
judicial or quasi-judicial review over decisions taken by the Minister, or as
it will now be by the Director, over State Wards — a recommendation
which in principle I wholeheartedly support.
There is an enormous amount of material in the» Report onwhich
many views can be expressed, but 1 would like to mention briefly one
recommendation in particular: the establishment of Youth Aid Panels. I
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have discussed this at some length in the paper at pages 32 — 38. Youth Aid
Panels are to consist of three persons: a member of the Department, a
lawyer and a member of the community. They will deal essentially with
ﬁrst offenders. Their powers will be limited to counselling and requiring an
undertaking from the parent and child to accept supervision for up to six
months. They will only deal with admitted offences. If the offence is not
admitted, the case will go to the Youth Court. The Aid Panels also have
power to refer matters to the Youth Court when the undertaking is not
honoured.
Aid Panels have been introduced in Scotland and in South Australia
under legislation, and in Western Australia without the beneﬁt of legislation.
The Scottish system is signiﬁcantly different from the South Australian one
and the Phibbs Committee’s recommendations have some ingredients of both
although it seems to me they lean more heavily in the direction of the
South Australian system.
I have mixed feelings about Youth Aid Panels. If they succeed in
diverting from the Children’s Court many children who should not go there
in the ﬁrst place, and particularly ﬁrst offenders, and deal with them more
leniently, with less stigma and perhaps some counselling, then I am in
favour of them, although I do not see them as a ‘cure for juvenile
delinquency’, or even as a vefy signiﬁcant advance. i think they could
simply be useful in stopping unnecessary harm to children. If, on the other
hand, the Panels succeed in widening the net of children who are brought
before the law for their misconduct, if the police and welfare authorities
with Panels are now going to pick up and deal with children who they now
let off with a warning, then I am against them. What I fear most about the
Panels is that it will represent an extension, and in my view an unnecessary
extension, of ofﬁcial power over children who commit relatively minor
misbehaviour.
l have discussed the powers of the Courts at some length in the paper
(p.43). 1 must confess that l have some difﬁculty in following the Phibbs
Report on this, and it is a highly difﬁcult technical area. However it seems
to me that whatever the precise details of the recommendations the
Children’s Court is going to have the same sort of power it has now. It is
still going to have power over those children who commit other than the
most serious offences. It is still going to have power over children who are
uncontrolled or uncontrollable and it is still going to have power over
children who are broadly deﬁned as ‘lacking the normal kind of parental or
other supervision‘.
In the second part of the paper I have dogmatically stated what I
think the Phibbs Report should have said. I am extremely conscious, not
only of my own limitations, but taking up the point that was mentioned
by Dr Wright-Short, the problem of anybody confronting this area and
trying to work in an inter-disciplinary way. I am also aware of the pervasive
dilemmas that seem to face anybody working in this area. How to give
sufﬁciently flexible power to the authorities to protect children who really
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 are adrift without granting the bureaucracy excessive power over people’s
lives? How to balance the rights of children against the legitimate interests
of the public in_not having their cars pinched and their houses broken into?
How to look beyond crude physical distress to more subtle emotional needs
without infringing the needs of children to work out their own emotional
and spiritual destinies? How to work out a proper balance between the
different disciplines and how to draw a proper balance between judicial and
executive power? There are many other dilemmas.
Although I am conscious of these dilemmas, rather than say-
academically cautious things, I thought it was probably more useful to lay
my cards on the table in the last section of the paper. Here I have tried to
outline what I think an alternative child welfare and criminal law system
for children might look like. I believe that at the heart of it a great deal
depends upon how we deﬁne the problems, and the deﬁnition is not given
in the nature of things. If a child runs away from school what sort of a
problem is that? Perhaps it is a problem of truancy so we do something to
the child. Perhaps we send him to another school. We make him go to
school. We send him to Anglewood. Perhaps it is a problem of misguided
parents so we ﬁne them $50.00 a day. Perhaps it is a problem of the
school so we investigate the school. Perhaps it is a problem of a peer
culture which is hostile to the school and violent and hostile to authority.
Let us try and change the peer culture, or remove the child from it.
Perhaps it is the problem of a society that has not enough useful places for
all of its members so that it artiﬁcially extends the period of dependence
well beyond the period of emotional maturity (or what would be maturity
if our schools were not so effective in their tasks).
Once you choose your deﬁnition of the problem it seems to me a
great deal follows in terms of the action that you take. From that point of
view the present Child Welfare and Children’s Courts system seems to me to
be a deﬁning system because it tends to deﬁne by itself, tends to deﬁne
problems as the failures of individuals or failures of families to cope, rather
than the problems of housing in cities, rather than the problems of the
educational system, rather than the problems of the sorts of families that
the Henderson Commission has talked about, the sort of poverty that seems
to be built into our system. I am very apprehensive that even well
intentioned and effective reforms within the present system only succeed in
reinforcing and streamlining a system which wrongly deﬁnes public problems
as personal and individual problems. How can we get away from this?
Essentially it is not just a question of substituting the correct deﬁnitiOns
for_the incorrect ones, it is a question of getting the right people to do the
deﬁning. What we ought to be doing is looking for a system» which shifts
the deﬁning of the problems from us, the nice middle class helpers,
academics and others, on to the people who are most concerned with this—
the children and their families. That is very difﬁcult to do but the scheme
that I have outlined in my paper is an attempt to move in that direction.
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 The scheme envisages a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum are the
children who commit criminal offences, or clearly offences, and we are
doing something about them in order to protect society from what they do.
Our society is not prepared to have children going around breaking into
houses, mugging people, stealing cars. It seems to me that at the criminal
end of the spectrum what we are doing to children is essentially the same
as what we are doing to adults charged with criminal offences. At the other
extreme we have the Child Welfare system which is reﬂected in laws about
battered babies etc., which enables the State to intervene to protect
children and babies who are at real risk from the adults who have them in
their care, or from other adults. It is possible to say of that end of the
spectrum that what is happening is that society is intervening purely to help
and protect the child. In the middle of the spectrum there is a large range
of activity which now goes under such labels as ‘uncontrollable’ and
‘neglected’ ‘exposed to moral danger’ and the like. It tends to deal with
adolescents who run away from home, who cannot be coped with and who
behave in ways which our society does not like but who do not commit
criminal offences and who are not in any immediate serious need that can
be readily deﬁned. The essence of the scheme that I have set out (pp.
63—65) is to retain both ends of the spectrum and leave out the middle.
This middle group represents amajor challenge to our society in terms
of providing them with real alternatives. It seems to me that we ought to
take the view that the only way we can deal with these children is to try
and sell them something. We must remove the whole coersive element of
our system in dealing with this middle range. I think it is right to have a
coersive element for the kids who commit crimes, and we should frankly
acknowledge that we are protecting ourselves from them as we do from
adult criminals. I think it is also right to keep the coersive element at the
other end of the spectrum because there are going to be some parents and
some other adults who will not respond to anything we can do and who
are likely to kill or otherwise seriously harm children in their care. The
State must have a coersive power to protect those children. But this whole
middle area, particularly the adolescents who are trying to discover
themselves and who are running away from difficult home situations,
represent an almost completely unmet challenge to our society to provide
alternatives in which they can participate and which arise out of their own
needs. The relatively few, and typically underﬁnanced, initiatives that have
happened include such things as the Young Peoples’ Refuge, the Drug
Referral Centres and many other activities some of which we do not hear
about. The kind of system I am recommending is certainly not a half
hearted or a mean approach to Child Welfare but it would involve a massive
attempt to ﬁnd out what it is that these children need, to help them to
ﬁnd their own objectives and to have a massive system of voluntary
community support. It seems to me that the Australian Assistance Plan
(although I know that there have been serious problems in its
implementation) is basically correct in theory. Such activities as the Young
Peoples’ Refuge must be supported even if there are risks involved and
serious difﬁculties in its original implementation.
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COMMENTARY
His Honour Judge J. T. Martin, Q.C.
A Judge of the District Court, New South Wales.
Mr Chisholm’s paper deals basically with the changes proposed in the
reports of three Committees and it is necessary in dealing with Mr
Chisholm’s paper to refer brieﬂy to those reports.
The ﬁrst report was by our Chairman, Judge Muir, and he dealt
mainly with Courts and things associated, the second was led by The
Honourable W. J. Holt MLC and the third was a summing-up report on
those and a number of other reports written by a team lead by the
Reverend Father Phibbs. I will refer to them brieﬂy as the Muir, Holt and
Phibbs Reports.
Although Mr Chisholm has dealt mainly with the Phibbs Report I will
deal with the Muir Report because it covers basically the things I wish to
talk about: i.e., the courts and the panels, and because it is fair to say that
the other two reports basically follow the report of Judge Muir. They differ
from his only on details, very important details, of course, such as lowering
the age from eighteen to seventeen, but his report does set out reasons
much more fully than the Phibbs Report. Mr Chisholm expresses
puzzlement at certain aspects of the Phibbs Report; in particular how you
decide between Panels and Courts in respect of jurisdiction. I think that
this Committee was probably trying to follow Judge Muir but having ’no
beneﬁt of lawyers on its team it went a little bit astray in legal
technicalities. I think that if, as we are being told, that a Bill is being
drafted any legal technicalities will be read from the Muir Report rather
than the Phibbs Report.
I have been asked to comment speciﬁcally on the proposal for panels
to replace children’s courts in certain areas. One must almost say it is
probably a fair accompli because the three reports are quite unanimous on
the need for the panels, they are practically unanimous on the reasons for
them.
Mr Chisholm, as you heard and noted from his paper, is a little half-
hearted about them, and he has quite a number of qualms although he did
not dissent in that respect from the Holt Report. He dissented in other
respects but not in that respect. I have recently had the advantage of
reading an excellent article by Miss Helen Gamblel of the Australian
National University also dissenting quite strenuously from the proposal. I
am indebted to both Mr Chisholm’s paper and Miss Gamble’s for some of
the arguments for and against panels that follow.
1. Helen Gamble ‘C‘hildren’s Hearing Panels for N.S.W.'." A.l..J. Vol. 50 1976. P. 68.
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The Muir Report sets out the advantages, and it is true in respect of
quite a large body of children that the stress should be put on counselling
and help rather than 0n punishment. That is the ﬁrst point, to remove a
‘stigma’ (that is Judge Muir’s word) or ‘stigma and trauma’ (Holt and
Phibbs Reports). The second point that Judge Muir makes in favour of the
panels is that he says pragmatically ‘it will reduce the court’s time’, and
that we are going to have increased numbers of courts and naturally
increased crime with the growth in population. It will reduce the number of
courts necessary, and further he says that it will save time of police and
child welfare ofﬁcers. The scheme is to have basically ﬁrst offenders, minor
offenders who admit their guilt, referred to a Panel and not come before a
Court. The Holt Report suggests, and the Phibbs Report follows it, that by
having the child treated by a Panel both the family and the community
become involved.
In considering the case against the Panels the opponents ﬁrst of all
attack the assumptions that are made by the proponents. How is it that
some amateurs (the laymen on the Panels or social workers) will do better
than the Courts? Why are they to do better than experienced Children’s
Courts magistrates? Why can’t the Courts counsel as well as punish, and
prove their skills? How will such amateurs and social workers in a Panel be
able better to communicate with children than the Courts? Can anyone
really communicate in the limited time available? Anyone who has seen the
thing in operation knows that the majority of people who appear are
inarticulate and their parents are equally inarticulate. What will they talk
about? It is said to take thirty minutes in South Australia, the revised
ﬁgure in a recent report after two years experience is forty-ﬁve minutes.
What will they do in the forty-ﬁve minutes? Will they do as a probation
ofﬁcer said in this hall we are not to do — ask the child ‘Why did you do
it?’. The probation ofﬁcer said anyone who asks that is to be treated as a
mug. Has there ever been a case where a child can tell you why he did it?
Will they, as the South Australian Report on the operation of the Panels
suggest, have too great a tendency merely to moralise and threaten the
child? Morality that perhaps the child does not understand, threats that
perhaps may be a little more real. Will they be unable, as the Report
suggests, to deal properly with grief and distress? The South Australian
Report makes those points but I should add that the South Australian
Report is happy in general with the two years of practice by the Panels
there.
The second ground of attack refers to the ‘stigma’ of appearing before
the Court. Will it be any different appearing before a Panel? Is it any
different from having committed the crime, having come under the hands of
the police? On a small point the South Australian Report suggests that the
call up document should be less formal 7 it should not have the coat of
arms on it and so should have less of a stigma about it. Does the stigma
matter much anyway? Isn’t it perhaps desirable that those who have
offended learn that the natural consequence is that you have some sort of a
stigma upon you?
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 Thirdly, how will it really save time? It if saves magistrates’ time
won’t it waste the time of two panel members as Muir proposes, three
panel members as Holt proposes and Phibbs proposes, and at least ﬁve
panel members as another team proposes? Why cannot courts spare that
time if panels can spare that time? Why cannot we have more courts to
spare that time because one only has to see adult offenders to know that it
is the time spent in the children’s area that is the most important? Why
shouldn’t courts have longer hearings? Will the police time, as Judge Muir
suggests, really be saved? Will the welfare ofﬁcers’ time really be saved? The
South Australian Report speaks of the policeman coming to give the facts
and being available to repudiate or to answer disputed facts put by
children. I may say I put this to the Chairman and he tells me he would
not contemplate police and welfare ofﬁcers, district ofﬁcers being there. He
would see that the facts would have to be in some way sorted out in
advance.
Fourthly, as has been mentioned by Mr Chisholm, will the net go
wider? Will the children who now may well be given a police caution,
which often is quite enough, have to appear before the panels? Will they
come into ofﬁcialdom further than at present? Will less serious cases be
brought in? As Miss Gamble suggests, will the children’s court dealing with
cases who have not gone before the panels tend to see themselves more
seriously and assume they are getting the recidivists? I might mention with
regard to the less serious being brought in that this is one small but
important area where the Phibbs Report goes desperately wrong, as
Chisholm points out, in saying that when the Panels come police cautions
will be phased out. I am sure that is due to.the team not having the
advantage of legal assistance. The Muir Report strongly suggests that police
cautions should be retained, that they have been very useful in the past and
will remain useful.
My ﬁfth point concerns dominance by the Department. The Holt and
Phibbs Reports both say that one of the three Panel members should be a
social worker of the Department, the other is to be a lawyer and the third
a layman, or possibly two laymen if legal aid is available. The Muir Report
suggest a social worker nominated by the Department. I questioned the
Judge this afternoon by what he meant by that, and he stated that in the
city it may well be a social worker employed by the Department but in the
country it might be a social worker employed by the Health Department
and in any case (as I understand him) it was meant to leave the matter
open. But if it is to be Departmental ofﬁcers how are the laymen to stand
up to them? Won’t it be really just departmental decisions as against what
we have now which is at least the independence of a magistrate?
Sixth, it is suggested by some of the Reports that the panels may be
useful in allowing the laymen to come from the same neighbourhood as the
children or possibly from the same ethnic groups. It is said that this will be
of great value and it. may well be, but it also seems to me to raise a
problem of privacy. Ethnic groups are sometimes small, neighbourhoods in
the country are sometimes small, and there seems to be quite a serious
privacy problem there.
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Seventh and ﬁnally it could be argued why aren’t the courts better?
, Courts are important for three reasons:
(a) because after all the child is taught if you commit a crime and
it is serious enough not to be cautioned by a policeman, you go
to Court and you take the consequences of your action,
(b) Courts may be fairer and better in assessing the possibility of
false admissions of facts or false pleas of guilty, and
(c) it is suggested, by both Chisholm and Gamble, that the eAistence
of courts may well resist the public backlash against
over-softness in dealing with children.
Gamble refers to a copy of Glasgow Herald2 which she cites as saying
that the panels in Scotland have been an expensive failure.
My personal views started off being a little lukewarm like Mr
Chisholm but, as I thought about it, I gradually became more enthusiastic, and
indeed, I am now an enthusiastic supporter of Youth Panels. Assuming that
a lot of child crime is immature as with adult crime, such as crime of
distUrbed people as in shop thefts, petty burglaries, joy-riding etc., and
assuming that it is in the interests of society, not merely in the interests of
the child, that the child be stopped from crime by counselling and by being
kept from the corruption of crime in institutions where the worst elements
are lumped together so that evil can breed on evil and evil can help evil,
assuming then that rehabilitation is in the interests of society, I think we
can see that the panels are worth, to use a colloquialism, ‘a go’. The Courts
are devoted primarily to punishment. They have books of the crimes and
books of the penalties and we have been reminded lately of a number of
decisions of superior courts that punishment is basically what courts are for.
Courts are devoted to formality, and it is not so easy for courts to
get away from their habitual formality. It is not easy for people and
parents to talk to magistrates. It is less easy when they are being prodded
to stand up. The community stands a reasonable chance that the Panels will
tend to stress the giving of help rather than the giving of punishment.
Justice must appear to be done and not only be done. The panels will be a
community demonstration that the community is trying to get away from
punishment. The community is trying to hold out help to children and
their parents. I think that adopting the Panels will be a demonstration by
the community that it too has a little bit on the side of help and love and
not mere vengeance; that the community is a little on the side of being
opposed to answering hate with hate and violence with violence.
2. ibid., p. 72 ‘Children’s Panels — a Costly Failure’ Glasgow Herald, 8th March
1975.
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 I said there were several problems in regard to the panels that I do
not propose to deal with in detail. There is the constitution, the number,
the jurisdiction and a very serious problem of how you choose whether you
go before a court or whether you go to a panel. The latter problem is too
complex for me to deal with in any detail. The others I will deal with very
brieﬂy. In regard to numbers, the Muir Report says two, Holt and Phibbs
Reports recommend three and other teams say ﬁve. South Australia has
two, Scotland has three. I think that the advocates of two are clearly right.
The more you have on the panel the harder it is going to be for people to
communicate.
Concerning constitution, .the Muir Report suggests a social worker
nominee of the Department, a lawyer, or if there is legal aid, a layman. Legal
aid, I understand, has now been achieved. The Holt Report and Phibbs
Report suggest a social worker of the Department and a lawyer and a
layman or two laymen, and some of them would like to see a lady on too.
South Australia has a police ofﬁcer and a departmental social worker. One
would think, this not in the slightest disrespect to police ofﬁcers who of
course have a most important function in our community, that it would
not be a good idea as they have a different type of function to the panel,
but it was deliberately chosen by people who are drawing up a liberal law
in South Australia and the Report says that it works basically well.
Scotland has, as you read in the Chisholm paper, a Reporter, 3 sort of
clerk to the justices, and a couple of laymen. Here again I would have
thought that the best that we can do is Judge Muir’s suggestion i.e. a social '
worker nominated by the Department but not of the Department.
At the end of the Chisholm paper he says ‘the basic structure
remains’. I think he is far too pessimistic, and I think that the basic
structure under the Recommendations is in for some serious and important
changes. You will read his views further both in the Law Society Journal of
April 1975 and his minority report to the Holt Report. There is an
excellent article to the same effect in Chapter 8 of Morris & Hawkins The
Honest Politicians Guide to Crime Control. Chisholm’s thesis is that there
ought to be a sorting out of the protection angle from the welfare of the
child angle. 1 agree with him in general but not entirely. I think that all
that needs to be achieved are two of the things that he seeks to achieve
and two of those things I think the Muir Report itself seeks to achieve.
The ﬁrst, of course, is the attempt to abolish the victimless crimes of
children. There has been a lot talked about the victimless crimes of adults,
there are beyond any doubt victimless crimes of children. The three main
ones Chisholm has mentioned; running away from home, truancy, and sex,
the latter particularly by girls who come under ‘exposed to moral danger’
category. I agree with Chisholm that the sooner they are off our statute
books the better. We must try to deal with them by some form of help
and not as they are still dealt with—by locking up. What he overlooks is that
in the Muir Report there are a number of attempts to deal with these
problems. ‘Exposed to moral danger’ is gone. It is true that it is replaced by
‘care, control and protection’ but that is not the same. The emphasis is
quite different. It is possible to say that a girl of 17% who slept with her
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boyfriend is ‘exposed to moral danger’ but it may not be as possible to say
she‘is in need of ‘care, control and protection’. Judge Muir in his Report
refers to the very question of whether it is in accordance with modern
thinking and the modern situation that a seventeen or sixteen year old girl
should be locked up for ‘immorality’, as it is called.
As for truancy, the Muir Report draws attention to conditions that
the Judge apparently found at Anglewood where truants were treated more
severely than criminal children. They were there for a longer time, they did
not get any weekend leave as people at ordinary boarding schools do. As
for running away from home, again in the Muir Report the emphasis that
the onus is against locking up and that we endeavour to deal with this
problem. '
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DISCUSSION
J. M. Callaghan S.M., previously Special Magistrate, Children’s Courts
Perhaps we expect too much if we anticipate that the Phibbs Report
will be enacted exactly according to its recommendations. In some of my
conversations with the senior members of the Department I understand that
they are fairly sceptical about some of the recommendations.
I have no objection to panels provided that they are composed of
people who know what they are doing. However, it could well be that the
same District Ofﬁcer on the panel then has to supervise the boy in a
supportive role. The other alternative is a magistrate who may not have had
any special experience with children. I am very conscious of the changes
that Richard Chisholm is wanting to bring about but it is just not possible:
that is the alternative of the coercive structure of courts and departmental
ofﬁcers such as The Young Peoples’ Refuge, the Drug Referral Centre, some
of the Church organizations, the Wayside Chapel and so on. Such
organizations cannot cope adequately with the problem.
It may be that you can resettle some children back with their families
but the children that come before the court are not usually those who have
done absolutely nothing wrong. There are children from comparatively
‘good’ families who have become involved in car stealing — such cases may
be dealt with by a caution or by a panel or some other means. But in the
‘neglect’ area, where it is the conduct of the child itself which is the cause
of him coming to court you will find that usually psychiatrists, social
workers, the Child Welfare Department, and the police have all tried to
inﬂuence such a child before he comes before the court. There are some
exceptions, such as police raids for drugs, where some children without any
drugs on them are charged with ‘uncontrollable’; or cases where a genuine
dispute exists between a parent and a child, perhaps over their companions,
but the Child Welfare Department is very much alert to try and prevent
children facing a court. The police appear to be a little more willing,
because it is their more normal course of action.
Panels could provide a greater degree of community involvement in
the welfare of children. Most of the children who get into strife do so
because they do not have the support that they need. They do not have
the support either at home, or of a peer group, and they have not the
experience and the maturity to develop a life style on their own. This is
not going to be a short term job for anybody, it is a long hard grind all
along the line. It is no use ‘wagging your finger’ at them. Those who will
reform do not need to be worried about — their parents will pick up the
tag and will be quite adequate to handle the problem. The children that
cause concern are those whose parents cannot handle them.
I sympathise very much with Mr Chisholm’s point of view. If only we
could get our community organisations running the way that he wants
them, probably we could organise our system in the way that he would like
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 it. I tried hard during my period with the children’s courts to involve as
many community organisations as I could, but I was left empty handed in
many cases. Nobody wanted these children, so I had to send them to a
Child Welfare Home. This is not a criticism of the Child Welfare Homes but
indicates that we do not have the more acceptable alternatives.
John Parnell, S.M., Department of Justice, N.S.W.
I want to start with a view that I have held: familiarity makes you
case hardened. That is a dangerous situation and indeed it is probably
untenable when you are making decisions dealing with peoples lives. I am
concerned that the new proposals are for permanent youth court personnel,
and I wondered if Mr Chisholm would comment on the proposition that
‘familiarity is the thief of compassion’ notwithstanding whether there is a
case for stafﬁng the new youth courts on a rotational basis from the ranks
of the existing magistrates or judges.
Peter Quinn, Department of Youth and Community Services
I would like to comment on that last suggestion. It was not my
understanding that that was envisaged. I am sure that it was not contained
in the Muir Report. I do not think that it would receive general support
from the Department of Youth and Community Services, nor do I think
that it would receive general support from the Justice Department. The
Justice Department has in fact moved in the opposite direction in recent
years, and my personal view is that the present turnover of magistrates at
regular intervals is entirely justiﬁed.
I would like to make one other comment on the proposition that
Richard Chisholm raised about the so-called middle group who are said to
be involved in victimless crime. I presume that means those children who
are uncontrollable or are uncontrolled, neglected, or run away from home
or do not go to school. I suggest that his view is a very naive one. In
justice to the Phibbs Report, the Committee was asked to review the
legislation and not to propose a system of social treatment of children.
This middle group is a group of children who confront society and proclaim
the fact that they are uncontrolled. It does not matter whether the
terminology is ‘exposed to moral danger’, ‘neglected’ ‘uncontrolled’, give it
whatever name you like, the Phibbs Committee calls it ‘in need of care and
control or protection’. This particular group of children does confront
society, and it will not go away just by suggesting that we can provide
better facilities in the community.
Those facilities do not exist in country areas of this State and, even if
they did exist, what about the rights of the child who, for example, does
run away from another State and is located in a country town or even in
this city? Is that child to be forcibly taken to one of those facilities?
Where is the justice in that? The child is not being given the basic justice
of appearing before a court or some other tribunal.
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PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW
G. H. McLennan, S.M.,
AMember of the Child Welfare Advisory Council
It is well recognised that the Child Welfare Act 1939, does not
adequately provide for the welfare of our children. An extensive review has
been undertaken and we look forward to the introduction of new legislation
which, whilst giving due recognition to the need for protection of the
public, ensures that the welfare of the child will be the paramount
consideration.
All the recommendations which have been made for legislative change
were uniform in that it should be enacted and speciﬁcally declared in the
new Act that, the welfare of the child should be paramount. In England,
the Children and Young Persons Act of 1933 laid down a ﬁrst and guiding
principle in which the English Juvenile Courts should approach their task:
‘Every Court in dealing with a child or young person who is
brought before it, either as being in need of care and protection, or
as an offender or otherwise, shall have regard to the welfare of the
child or young person, and shall in a proper case take steps for
removing him from undesirable surroundings and for securing that
proper provision is made for his education and training.’
This provision _was hailed by many as a most significant and
progressive step forward, which undoubtedly it was, but it might be
considered to provide a rather limited protection when compared with S3
of the Juvenile Courts Act 1971 (South Australia), viz:
‘In any proceedings under this Act, a juvenile court or a juvenile
aid panel shall treat the interests of the child in respect of whom the
proceedings are brought as the paramount consideration and, with the
object of protecting or promoting those interests, shall in exercising
the powers conferred by this Act adopt a course calculated to
(a) secure for the child such care, guidance and correction as
will conduce to the welfare of the child and the public
interest; and
(b) conserve or promote, as far as may be possible, a
satisfactory relationship between the child and other
members of or persons within, his family or domestic
environment,
and the child shall not be removed from the care of his parents or
guardians except where his own welfare, or the public interest, cannot,
in the opinion of a court, be adequately safeguarded otherwise than
by such removal.”
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No such statement is to be found in the Child Welfare Act 1939, and
viewed in the light of its historical background this, perhaps, is
understandable. Indeed, if one compares the provisions of Ss 82 (2) (e), 83
(3) and 83 (4) with those of Ss 554, 556 A and 558 respectively of the
Oimes Act 1900 (as they were before the 1974 amendments) and if one
keeps in mind the words of Ss 82 (e), 83 (l) (c) and 83 (2) (d) under which
a child or young person found to be neglected or uncontrollable, or to have
committed an offence, may be committed to an institution for a period
not exceeding three years, it seems clear that it was intended not only that
the Children’s Court possess punitive powers but that such powers were at
least co-ordinate and not in any way subservient to the Court’s protective
powers.
‘It is one of the cliches of the literature that the system
reflects combination or confusion of two objectives, the criminal and
the welfare. More precisely, the scheme involves two identiﬁable
patterns of assumptions, attitudes, procedures and objectives. The ﬁrst
has been described as ‘criminal’ or ‘legal’ or ‘punitive’, and centres on
the notions of individual responsibility and punishment, justice
through legal rules and procedures, the offence as the reason for court
intervention, the protection of the community through sanctions, and
punishment which bears a reasonable relation to the offence. The
second ‘welfare’ or ‘paternalistic’ set centres on needs and services,
jurisdiction founded on evidence of individual need, therapy and
benevolence, flexibility and wide powers to accommodate varying
needs, a dominance of professional judgments and preference for
administrative and consultative decision-making processes . .. My
present view is that what is wrong is precisely this ambivalence of
objectives. Protection of rights and due process inevitably lead to
procedures and principles which are quite unsuitable for a helping
operation; measures designed to promote more effective social work
inevitably make the civil libertarians scream.’l
These observations highlight what 1 see as the area of greatest
difﬁculty with the present legislation so far as it applies to Children’s
’ Courts. Is this a situation where the Court should adopt a punitive or a
protective approach? There will always be cases where punitive measures
will be proper. Sections 42 and 43 of the Juvenile Courts Act 1971 (South
Australia) provide for this. But a clear statement of legislative intention
would ensure that in whatever action it takes, the Court must keep the
welfare of the child foremost in its mind.
Legal Difficulties arising from Statute
Other examples are readily available of legal difﬁculties which arise by
force of the statute itself in cases where the Court desires to act
protectively. I will try to deal with a few of them.
1. Richard C. Chisholm ‘Reforming the Juvenile Courts’ Law Society Journal April
1975, p. 75, at pp. 77—78.
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 There are only three types of order which may be made
removing a child or young person from his home: .
(a) by Ss 82 (c), 83 (l) (b), or 83 (2) (b), he may be committed
to the care of some person who is willing to undertake
such care upon such terms and conditions as may be
prescribed or as the Court, in any special case, may think
ﬁt and for such period of time (whether expiring before or
after the date upon which the child or young person
attains the age of eighteen years) as the Court may think
ﬁt;
(b) he may be committed to the care of the Minister to be
dealt with as a ward admitted to State control: 83 82(d),
83(1)(d) or 83(2)(c);
(c) by Ss 82(d), 83(1)(d) or 83(2)(d), he may be committed to
an institution either generally or for some speciﬁed term
(whether expiring before or after the date upon which the
child or young person attains the age of eighteen years)
not exceeding three years.
I think the view is well held that orders of committal to the
care of some person or committing a child or young person to
be dealt with as a ward admitted to State control ought not to
be used where the child or young person is clearly delinquent.
These orders should be used in the case of dependent child for
whose welfare placement away from'his family (where he has
one) must be considered. Section 21, in providing for the
establishment of depots, homes and hostels when contrasted with
S49 providing for the establishment of institutions, may be
thought to lend some support to this view. Homes and hostels
will be seen to be for the reception and maintenance, or
accommodation and maintenance, of the persons referred to in
paras. (b) and (c) of 821, whereas institutions are declared by
S49(b) to be for the reception, detention, maintenance,
discipline, education and training of children and young persons.
Also, by S 53(2), ‘No ward who has not been committed to an
institution by a Court shall be placed in or transferred to an
institution set apart for the reception, detention, maintenance,
discipline, education and training of juvenile offenders’.
Reference will be made later to the question of expunging
7 records, but that area aside, an order committing a juvenile
offender to wardship or to the care of some person willing to
undertake his care, must be prefaced by a ‘ﬁnding of guilt’. In
these cases, it seems clearly wrong that, the Court having
accepted the child as dependent, such child must first have a
‘ﬁnding ’of guilt’ recorded against him in order to provide the
change in arrangements for his custody or care. Take, for
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 example, the child whose larcenies have been committed at the
suggestion of his parents (we do have our Fagins in modern
society) who asks to be permitted to remain in a shelter, saying:
‘I’ll get a good feed here’.
True, the information could always be withdrawn, or the child
dealt with by admonishment without finding of guilt under
S 83(3)(b) and a complaint made under S 72(j) alleging that he is
under incompetent or improper guardianship. Evidence to
support the complaint must be available and it may well be that
whereas the commission of the offence will be admitted or is
capable of proof beyond reasonable doubt, evidence of the
defective guardianship, even on a lesser standard of proof,
cannot be obtained. After proof of the‘offence, the provisions
of 889(2) under which the Court is required to receive and
consider reports (when tendered) setting out the details and
results of investigations into the antecedents, home environment,
etc., of the child, may well result in there being disclosed a
state of affairs which could not, because of practical problems
of proof, be established in support of the complaint. But where
the Court’s jurisdiction is founded on proof of the offence, a
ﬁnding of guilt will necessarily be recorded.
South Australia, Juvenile Courts Act 1971 S43(2)(d), has met
this situation by providing that the Court upon convicting the
child, or without convicting him, may place him under the care
and control of the Minister for a period, speciﬁed by the Court,
of not less than one nor more than two years. It will be
observed that in New South Wales, proceedings for neglect or
uncontrollability are by way of complaint, and do not in any
event involve a ‘finding of guilt’ (the term substituted for
‘conviction’ by $128 of the Child Welfare Act 1939).
Where a child is alleged to be neglected within S 720) in that he
is under incompetent or improper guardianship, it is important, I
think, to ask: ‘Who are the defendants?, or more properly,
perhaps, ‘respondents’. Is it merely the child? or the child and
his parents? or just his parents?’ Most, although not all, of the
other paragraphs of S72 relate only to acts or defaults of the
child. Section 89(1) directs the court, if satisﬁed that a prima
facie case in support of the complaint has been made out, to
give the child or young person or his parent an opportunity to
call evidence, and to hear any evidence that may be tendered by
or on behalf of the child or young person. The Court may, in
any case, and shall, if the parent or guardian can be found and
resides within a reasonable distance, require the parent or
guardian to attend and be present during all stages of the
proceedings, unless satisﬁed that it would be unreasonable to
require his attendance: 881(2). Police are required to cause the
parent or guardian to be warned to attend at the Court: S 81(3),
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 and the Court may bring the parent to Court by warrant:
S81(4). But under 881(1): ‘Where any child or young person is
brought before a Court as a neglected or uncontrollable child or
young person or is charged with an offence and is brought
before a Court, the Court may thereupon hear and determine
the matter or charge”.
Certainly, the provisions of the Act are not as clear as one
might wish, but it seems to me that the child’s parents are not
parties in the proceedings. The Court may, in a proper case,
proceed without them, and it is only where they can be found,
that there is a requirement of notiﬁcation that the child is at
Court.
The difﬁculty which sometimes arises is this: suppose a girl
complains of misconduct amounting to incest on the part of her
father. She gives evidence on oath of what she says has
occurred, but there is no corroboration of her testimony. The
admissions she has made out of Court will be evidence in
support of the complaint under S720), but no evidence against
the parent, in the absence of admission. If her own admissions
are given sufﬁcient weight, the complaint, insofar as the girl is
the respondent, may be found proven, but if the parent(s) are
to be regarded as parties to the proceedings, her admissions
made out of Court would be of no avail so far as it was
necessary, if at all, to establish that the parent(s) are improper
or incompetent guardians. There are cases, too, where the only
evidence offered in support of the complaint, consists of the
admissions made by the child out of Court and where the child,
despite her anguish, will not ‘tell anyone else because I do not
want my parents to get into trouble’.
Sub-sections (2) and (3) of SS9 bring forward another set of
problems. In very many cases reports tendered under S 89(2) will
contain information which has been volunteered in conﬁdence,
and the reports will be accompanied by a request that their
contents, or some part of their contents, be not disclosed to the
child, his parents, or both. And yet this information, if acted
upon, will without doubt inﬂuence the Court in its
determination. Quite apart from the provisions of ss (3) which
permits, rather than requires, such reports to be made available
to the child’s counsel or solicitor, it seems only just that the
material contained in these documents be communicated to the
child and his parents where the Court feels it might be acted
on. How else could such information be rebutted? Perhaps that
situation is met by adopting the view that if the person
volunteering such information will not agree to its disclosure; it
should be disregarded. It does become rather difﬁcult, however,
if that view is taken and the information in question has come
from the boy’s mother, that either he or his friends will ‘ﬁx
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 her’ if she tells anyone that she cannot control him, and when
she has already been provided with a sample of what to expect
by being hit by said son with a laundry stick!
In South Australia, the Juvenile Court is speciﬁcally empowered
to order the whole or any part of a report shall not be made
known to the child or his parent or guardian, if it is of opinion
that the report contains material which, if disclosed to the child,
or his parent or guardian, may be prejudicial to the welfare of
the child: Juvenile Courts Act (South Australia) 1971, 843(3).
Section 83(3) permits the Court to make one of several orders
without proceeding to a ‘ﬁnding of guilt’, but it will be noted
that the welfare of the child alone is not sufﬁcient to warrant
such a course, because as well, regard must be had to ‘all the
circumstances of the case’. Section 556A of the Crimes Act
1900, is now certainly in terms more favourable to an adult
offender since the Court may have regard to ‘any other reason
which the Court thinks it proper to consider’. Section 556A was
introduced to the Crimes Act in 1929, whereas S83(3) came to
the Child Welfare Act in 1923, but even before the amendment
to S 556A in 1974, this latter section was drawn in wider terms
than its counterpart in the Child Welfare Act.
A child before a Children’s Court for a summary offence may,
of course, ‘be dealt with according to law’: S83(1)(e), in which
case S 556A may be used in lieu of S 83(3) but where he is there
for an indictable offence, he may not be so dealt with unless
committed for trial or sentence to the District Court — not
really an acceptable way of providing for him a solution which,
because of a strict reading of 883(3), may not be available to
him under the Child Welfare Act.
Section 91(3), inter alia, permits an order of committal to the
care of a person to be terminated at any time by the Court or
judge imposing the same. The section is silent as to who may be
parties to the proceedings. To what extent, if any, does the Act
permit the person having the care of the child to participate? Is
he entitled to be heard, to call and to give evidence, to
cross-examine the witnesses? To what extent, if any, may the
Director be heard? May the Court receive reports?
Section 89(2) would not seem to apply. Perhaps the answer is
that it is for the Court to determine the answers to these
questions in the light of the particular case. It would seem right
that as reports must be considered before the order of
committal was made, they should equally be considered before
the order is unmade. This is what does happen in practice.
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 It would also seem right that the person having the care should
be heard, where he wishes to be, since he will have intimate
knowledge of the child’s strengths and weaknesses and may well
be in a position to offer helpful evidence as to the present
relationship between the child and his parents and perhaps also
as to the parents’ attitudes and capacity to give the child
adequate care.
The Act has been the subject of much criticism because it
provides no method for judicial review of an order of committal
to wardship after the right of appeal has passed or been
exhausted. In Ex parte the Minister for Child Welfare, re
Hancock and anon, Court of Appeal (NSW) on '14th September
1967, it was held that a Children’s Court which had granted an
application to terminate such an order was without jurisdiction
to do so. In upholding the appeal, the Court of Appeal made
the following observations:
‘What does emerge from the matters raised in this
case is that a court or judge should be very loath to take
action under 882(d) which has the effect of permanently
depriving parents of the guardianship and custody of their
children without any right of review thereafter by the
court or the judge. In the present case, the order having
been made, the question calling for consideration is solely
what is the effectof that order. However, the effect of
the order being to deprive parents permanently of the
guardianship and custody of their children unless an
administrative rather than a judicial decision is made to
restore the children to the guardianship and custody of the
parents, a court should not make such an order unless it is
satisﬁed that no other course under section 82 would have
been better suited to the occasion.’
The Child Welfare Legislation Review Committee has
recommended that a Wardship Review Tribunal be set up to
meet these objections.2
Creation and Maintenance of Criminal Records
What is a criminal record? Probably it is the record of convictions and
orders of the Courts maintained by the Police Department at the Central
Fingerprint Bureau which we have in mind when this term is used. But
criminal records will also include the minutes of convictions and orders and
the indices of names of persons appearing maintained in the Court ofﬁces;
entries in charge and other books kept at police stations and records of
children and young persons dealt with in Children’s Courts kept by the
Department of Youth, Ethnic and Community Affairs.
Welfare Legislation Review Committee Report, August, 1975:
Recommendations 46 and 48.
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If motor trafﬁc offences are included there will be a record at the
‘Department of Motor Transport of the convictions of and trafﬁc
infringement notices paid by the owners and drivers of motor vehicles. The
Public Transport Commission keeps a list of railway offenders; ' the
Department of Main Roads records offences such as overloading of heavy
vehicles on main roads; the Commissioner for Taxation notes offences under
the tax Acts; the Board of Health offences under the Public Health Act and
local municipal and shire councils are usually able to inform a Court
whether a person found guilty at the suit of the council has any prior
convictions under the Local Government Act and Ordinances. No doubt
other governmental agencies maintain similar reference systems.
The offences of which records are kept cover the whole spectrum of
infringements under a multitude of laws. But since it is the Police
Department which keeps details of criminal offences, my remarks will apply
primarily to them.
It might be assumed that in the beginning a record system was
established for convenience and as an aid to memory, but that as time
passed and scientiﬁc methods of identiﬁcation were recognized, the
identiﬁcation of persons charged and of those convicted became of at least
equal importance as are the details of their proven criminality on past
occasions. It may be fair to say that these entries have been made primarily
for the information of the police and of the Courts.
Section 353B of the Crimes Act authorises the taking by the
Ofﬁcer-in-charge of the Police Station of such particulars as may be deemed
necessary, including his photograph, ﬁngerprints and palm prints, for the
identiﬁcation of a person in lawful custody for any offence punishable
summarily or on indictment. Other than for the provisions of this section, I »
am not aware of any statutory authority in New South Wales for the
creation and maintenance of criminal records.
Should Records be Expunged?
There is no question that a conviction might have consequences for
the offender going far beyond the punishment ‘which the Courts may
lawfully impose for the offence. A conviction can follow an offender as his
shadow: from it he may never shake himself free. The penalty itself will
pass, but the fact of conviction will not.
The eligibility of a certain candidate who had been elected to
parliament in Victoria was challenged on the ground that he had been
convicted of felony by order of a Children’s Court when he was about 16
years old, since which time there had been no further such conviction. He
had been released on a good behaviour bond which had expired many years
previously. In the result he was held to be ineligible by reason of the
Children’s Court conviction. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of
Victoria outlined the history of the use of the term ‘felony’ since the
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 seventeenth century and held that it is not an essential characteristic of
felony that it should be triable on indictment or presentment or in a Court
which tries criminal charges with a jury, and that a conviction in a
Children’s Court of a crime which is a felony under the Crimes Act 1958
(Victoria) is accordingly a conviction of a felony within the meaning of S 73
of the Constitution Act (Amendment) Act 1958 of that State: Re Walsh
[1971] VR 33.
Similar provisions are to be found in New South Wales. The
Constitution Act 1902, S34(e), provides that if any member of the
Legislative Assembly is attainted of treason or convicted of felony or any
infamous crime, his seat in such Assembly shall thereby become vacant.
Section 19(f) of the same Act places a Legislative Councillor under the
same disability.
Examples are to be found in a number of Acts of this State, for
example, Public Service Act 1902, 861(1): ‘if any ofﬁcer is convicted of
any felony or other infamous crime he shall be summarily dismissed’; the
Government Railways Act 1912—1957, S60: ‘if any officer is convicted of
any felony or is sentenced to imprisonment for any term of or exceeding
six months he shall be deemed to have vacated his ofﬁce’.
I do not seek, in this paper, to make out a case to relieve the public
servant or the parliamentarian from these disabilities. I have referred to
them because this seminar is concerned with the protection of children and
these provisions are as relevant to them in their future lives as they are to
any adult. It must be remembered that subject to the necessary proofs, a
child of eight years may be convicted of ‘felony or other infamous crime’!
I have already referred to the restricted availability of 883(3) of the Act
and I think there are very few who would argue that the law should be left
in such a state that a child of such tender years could suffer these
disqualiﬁcations.
I have used the word ‘conviction’ in relation to children in this
context advisedly because I suggest that the provisions of S 128: “that the
words ‘conviction’, ‘sentence’ and ‘imprisonment’ shall cease to be used in
relation to children and young persons dealt with summarily” (my
emphasis) do not achieve their undoubted object of seeking to remove the
stigma of criminal conviction from the Children’s Court.
Walsh’s case has been referred to above, and there is very recent
authority in our own State for my proposition. Certain children aged 11 to
14 years appeared before a Children’s Court, one of them charged with
stealing a wallet containing $300.00 and» the others each with receiving
$50.00 knowing it to have been Stolen. One was acquitted, two were
released on probation and the fourth boy’s case was adjourned for the
purpose of obtaining reports. The three boys who were not acquitted
commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court under S 112 of the Justices
Act 1902 for prohibition and one of the questions which arose for
determination by the Court was whether there had been a ‘summary
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conviction or order’ in all or any of the several cases. Yeldham J. observed:
“Two things at least emerge from a number of the authorities which I have
consulted. The ﬁrst is that ‘conviction’ related to proceedings begun by way
of information [as, necessarily, were these proceedings*] and ‘order’ to
those initiated by a complaint; the second is that ‘conviction’ is commonly
used with two different meanings. Sometimes it is used to mean the final
disposal of a case and sometimes denoting a finding of guilt”.3 His Honour
went on to say: “Accordingly I am of the view that, in relation to each
plaintiff there is a, ‘summary conviction or order’ notwithstanding that, in
the case of the first plaintiff, no penalty has been imposed, and in the case
of the other plaintiffs, that the provisions of S83 of the Child Welfare Act
were invoked”.4
So that, in my submission, where a finding of guilt has been made
upon an information charging a child or young person with an offence, he
will, under the existing law be subject to precisely the same future
diSqualiﬁcations as is an adult convicted. These disabilities can, of course,
be relieved by changes in the law and I will refer to methods which have
been adopted in some other places.
In South Australia (except in cases of homicide), an embargo has been
placed upon the charging of a child under 16 years of age with an offence;
but a complaint may be made alleging that the child is in need of care and
control: Juvenile Courts Act 88(1). It must then be established that the
offence charged was committed AND that the child is in need of care and
control of a kind that may be provided pursuant to the Act, before any
order may be made: S42(1). No conviction shall be recorded: 842(2).
Where the child at the time of the commission of the offence had
attained the age of 16 years, the Juvenile Court may make a variety of
orders, including the imposition of a ﬁne or placing him under the care and
control of the Minister for a period of not less than one nor more than
two years; 842(2), but any one of its orders may be made ‘with or without
convicting him’.
The Children’s Court Act 1973 (Victoria) does not contain a similar
embargo. The Court is invested with jurisdiction to hear and determine
indictable and summary offences (excluding homicide) subject to the right
of the child or his parent to elect to be tried by jury where the offence is
indictable; S 14/15, the Children’s Court has at its disposal, upon proof of
an offence, a number of orders some of which are to be made ‘without
convicting him’ and others ‘whether convicting him or not’. However, an
offender may be sentenced to detention (and where under 15 years of age
at the date of the conviction to the care of the Department) only after
conviction: 826(1).
My comment.
3. Dixon v McCarthy (1975) 1 NSWR p. 617 at p. 623.
4. ibid., at p. 625.
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Provisions somewhat similar to those in South Australia were enacted
in England by the Children and Young Persons Act 1969, its object being
to keep children under 14 years of age out of Court unless the Court could
first be persuaded that the child was in need of care, protection and
control which he would be- unlikely to receive unless the Court were to
make an order under the section with respect of him: S 1(2)(f). It
withdrew. from the magistrates much of their sentencing power in respect of
children under 14 years of age: S 1(3). However, care must be taken in'
reading it because some important provisions have not yet been brought into
force, and because of the non-implementation of some sections, it would
appear that it still leaves a child above the age of ten years liable to
prosecution in the Children’s Court.
‘It may happen that the offence condition is satisﬁed but that
the need for care and control is not established. The Court may make
no order in respect of the juvenile except for an order for
compensation, but he is left with a ﬁnding or guilt against him.’5
In his Report to the Minister for Youth and Community Services on
‘Certain Parts of the Child Welfare Act and Related Matters’ His Honour
Judge Muir has recommended that in all matters dealt with by the Youth
Court6 or by the District Court on appeal, no conviction or finding of guilt
shall be recorded unless the Court so directs and he envisaged that the
power to direct that a conviction be recorded should be used only in the
case of serious offences found proven, or where the young person is a
repeated offender. He suggestedthat any action to expunge the record of
any“ conviction should be more appropriately dealt with in any overall
consideration of this matter in respect of all offenders whether adult or
child or young person;7 and that where a young person is tried by jury in
the District Court or the Supreme Court (excepting homicide, rape, or other
offence punishable by penal servitude for life) it again be provided that no
conviction shall be recorded unless the Court so directs.8
Judge Muir also recommended that:
(a) in the case of children under 14 years of age, except for
homicide and other offences punishable by penal servitude for
life, the commission of an offence should no longer be sufﬁcient
ground for such children to be brought before a Court — that it
should be necessary as well to show such child to be in need of
care and control;9
5. A. E. Bottoms, J. D. McClean and K. W. Patchett: ‘Children, Young Persons and
the Courts H a Survey of the New Law’, Criminal Law Review (1970) 368 at
376.
6. Youth Court is the name proposed instead of the present title of Children’s
Court.
7. Judge Muir’s Report pp. 59-60.
8. ibid., p. 60.
9. ibid., p. 44.
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/(b) the age of criminal responsibility be raised from 8 to 10 years;10
(c) non-judicial bodies to be known as Aid Panels be established to
deal in the main with ﬁrst offenders where the offence alleged is
riot of a serious nature;11
'(d) no conviction shall be recorded against a child found by a Court
to be in need of care and control;12
(6) where a child or young person appears before a panel or a
Court and an offence or offences have been proved against him,
and whether or not he has been found to be in need of care
and control — and where a young person has appeared before a
Court and on that appearance has been found guilty of an
offence or offences and no conviction has been recorded — then
he shall be deemed not to have appeared before the panel or
Court unless within a period of three years he appears before
any Court and is found guilty of an offence, in which event the
deeming provision shall cease to apply, if the Court so orders;13
He went on to observe that the recommendation last-mentioned does
not involve expunging a record where a conviction has been recorded, but
rather would give full effect to the non-recording of a conviction.14
The Child Welfare Legislation Review Committee in its Report (August
1975), on the subject of recording convictions, made similar proposals but
added to these by suggesting that where a child or young person has been
convicted of an offence, he may, after a period of three years (or such
longer period as the Court shall order) apply to a Youth Court for an order
that he be deemed for all purposes never to have appeared before such
Court or to have been so convicted, provided that he has not been found
guilty of an offence within a period of three years or such longer period as
the Court has ordered.15
These recommendations appear to be unique and if adopted would,
pending a review of the whole area of the expunction of convictions,
provide juvenile offenders with a very substantial measure of protection
against the lasting prejudice arising from the fact of conviction. For those
who feel that the recording of a conviction is a form of punishment and
deterrent, such a remedy will still be available in a proper case: for those
10. ibid., p. 10.
ll. ibid., pp. 22, 31, 37.
12. ibid., p. 79
13. ibid., p. 79.
14. ibid., p. 80.
15. Child Welfare Legislation Review Committee’s Report (August 1975);
Recommendations 67 and 68 and at p. '64.
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 who accept that a black mark for the rest of one’s life is unacceptable,
children and young persons at least will have the opportunity after a period
(which after all is a very long time in the eyes of most young persons) of
making a fresh start unhampered by the legal disqualiﬁcations referred to
above.
There are several methods by which attempts may be made to protect
or exempt convicted persons from the disadvantages they face long after
their sentences have passed. Legislation may be enacted by which:
(a) the conviction shall be deemed never to have happened;
(b) the convicted person may apply for an order of a Court with
the same effect;
(c) the law itself might be changed to remove automatic
disqualifications, or some of them;
(d) the Courts were provided with a discretion to pass sentence with
or without conviction, or, as recommended by Judge Muir, a
conviction shall not be recorded unless the Court so directs.
Some Matter Pertaining to Automatic Rehabilitation
Any one of these courses is open to objection, principally, perhaps,
that under methods (a) and (b) above, the offender will be placed in a
situation where the law will permit him to lie about his past.
The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (U.K.) ‘provides that after a
set rehabilitation period of up to 10 years (depending on the sentence
imposed) a conviction resulting in non—custodial sentence of a custodial
sentence of not more than 30 months must be treated in law as spent and
the convicted person must be’ treated as a rehabilitated person, provided
that he has not meanwhile beenconvicted of anything more serious than a
summary offence’. ’6 i -
This Act is founded' largely on proposalsin Living it Down: the
Problem of Old Convictions which was-the Report of a Committee set up
by ‘Justice’, the Howard League for Penal Reform, and the National
Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders. The Committee
took the view that ‘when a man has demonstrably done all he can to
rehabilitate himself, and enough time has passed to establish his sincerity,
it is in society’s interest to accept him for what he now is, and, as long as
he does not offend again, to ensure that he is no longer liable to have his
present pulled from under his feet by his past’.17
16. Note to preamble to Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (U.K.) in ‘Current
Law’ Statutes, Annotated, 1974, part 7.
17. Report of a Committee set up by ‘Justice’ Living it Down: the Problem of Old
Convictions (Stevens 1972) Para 18.
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By 85(1) of the Act certain sentences are excluded from
rehabilitation, viz:
(a) a sentence of imprisonment for life;
(b) a sentence of imprisonment or corrective training for a term
exceeding 30 months;
(c) a sentence of preventive detention; and ‘
(d) a sentence for detention during Her Majesty’s pleasure or for
life, or for a term exceeding 30 months, passed under SS3 of
the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 or under S 57 of the
Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937 (young
offenders convicted of grave crimes).
Special provisions are made for certain sentences conﬁned to young
offenders (Table B), the rehabilitation periods in these cases being from a
minimum of three years to a maximum of seven years. Rehabilitation
periods for other offences are contained in Table A, which range from ﬁve
years to ten years, are to be halved where the person convicted was under
seventeen years of age.
A criticism to which the Act is open is the provision excluding
sentences exceeding 30 months.
The Committee has recommended: ‘It will be seen that we have
chosen a sentence of two years imprisonment as the maximum for which
‘legal rehabilitation” is possible. Here again, there is room for argument, but
we have come to the conclusion that in current circumstances this provides
a convenient watershed between redeemable offenders and those whom
society is likely to regard either as hardened professionals, or as people
whose offences have been such that the notion of rehabilitation evokes
strong feelings of resentment. A sentence of two years is also the longest
which, under our present law, can be suspended‘.18
Another criticism is the failure to make any provision for those
persons, or any of them, who have been excluded from the beneﬁts of the
Act. Again pursuant to 54(4), certain professional and other areas of
employment have been exempted from the provisions of the legislation.19
Some Matters Pertaining to Rehabilitation by Application
The Criminal Records Act 1970 (Canada) permits a convicted person
to apply for a ‘pardon’ after two years in summary cases, or after ﬁve
years in non-summary matters, from the time when the penalty imposed
has terminated. The case is investigated by the Parole Board which, upon
18. ibid., para. 36.
19. Statutory Instruments 1975, No. 1023.
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 being satisﬁed of the applicant’s good behaviour, makes a recommendation
for pardon to the Solicitor-General. The ﬁnal authority for pardon is the
Governor. Persons other than the Crown are prohibited from seeking details
of pardoned offences from applicants for employment.20
The Committee felt that ‘the need for such applications would be
self-defeating, since in the overwhelming majority of cases they would bring
upon the head of the applicant precisely the consequences which he has
most reason to fear — namely, the disclosure of a past which he has
succeeded in living down and which no-one in his new chosen environment
knows about’.21 It felt there could be room for a procedure of
‘rehabilitation by application‘ for those persons whose sentences were not
covered by the recommended legislation, but that in such cases it would be
essential that the hearing of the application should take place in private and
should not be capable of being reported. 22
Some Matters Pertaining to Other Methods of Rehabilitation
If legislation such as the Public Service Act 1902 and the Government
Railways Act mentioned previously were amended so that the employing
authority were left with a discretion as to the employee’s future
employment, dismissal would no longer be automatic as is presently the
case. But would it not be hoping too much that such amendments be
considered? After all, is it likely that any employer would exercise his
discretion in favour of the employee in such a case? The offences referred
to in these Acts could hardly be regarded as minor and were the employee
sentenced to imprisonment, his employment could not continue. But in
contrast to this type of automatic disqualiﬁcation, S 62 of the Public Service
Act 1922—1973 (Commonwealth) states:
‘(1) Where an ofﬁcer is charged with having committed any criminal
offence against the law of Australia or of a State or of a
Territory, punishable either on indictment or on summary
conviction, he may be suspended by an authorized officer.
(2) If, upon the hearing of the charge by any court, the ofﬁcer is
found guilty of the offence, the Board may (whether the ofﬁcer
has been suspended or not) dismiss him from the Service, or
reduce him to a lower Division, class, or ofﬁce, and salary, or
reduce his salary, or inﬂict such other punishment as the case
demands.’
It is well recognized, I think, that because children and young persons pass
through difﬁcult periods of adjustment while ‘growing up’, they can be
helped to mature into adults who conform with society’s rules (in most
20. ‘Living it Down’ Appendix D 3.
21. ibid., para. 44
22. ibid., para. 45.
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 cases) by proper supervision, guidance and correction. ‘Changes of
personality take place and more quickly during most people’s ’teens, and
less time is needed to give society a reasonable assurance \that the change
will last.’23
I suggest that giving the Courts the discretion to determine, in any
case, whether a conviction be recorded 'or not, would go a long way
towards meeting the special difﬁculties and need for protection of the
young offender. It may be that the ‘present recommendations in New South
Wales, referred to above, could run together with such provisions as might
later be introduced covering all offenders, juvenile and adult.
A useful review entitled ‘Rehabilitation Laws in Other Countries” is
contained in Appendix D of Living it Down. Referring to young offenders:
‘In California (California Penal Code 1203.45), a person under
twenty-one who has committed one misdemeanour may ‘petition the
Court for an order sealing the record of conviction and other official
records of the case, including records of arrest’; if the order is
granted, the conviction is deemed not to have occurred, and the
petitioner may answer accordingly any question relating to his past.
Traffic violations, registrable offences and narcotics offences are
excluded. The applicant must have served any sentence satisfactorily.
The law does not, however, as does the equivalent law applicable to
juveniles, require the law enforcement agencies, who also have records,
to seal their books.’24
Another factor to be considered when we speak of ‘expunging a
record‘ is that very often what is meant is the complete destruction of all
documentary evidence of the conviction. This would appear to be the
position in, for example, Austria, the Netherlands and in Japan.25 Whereas
in the United States, in a number of the States where legislation has been
introduced to allow the expunging of records of juveniles and adult first
offenders, ‘expunging’ usually means the sealing of the record, not its
physical destruction, and the aim is to prevent access to the record so that
the conviction can be deemed not to have happened.26
The Committee whose report is contained in Living it Down did not
favour a procedure involving destruction. ‘There remains the question of the
conﬁdentiality of criminal records. As we have already said, we think it
important that such records should continue to be maintained and be
accessible to those who really need them.’27 ‘... We think it important
that a court of conviction should have the full record before it whenever
the man in the dock has been convicted of a serious offence.’28
23. ibid., para. 40.
24. ibid., Appendix D 1, page 44.
25. ibid., Appendix D 6, page 46.
26. ibid., Appendix D 1, page 44.
27. ibid., para. 71.
28. ibid., para 41.
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 The Committee recognized that there are various public authorities
who, for the protection of the public, have a justiﬁable need for the
information, regardless of whether or not the convicted person has in the
meanwhile rehabilitated himself. Some examples were. given, including the
police, who ‘must — as part of their function of maintaining law and order
on behalf of the community — be able to ﬁnd out whether any speciﬁed
person has a criminal record’: and ‘the Department of Education and
Science, which is concerned to ensure that no one is employed as a
schoolmaster who has a previous record in relation to children which could
make such employment particularly dangerous.”
Perhaps those proposals which would entail the complete destruction
of criminal records must be approached with some caution.
Consideration also would need to be given to provisions such as those
contained in SlO(3A) of the Motor Trafﬁc Act, 1909, which impose
automatic disqualiﬁcation for holding drivers’ licences for three years where
within the past ﬁve years the driver has been convicted of certain motor
trafﬁc offences, and S 10(5) of the same Act, which excludes (in certain
matters) the application of SSS6A of the Chimes Act when the driver has
had the beneﬁt of that section at any time during the past 5 years. These
provisions apply, of course, to juvenile offenders as well as adults.
The Home Ofﬁce Research Unit provided the Committee with
an estimate that there might be as many as a million people in England and
Wales who had a criminal record but who had been free of conviction for
at least ten years. ‘For these people, the chance that they will ever be
convicted again is minimal’30
What is the situation in New South Wales? The Bureau of Crime
Statistics and Research Statistical Report 6 Series 2 ‘Court Statistics 1974’
reports in relation to Petty Sessions Courts in that year, ‘Just over half
(51.7 per cent) of persons appearing before the Court had no previous
convictions. One in three (34.3 per cent) had previous convictions for
summary offences, and 13.9 per cent had a history of relatively serious
(indictable) offencesz‘
‘Table 2.5 — PREVIOUS OFFENCES
Number Percentage
No previous convictions 22 607 51.7
Indictable with/without
summary convictions 6 076 13.9
Summary convictions 15 006 34.3
Not known 41 0.1
29. ibid., para. 72.
30. ibid., para. 16. 
 The same report lists these details in Section 6, Statistics of Higher
Criminal Courts:
‘Many of those who appeared in the Higher Criminal Courts of
New South Wales during 1974 had already had earlier encounters with
other jurisdictions. In fact three out of four (73.2 per cent) had a
previous Court conviction, whether in a Higher Court, a Court of
Petty Sessions or a Children’s Court. In more than two cases in ﬁve
(42.9 per cent) the offence history dated back to a Children’s Court.
One in four had been committed to and institution as a juvenile.+’
‘Table 6.6 — PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS
 
 
Number++ Percentage
None 1 070 26.8
First convicted at
Children’s Court 1 715 42.9
Petty Sessions 1 146 28.8
Higher Court 60 1.5
3 991 100.0
 
 
++ Previous convictions not known in 25 cases.
+ Juvenile offence history not known in 28 cases.’
The Home Ofﬁce Research Unit ‘chose a random sample of more than
4000 males who were convicted of an indictable offence in the
Metropolitan Police District in England in 1957. Of the total sample, about
45 per cent were ﬁrst offenders, and the rest had been convicted before:
this agrees quite closely with similar ﬁgures which are available from other
sources. The follow-up has so far produced these results:
(a) of the ﬁrst-offenders, 64 per cent remained free of further
convictions for ﬁve years, and 60 per cent for ten years;
(b) of those who already had previous convictions, 33 per cent
remained free of further convictions for ﬁve years, and 30 per
cent for ten years;
(c) the reconviction rate after ten years free of conviction was
minimal.
‘It follows, therefore (from (a) and (b)), that about nine out of ten of
those who go straight for ﬁve years are still on the right side of the law
after ten years, and (from (c)) that their chance of being convicted again
after that is minimal.”31 Is the situation in New South Wales similar?
31. ibid., para. 16.
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Should records be expunged? Perhaps the answer lies in a_
consideration of the circumstances disclosed in Re Walsh [1971] VR 33,
referred to on page 86 of this paper, and of one of the cases referred to in
Living it Down”:
‘When Robert was a youth, he committed a series of
house-breaking offences and was sent to prison, although he was a
ﬁrst offender. After his release, he found work as a shop assistant. In
his spare time he took ‘0’ and ‘A’ levels, a University degree and a
professional qualiﬁcation. Later, he married .a girl who knew nothing
of his conviction, and they had three children. Eventually, he secured
a lectureship at a University in the Commonwealth. No question about
previous convictions appeared on the application form for the post.
He sold his house and furniture, both he and his wife gave up their
jobs, and they took the children away from school and disposed of
the family’s pets. Four days before they were due to leave, the
University discovered about the conviction, which was then fourteen
years old. (They found out through the High Commission which had
had it conﬁrmed by the Criminal Record Ofﬁce). The University
cancelled the passages and terminated Robert’s appointment,
compensating him only for the actual expenses he had incurred. It
took him another six years to ﬁnd a comparable job.’
Community Interest
It seems axiomatic that just as it is in the interests of the community
that criminals be brought to justice, the community interest also requires
that offenders who have served their sentences and thereafter been free of
conviction should not be punished further for their wrongdoing.
And yet, as we have seen, this is not the way things are. On 3rd
October, 1928, when moving the second reading of the Crimes Amendment
Bill, then before the legislative Council, The Honourable F. S. Boyce had
this to say:
32.
33.
‘I invite Honourable Members” attention to clause 15, which is a
new provision. At the present time, if a Judge or a Magistrate in the
case of a ﬁrst offender, or even in the case of any offender, feels that
the man ought not to go to Gaol, he may sentence him and suspend
sentence under the provisions of the First Offenders Act. But that
man is a sentenced criminal always. The clause provides that even if
the Magistrate thinks the charge is proved, he need not convict, having
regard to the general character and antecedents of the man, to the
triviality of the offence, or to any extenuating circumstances; and
without making a criminal of the man he may either dismiss the
charge or bind him over to be of good behaviour. This is a provision
which is taken from the English Act, 7 Edward VII, Chapter 17,
Section 1333
ibid., para. 1(g).
N.S.W. Parliament Debates 1928, Vol. 114, p. 533.
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 Clause 15 became, in 1929, 8556A of the Crimes Act 1900.
Community thinking and understanding has advanced much since then and
in 1974, or 46 years after The Honourable F. S. Boyce spoke to the above
amendment, we saw the limitation in that section restricting its operation to
Courts of summary jurisdiction removed by the Crimes and Other Acts
(Amendment) Act, 1974, so that S 556A is now available for the beneﬁt of
offenders dealt with on indictment. By the same Act, the grounds for its
use were widened to include ‘or to any other matter which the Court
thinks it proper to consider.’
I am not aware of any disapproval in the community of these
merciful changes in the Crimes Act. I do not believe that the members of
our community desire that a convicted person who has rehabilitated himself
should be hounded by his conviction until he dies. A fortiori where the
offender appears for the ﬁrst time, and is young.
‘Most civilized societies recognize that it is in their interests to
accept back into the community a person who despite one or more
convictions, goes straight for a sufﬁcient number of years.’34
Finally, as a member of a project team which at the request of the
Minister for Youth and Community Services (then the Honourable R. O.
Healey, M.L.A.) examined the large number of suggestions received from
members of the community for new child welfare legislation, I can certify
that there were many which evidenced a desire that, where the
circumstances would permit, children and young persons be kept out of
Court altogether and in the last resort, be dealt with without conviction.
34. ‘Living it Down', para. 3.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
G. H. McLennan
Firstly, I would like to mention that. in response to the invitation by
the (then) Department of Youth, Ethnic and Community Services in
relation to matters which might be considered for review under the Child
Welfare Act there were a great number of submissions made from all
sections of the community. Many of them were from private individuals and
many of them were very valuable. You have heard about some of the fruits
of these submissions here tonight. In regard to the discussion on panels, I
remember reading one submission and I feel sure that I am at liberty to
mention it. The writer suggested that the Children’s Courts should be
reformed so that its sittings might be convened at the child or young
person’s own home. Perhaps that is an indication of how impracticable
some suggestions might be, but it is certainly no indication of the merit of
very many of the submissions that were put forward.
In my paper I have tried to point to some of the legal difﬁculties
which arise in the implementation and in the interpretation particularly of
the protective provisions of the Child Welfare Act. When I say protective
provisions I believe that the intention behind the whole of the Child
Welfare Act was a protective one even in relation to the delinquent
so-called who is committed to an institution to undergo what the
Department calls ‘curative training’.‘ He is protected from the full
consequences of his wrongdoing at law. One of the few areas in which
there has been judicial guidance from Superior Courts for the information
of those who are concerned with Children’s Courts was in relation to one
of these areas, where the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales
took a very dim view of the magistrate’s decision which doubtless had been
meant to be protective. I will return to this later.
I have also touched on the creation and maintenance of records of
convictions and whether they should be expunged, and brieﬂy on what I
have been able to think in relation to community interest so far as this
question is concerned. We should keep in mind that although the Child
Welfare Act was passed in 1939 its parent Act was passed in 1923 so that
essentially we have had very much the same legislation in force in New
South Wales for the past ﬁfty-three years. But despite that very long
standing of the legislation there certainly have been few occasions when the
law as it is interpreted by and the practices followed in the Children’s
Court have ever been tested in a judicial way. I have referred to at least
one instance in my paper — the matter relating to the termination of an
order of committal to wardship where it was held that the Children’s Court
did not have the power to interfere with that order once made: p.84. The
absence until fairly recently of legal representation in Children’s Courts
might well have been a contributing factor to the lack of judicial review of
what has been happening in Children’s Courts. There has been very few
occasions, so far as I can recollect, of any judicial review and I seethe
provision of legal aid as a very signiﬁcant step forward although not only-
for that reason.
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There are, of course, many problems which arise in the
implementation of the law in treatment of children associated with crime or
otherwise and I have referred to only a few. One in particular on which I
have not touched is the question of the committal for trial. In New South
Wales we must remember that the age of criminal responsibility begins at
eight. Children’s Courts have jurisdiction to deal with children and young
persons eight years old and older who have committed indictable offences
except homicide, rape or other offences which are punishable by penal
servitude for life, and the Children’s Court may deal with those people in
the manner which is provided by the Child Welfare Act, i.e. by probation
orders, dismissals, committal to an institution, committal to the care of the
Minister and so on. But the Court may nevertheless where any child or
young person who is charged with an indictable offence commit for trial to
a District'Court. There is nothing in the Child Welfare Act to guide us as
to how the discretion of the magistrate, and it is entirely his discretion, is
to be exercised: nothing to indicate to what principles he is to have regard
to coming to that decision. The Court is required in any case where a child
or young person is committed for trial to notify the Attorney-General and
the Minister with a statement of reasons for his decision. Again there is no
indication of what might be considered to be sufﬁcient reasons. It may be
that one would have regard to the serious nature of the offence, the age,
the antecedents of the offender, but when we consider the question of age
it is necessary to ask, of course, what we think is a very serious crime.
Breaking, entering and stealing, commonly known as burglary, is a serious
enough crime. It is punishable by a maximum of fourteen years of penal
servitude which was increased from ten years only in 1966, and that is one
of the most common crimes that is committed by children and young
persons, particularly around the ages of thirteen and fourteen years. It is
necessary to ask how far up or down the scale depending where we begin,
eight or eighteen, before we say this crime is so serious that the child
ought to be tried on indictment, i.e., sent to a District Court where he
may
be tried by judge and jury. It is notable that in the recommendations that
have been made, the magistrate will no longer have the authority to make
this decision alone. He will not be able to exercise jurisdiction over
indictable offences in a summary way except with the consent of the child
or his parents, and it has been recommended that there be certain
guidelines set out in the legislation to which he must have regard in
determining whether he will deal with it or commit for trial. In other
words, if a child is very young it would seem to me that it would not be
sufﬁcient that the crime is one which is very serious indeed which might
earn an adult quite a number of years in prison. It would be difficult, for
example, to imagine a child of eight, assuming all the necessary proofs can
be given, being sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Some of you might
be surprised to hear that that is the law in our State. There is nothing
legally to prevent it except the good sense of the magistrates and the
judges.
Some guidance can be found in a case of R v Dawson which was a
decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales of the 2nd
August, 1973, and this is reported in the Petty Sessions Review vol. 3,
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 November and December 1974, at p. 1190. (The Petty Sessions Review is a
supplement to the Petty Sessions Chronicle published by the New South
Wales Petty Sessions Ofﬁcers’ Association.) Dawson appealed against the
severity of sentence in respect of two charges. The ﬁrst was a charge of
assault with intent to rob whilst armed, and second, robbery whilst armed.
'He had pleaded guilty at Quarter Sessions and was sentenced to eight years
imprisonment on each to be served concurrently, and at the time of the
sentence he was twenty. When he committed the offences he was about
17%. He had decamped to Melbourne on the night of the last robbery
which were on consecutive evenings and he was not arrested until almost
three years afterwards. His crimes had been committed in the company of
three accomplices, all of whom were less than eighteen. Although the report
does not indicate just how old they were I think they were in the upper
range of the age group, and they had been dealt with within several months
of the commission of the two offences because they had been arrested soon
after. Now of those three, two each were committed to an institution for
eighteen months and one for sixteen months. It was urged 0n the Court of
Criminal Appeal that if the appellant had been arrested shortly after the
crimes, he too would have been dealt with in a similar way to the others;
i.e. committed to an institution for a period of time. It was therefore
submitted that the disparity of the sentence was so great as to justify the
Court’s intervention. The Court consisted of Mr Justice McClemens, who
was the Chief Judge at Common law, Mr Justice Begg and Lee, and at p.
1191 they said this:
‘At the hearing, all members of the Court as presently
constituted, expressed amazement at the trivial nature of the penalties
imposed by the learned Magistrate on the other three offenders and,
indeed, we reserved our decision to inspect the Court documents to
see precisely what information was before the Magistrate concerning
the co-offender’s antecedents and records.
‘We have now had an opportunity of considering those matters
and we can only express the view that the sentences imposed were
entirely disproportionate to the gross severity of the crime of armed
robbery even taking into account the youthful age of the offenders.
We note also that it appears that two of the three other co-offenders
were back in prison for offences-committed soon after they were
free.’
and at p. 1192:.
‘We have ultimately reached the conclusion that the error, if
any, existed in the lightness of the orders made by the Magistrate and
that that does not warrant this Court interfering with what is
otherwise a heavy but proper sentence.”
and later on the same page:
‘We say in passing, that because armed robbery is becoming
altogether too prevelant in this community, so often being committed
by young men in company, in our view it will. be necessary for
Magistrates to refrain from imposing the trifling punishment as was
sentenced in this case.’
100
 There is some judicial guidance as to what a magistrate is expected to
do in exercising that discretion of whether to commit for trial or deal with
a juvenile offender under the provisions of the Child Welfare Act. It would
appear from those words that the magistrate should certainly take account
of the severity of the crime charged, its prevalence and the sentence which
might properly be passed in a Court of law other than a Children’s Court
before exercising a discretion to deal with such persons under the Child
Welfare Act.
In another matter, a newspaper reported that on the 25th October,
1972, a boy of ﬁfteen was sentenced at the Newcastle Quarter Sessions to a
total of seven years imprisonment for armed robbery whilst in company and
for other very serious criminal offences. On the report of the proceedings
there can be no doubt that they were very serious crimes indeed, crimes of
violence, and the judge at the Quarter Sessions came to the view that that
young lad was the ringleader.
Considerations like these are matters which should be kept in mind if
we speak about limiting the existing powers of the Children’s Court to
commit to institutions. Under the recommendations one of the criteria the
magistrate must consider in deciding whether he will send for trial or deal
with the child or young person himself is whether he considers the powers
of the Children’s Court are adequate, having regard to the nature of the
offence. I think there have been recommendations which suggest that the
maximum term of committal ought to be limited to twelve months. If that
is adopted it would seem to me that there could very well be a very
substantial increase in the number of children and certainly young persons
who are committed for trial, and who are thereby exposed to imprisonment
because, naturally, I should imagine the judge at the District Court would
have to ask himself the same question: are the powers in the Child Welfare
Act sufﬁcient to deal with this child or young person? It was because of
situations like this that led to provisions in the Child Welfare Act allowing
a child or young person to be sent to an institution for a ﬁxed term up to
three years, because there were a great number of children and young
people in the community who had committed serious crimes and there was
no way in which they could be dealt with except to commit them for trial.
Naturally, the Attomey—General in the case of young children did not want
to ﬁle a Bill, and I expect if they did prosecute a jury would not want to
convict.
Another matter to which I have not referred and which seems to me
to be a legislation oversight relates to the powers of the Children’s Court to
suspend an order of committal to an institution. The Court is given this
power under ss 4 of S 83 of the Child Welfare Act. If it commits a child
to an institution then it may order that the order be suspended on him
entering into a recognizance to be of good behaviour and to comply with
such conditions as are ﬁxed. Of course, when an order like this is made it
will sometimes happen that the conditions of the order are not complied
with and sometimes, not always, arrangements will be made to have that
child or young person brought back to Court. Sub-section 6 of S 83 makes
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provision for the child or young person to be brought back to Court, and
ss 7 of S 86 makes detailed provision as to what orders may be made by
the Children’s Court where the young person has attained the age of
eighteen years by the time he has got back to Court. In fact, it can do
anything it could have done with him in the ﬁrst place including suspending
a committal order again, it can do anything except make him a State Ward.
That was especially excepted by the amendment to the Act in 1969. The
interesting thing is that nowhere have I been able to ﬁnd any express
provision as to what is to be done with those other juveniles who are under
eighteen if they have been subject to a suspended committal order. The Act
is silent. We have a situation where we can bring them back to Court and
they are subject to a suspended committal order, and I suppose everybody
would be prepared to assume that the Court may order that they go to an
institution. But here the liberty of the subject is involved, and the law is
that where the liberty of the subject is involved we must have it Spelt out
for us. You cannot take away a man’s liberty by inference. The legislation
being silent the provisions of the Act as they are at the present time would
not support an order which directs that young person to undergo his
committal. This situation might soon be resolved because under the
recommendations suspended committal orders, which I have always thought
were of very little use, will disappear.
I would like to turn just briefly to the question of expunging records.
You will see that I have relied rather heavily on Living it Down (see p.
90), the report of the Committees under the Chairmanship of the Right
Honourable Lord Gardiner. The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, in
the United Kingdom was based largely but not entirely on the
recommendations that were made by that Committee. The Committee
referred to statistics supplied by the Home Ofﬁce Research Unit which had
chosen a random sample of rather more than 4000 males who were
convicted of an indictable offence in the Metropolitan District in 1959, and
of the total sample about 45 per cent were ﬁrst offenders, the test had
been convicted previously. At the time that this report was compiled it had
been found that of the ﬁrst offenders 64 per cent remained free of
conviction for ﬁve years and 60 per cent for ten years, but of those who
had previous'convictions 33 per cent remained free of further convictions
for ﬁve years and 30 per cent for ten years and that the reconvi‘ction rate
after ten years free of conviction was minimal. In other words nine out of
ten of those who went straight for ﬁve years were still on the right side of
the law after ten years and the chance of them being convicted after that
was minimal. The New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research
has been undertaking a somewhat similar study here and their work is still
incomplete but it is hoped that the ﬁgures will be published in the near
future.
It was reported on the 17th December, l975,that the government of
South Australia had appointed a three man committee to investigate ways
that criminal records could be erased after periods of good behaviour, the
terms of reference appeared to be similar to those which were considered
by the Committee in Living it Down. There has been no further publicity
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 here as to their efforts and I do not think that the investigatio
n has been
ﬁnalised. I understand that the Privacy Commission of New South
Wales has
been preparing recommendations for proposed legislation in this
State. I
understand that a background paper has been prepared which ha
s been
made available for public information.
Another point in relation to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act in
the United Kingdom is that there are a number of occupations
and
professions which have been exempted from the rehabilitation provis
ions.
They range from medical practitioners, lawyers, Opticians, teachers, polic
e
down to any employment which is concerned with the provision of he
alth
services and which is of such a kind as to enable the holder of the o
fﬁce
to have access to persons in receipt of such services in the course of
his
normal duties. I have details of those available if anyone requires them.
Finally, whilst what I have said in regard to expunging of records
may, in some respects, be of general application, it was primarily directed
to children and young persons and it is within that context that any
comments I have made should be considered.
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COMMENTARY
Rev. W. V. Payne, ED, B.S. W.
A member of the Child Welfare Advisory Council
Mr Geof McLennan’s paper has given us the opportunity of seeing
past legislation, its weaknesses, its strengths and the way in which it has
developed understanding for the compilation of current and future
legislation. The declaration that the welfare of the child should be
paramount is in itself a positive contribution and an immense step forward.
However, these words do not really reﬂect the feelings of our community
on crime and punishment. The terms ‘care and protection’ are high
sounding words that generally refer to the well-being of the child.
Well-being in the past has often meant the removal of a child from an
environment which if they are going to function acceptably they must
understand, and placed in a situation of unreal isolated existence.
The dilemma as Mr McLennan states is whether the court should
adopt a punitive or protective role. However, the adoption of either role is
not the total prerogative of the courts. Many of these children are involved
in criminal activities and one has to be aware of society’s attitude towards
crime and punishment.
The major approaches regarding punishment — and this is related to
crime irrespective of age — are the retributive and utilitarian views. It is
necessary to deﬁne punishment in this setting. Flewl suggests that —
It must involve an ‘evil’, an unpleasantness to the victim.
It must be for an offence actual or supposed.
It must be for an offender actual or supposed.
It must be the work of personal agencies, i.e. not merely the
consequences of an action, it must be deliberate.
It must be imposed by authority conferred by the system of
rules against which the offence has been committed.
o Unpleasantness is an important part not just incidental to some
other aim.
The philosopher, Kant2 sees the punishment of crime as being a right
in itself and moral order maintenance requires the institution of
punishment.
Hegel3 supports the theory that punishment is necessary to annul the
wrong- committed by the criminal. The punishment is more than retribution
or compensation, the criminal has upset the balance of moral order.
 
1. Flew A. G. N. ‘The Justification of Punishment' Philosophy Vol. 29 No. 3
(1954) 291~307.
2. Kant l ‘Metaphysiche Anfangsgriinde der Rechtslehre’ Die Melaphysik de Sitten
(1797), Werke Vol. III (Berlin 1922).
3. Hegel G. W. F. ‘Pliilosophie des Rechts’ (1821) Wcrke Vol. III (Berlin 1833).
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The retributive viewpoint focuses on the wrong committed —— ‘an eye
for an eye’. According to this viewpoint crime justiﬁes punishment and
there is a deﬁnite denial of the consequences of punishment. People are
punished because they are guilty of an offence. According to supporters of
this theory the. offender should realise he has done wrong and realisation of
this is brought about by being punished. Punishment it appears provides
legitimisation of the negative feelings society has towards the offender. The
aim of punishment has been to allow society a means to show disapproval
of deviant behaviour. The utilitarian theorists look at the consequences of
punishment. Bentham4 states ‘all punishment in itself is evil and should
only be allowed if it eliminates a greater evil.’
The aim of punishment is to control the action of the offender by
reformation, by disablement or by being an example to others who might
be contemplating the same crime. It is interesting to note that both theories
exclude the offenders in their thinking. Both theories, whether utilitarian or
retributive, do not achieve their stated goals of an ordered society' of
reformed, or disabled, people as examples for others not to follow. Our
dealings with juvenile offenders in the past, I believe, have been conditioned
by the philosophy I have stated. It is very difﬁcult to hold up the welfare
of the child as being the foremost thought of the court when the thinking
of our society has had continual conditioning by these concepts of what
punishment is all about.
Former legislation has lumped needy children into the one category
that they have come under the notice of the authorities, viz., the police or
ofﬁcers of the Department of Youth and Community Services. I recall with
disdain the terms that were used in relation to girls appearing before the
court, neglected, uncontrollable, exposed to moral danger. By the use of
these terms no one knew if the girls were the offenders or they were
offended against. It was a case of something ought to be done for or about
these children, but what? As Mr McLennan states this legislation will do
much to differentiate areas of need rather than the continuance of general
statements and actions towards children appearing before the court.
At present the court acts in relation to those who are determined to
be in need of care and protection. Those who are neglected as far as I am
concerned have no reason to be confronted with a court setting. They are
victims of circumstances beyond their control, not people who have to be
brought before a court. Too much time has been spent on cases related to
wardship and neglect. Admittedly they have rights that must be upheld,
however other ways must be found to deal with this problem.
As Chairman of the project team dealing with services to juvenile
offenders we tried to take away the function of the court to some degree
by suggesting that a community structure comprising the local District
Ofﬁcer, a local social scientist, a member of the Municipal Council, a local
identity. recommend or act in relation to those needy children who could
4. Bentham J. IIrIIodurIimI Io [IN Principlrx (If Mom/r and Icglxlarmn (1789) W
Harrison ld. (O\tord 1948).
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 not be termed delinquents but rather victims. I agree there should be a
junior court but the court system should not be for all children who come
under the notice of the authorities.
Mr McLennan has dealt extensively with expunging of records. The
Muir recommendations have been generally accepted and he is of the
opinion that if a child is brought before the court and found guilty of an
offence and no conviction has been recorded, then he shall be deemed not
to have appeared before the court. No recording of a conviction takes
place. This, as Mr McIennan says, would provide juvenile offenders with a
very substantial measure of protection against the lasting prejudice arising
from the fact of a conviction.
In briefly considering community interest, I am not convinced the
community is interested in the child who is in need of care and protection.
As I stated earlier legislation reﬂects attitudes of our community. Those
who are involved in welfare services know well how the public responds to
appeals for the aged and young children. Services to those termed deviant,
and the child appearing before the Children’s Courts comes into that
category, usually get the ﬁnancial crumbs that fall off the welfare table.
There is no recognition of a child being socially handicapped, although his
cousin the physically handicapped, is receiving more and more support in
tangible forms.
As a community we must look at all children as our investment for
the future. They are children with special needs — these needs must be
recognised and appropriate services introduced. If the community had better
understanding of the problems in implementing the provisions of the law,
there would not be the difﬁculty we have experienced in the past.
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PRESENTATION OF COMMENTARY
R. N. Purvis, A.C.A.,
Barrister-at-Law
I am pleased to say that I endorse most of the observations made and
conclusions drawn by the Reverend Payne in his paper. One is left with a
conviction that the community is interested primarily in punishment and in
ensuring that a child who commits an offence is suitably dealt with. The
community does not seem so interested in the child as one who is in need
of care and attention but rather with the problem of the community itself.
The attitude of our ‘community’ is reﬂected in the legislation being
considered at this Seminar.
On a personal note, I would like to comment upon a remark
contained in Mr Chisholm’s paper, wherein at p. 63 he says:
‘Children should not be punished unless they commit what would
be a crime if committed by an adult.’
I believe that we must be rather careful in our deliberations and in
our thoughts in relation to children associated with crime in that we do not
unconsciously, and with the best of intent, endeavour to impose the heavy
hand on human beings in this community who have not themselves
infringed the criminal code, and who have not themselves committed what
might otherwise be described as an offence.
We do tend to think that we have a right to guide and control, to
ensure that people conform, to ensure that children conform. It is good
that we have this feeling, but I think we have to be careful that when we
are talking about supervision, about persuading and guiding, that we do not
substitute for the normal sanctions capable of being imposed by a Court
some other restrictive measure that contains young people and perhaps
causes them to grow up with a sense of rebellion against the society that
has endeavoured to restrict them in their early formative years. The creation
of an ‘initial judicial ﬁnding’, a ‘panel of assistance’, in addition to or in
substitution for the judicial process is fraught with possibility of
over-reaching and imposing upon children sanctions not otherwise available
to be imposed upon adult members of the community. This seems to me to
be a trend towards the heavy stick for an act which would not otherwise
be punishable if committed by a person of more advanced years.
We are thinking and discussing at this seminar the concept of
minimising penalty — minimising the imposition of sanctions. Dr Blow has
brought to our attention the statistical evidence of a phasing out of
criminal activities by persons as the years of discretion are cast upon them.
One cannot help but wonder what effect the imposition of sanctions upon
young children, as at the present time, has so far as this phasing out is
concerned. What might be the effect if the penalty and the imposition of
sanctions is lifted, and the otherwise criminally inclined youngster does not
at some stage in his youth experience the sting of punishment? Maybe it is
the pain that plays some part in the phasing out process.
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 DISCUSSION
G. D. Woods, Senior Lecturer in Law, The University of Sydney
The question of truancy has been raised by a number of speakers, and
I would like to draw upon my experience as a school teacher to raise the
question of why truancy occurs. It seems to me that one of the main
reasons is that the truant is worried by the competitive nature of the
school. I was a teacher of backward children for some time and my
experience was that children in the very bottom forms tend to feel very
strongly the slings that are cast at them both by other children in higher
intelligence brackets and (usually unconsciously) by teachers. This element
of competitiveness is a constant factor in schools. It seems to me that it is
a fallacy to believe that an alternative to a competitive system of schooling
is a system which allows completevfreedom to all children to do anything
that they want. There is a very great deal of scientiﬁc authority for the
proposition that students learn effectively in a disciplined environment, and
there are various reports and studies which suggest that it is not necessary
to allow children complete freedom and indiscipline in order for them to
learn effectively. My view is that the whole school system, particularly in
the secondary schools, is attuned to matriculating to university and that the
school syllabi conform to the assumption that the best children will proceed
to university. It seems to me that you could have a properly disciplined
school without that assumption, and we would then avoid some at least of
the competitive atmosphere which produces truancy and delinquency.
Next I refer to Dr Wright-Short’s paper. No doubt what he did was
justiﬁable but in my view the present law which makes homosexual
behaviour unlawful is disgraceful. It is grotesquely illiberal and it is a blot
on the statute books of our society. It seems to me that the necessity, in
the circumstances mentioned, to propose aversive conditioning in relation to
a young person aged ﬁfteen who had committed certain offences which
were not violent implies not a criticism of Dr Wright-Short but a criticism
of the present law. I also raise the question (in the case of a ﬁfteen year old
offender who is described in the case study as being somewhat dull) of
whether or not that young person would be able properly to consent to the
imposition of that kind of treatment.
Finally I would endorse the comments made by Mr Purvis and Mr
Chisholm, that it seems inappropriate to punish children for behaviour
which would not otherwise be criminal. ln saying that I am not otherwise
attempting to make a decision about which of the two views put forward
this. evening is the correct one: i.e. the view propounded in the Muir
Report and in the other reports, or the view put forward by Mr Chisholm.
I would suggest that that is a matter which obviously has to be given
further consideration. I would suggest that, whether the panel system be
introduced or not, consideration should be given to limiting the kinds of
things which are brought before it on a criminal basis to those acts which
would otherwise be criminal in an adult person.
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John Parnell, SM
My first question is directed to Mr Chisholm, and might require a
lengthy answer in the light of pages 41 and 42 of the paper. It is, Where
goes doll incapax?
My second question is directed to Mr McLennan. I would imagine that
about 50 per cent of the juvenile offenders would be dealt with outside the
three special locations of Albion Street, Minda and Yasmar, and it is
probably an indictment of myself as well as others that these other
locations are architectually incompatible with the philosophy of Children’s
Courts. Juvenile offenders mix with adult offenders, probably as a matter of
expediency, but what is the future for this 40 or 50 per cent in the
proposed scheme?
Warren Simmons
I was most disappointed to see terminology in the new Act such as
‘welfare of the child must be held paramount’; that we must think about
‘the best interests of this child’. They are high sounding words and they do
not exist in most cases in my opinion. It has been a sop to us that we can
do things in the best interests of the child; for the most part we do not.
Other considerations of law, such as punishment, and society getting its just
deserts appear to have been expressed tonight. In Beyond the Best Interest
of the Child1 appear some principles that we can apply: continuity of care,
the concept of psychological parent rather than ‘biological parent’, the
‘quality of attachment’ that the child held. Various basic psychoanalytic
principles were applied to legal situations, and the judgement made by the
authors was immensely different to the judgement that we have produced.
They went beyond the ‘best interests of the child’ and said let’s scrap all
that' and recognise that when we have a child in front of us, whether
neglected or having committed an offence, here is a child in stress. We have
to now start thinking of what is the least harmful thing not the best thing
— that went ages ago when his parents broke up or he became neglected —
that we can do for this child in this situation. We must start thinking in
terms of alternatives. At present we have only two alternatives and placing
the child into the child welfare home might be not the least harmful but
the most harmful thing that we can do.
The authors also say that the law is a very ineffectual thing in dealing
with those sorts of problems. The law is clumsy and inadequate when it
comes to being used to make relationships. It cannot undo harm, it can
‘only set up a very basic framework from which we can give other kinds of
services. That is where the alternatives come in, and we just do not have
enough.
Last year I was in Dundee I sat in on a panel for a day. It was a
tremendous experience. Three people (there are fifty people on the Dundee
panel and they take it in turns, three at a time) sat with the child: there
was some formality, there was some ﬁnger wagging and it was not all
 
1. Goldenstein, Freud and Solnit Beyond the Best Interests of the Child Macmillan,
London 1973.
109
  
counselling. They talked over what had happened in a supportive way,.
trying not to put too much pressure on him. He had to go into a home,
and the Reporter brought over a report giving all details of the home which
they then discussed with the child. How did he feel about it? etc., etc.,
After the child had left the room the panel held a case conference, being
concerned about his reactions to their questions and counselling. This for
me showed people really trying to work in the interests of the child.
I have been very interested in abusive parents. I do not believe that
they should be penalized as they are at present, but we do not have enough
facilities to deal with them.
Daryl Lightfoot, Social Worker.
I think the nub of the paper from Mr McLennan lies in its last few
lines.
The concern is that where possible children and young persons should
be kept out of court as far as possible, and not only out of gourt but out
of any kind of formal dealings, which are progressively going to label a
child, so that eventually that child will say ‘So help me if I am that, then I
will be that’.
I want to refer in particular to the formal police cautions. I agree
with the comment made earlier that it would be most unfortunate were the
reforms proposed by the various reports on child welfare legislation to in
any way undermine a process which can intervene in the passage of a
young person from the community into the judicial system. Perhaps we
need to look at some of the administrative considerations behind the law,
and not just become involved in the legal problems of what constitutes a
recorded conviction, what constitutes a record, what the notion of
expungement may or may not mean given the various forms of records
which are being kept and so on. Those latter issues only arise when a
young person gets into the judicial system. Looked at administratively a
young person is arrested and taken to a police station and the first
opportunity to ﬁlter out that young person can occur by an informal
action at the police station level where perhaps compensation can be
arranged with the parent.
The circumstances are such that an understanding police ofﬁcer with
his superiors can decide to take no formal action. That is the ﬁrst step.
The next one is the question of whether or not to charge. Two alternatives
exist. One is the decision to charge, the other is a direction that the facts
be reported further up in the police administration for consideration of a
formal police caution. In point of fact, the dice are somewhat loaded
against the juvenile in this situation in so far as the amount of
administrative work needed. I understand that the work involved to put the
matter up for a police caution is far more extensive than that in simply
proceeding to a charge. Administration can make implementation of
legislation a very heavy load, and, in fact, inﬂuence administrative choices.
llO
From a very minor study of children who had been put through the
cautioning process some interesting facts emerged. Most of those children
were ﬁrst apprehensions, as far. as we could tell. Of the number of children
who were recommended for cautions, according to police information,
roughly 97 per cent of them get it. Here is an effective screening out from
the court process if, in fact, at the police station level some formal action
can be taken and still divert the child from the judicial system. How does
it work? How well does it work? Again, we do not have accurate ﬁgures
and the police, to my knowledge, have not undertaken any specific study.
We tried to extract some ﬁgures when l was with the Department of
Youth, Ethnic and Community Affairs some time ago. I cannot remember
the exact ﬁgures, but I think in terms of cautions and ﬁrst offenders on
probation (using juveniles under sixteen for offences as distinct from
indictables which does not make; the study exactly comparable with that in
Living it Down) the ratio was about three to one in favour of young
people who had been dealt with by a caution. So, within that filtering
process was a fairly effective tool for selecting a group of children who
could make use of the chance they were given. I should also add that our
period- of time was not quite as long as in Living it Down. The possibilities
are there, because it seems from our juvenile experience in New South
Wales that the children are most likely to reoffend in about twelve months.
Given this, the question than arises at what level is a system of filtering out
considered effective? This involves another administrative decision. If, in
fact, we have a very high success rate in terms of cautions the implication
seems to me to be that many of the children who ﬁnally enter the court
system could have been ﬁltered out both to their own advantage and to
that of the community. These are some of the administrative issues behind
the law.
Graham Greenleaf, Research Ofﬁcer, N.S.W. Privacy Committee
I would like to make a few comments about the statements in the
Phibbs Report and the statements that have been presented in two of the
papers about recording of convictions and expungement of convictions. ,One
of the main recommendations of the Phibbs Committee in this area, a
recommendation supported by Mr McLennan, was that it would be very
helpful if the category ‘conviction’ was completely avoided, and ﬁndings
and dispositions other than convictions were used in almost all cases so that
a young offender would not have to carry the stigma of a conviction
throughout the rest of his life, and basically will be able to deny that he
has ever been convicted. This is somewhat similar to S 556A of the Crimes
'Act in New South Wales which allows adult offenders a ﬁnding of guilt but
the Court need not proceed to conviction. These types of provisions are not
much use if information about these non-convictions is available to other
government departments, particularly in the employment situation, and it is
not much use in the situation of private employment if employers on their
application forms ask questions such as: ‘Have you ever been charged with
an offence?’ or ‘Have you ever appeared before a Court or Youth Panel?’
Simply deeming an act not to be a conviction is not much use unless it has
the necessary administrative and legal backing. One of the best
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 recommendations of the Phibbs Committee in this area provides that there
simply cannot be access to any details of ﬁndings either of convictions or
non-convictions held in police or Youth and Community Services records
by other government departments or other persons except in very limited
cases. This can be very useful from the point of view of those government
departments as it enables them to be protected from the demands of other
government departments for this type of information. It must often be very
difﬁcult to resist demands for information from departments which give
help in many other areas, and reliance on speciﬁc statutory prohibition
against the disclosure of this information must assist them very greatly in
protecting the people whom they would wish to protect.
I do not wish to make any comments about the situation in New
South Wales, but it was recently reported that in Victoria the Victorian
Ombudsman made a special report to Parliament about the equivalent
Youth and Community Services Department concerning the disclosure of
criminal records of juveniles from that Department had made in
contravention of a speciﬁc statute in Victoria.
Secondly, the Phibbs Report, so far as actual convictions are
concerned, recommends that a young offender can only be rehabilitated of
that conviction on application to the court after a period of time. There is
to be no automatic rehabilitation of a conviction after the efﬂuxion of a
period of time. Mr Mclennan in his paper points out that the British
committee that looked at this said that the need for such applications
would be self-defeating since in the overwhelmingly majority of cases they
would bring upon the head of the applicant precisely the consequences he
has most reason to fear, namely, the disclosure of a past which he has
succeeded in living down and which no one in his newly chosen
environment knows about. To have to even bring this before a court three
years later is I feel an unnecessary imposition on a person who has
succeeded in living down a conviction. The United Kingdom Rehabilitation
of Offenders Act provides for automatic rehabilitation of an offence once a
certain period of time has elapsed, and I think the Phibbs Committee could
well have looked at this more closely.
Similarly another anomaly is created between convictions and
non-convictions is that with convictions it is suggested that there can be no
rehabilitation if a young offender is convicted and then later another
ﬁnding of guilt is made within three years. In other words two chances and
you are out for good — it stays as a conviction for ever and there is no
chance of having it expunged. One way of getting around this is to provide
that there can be no rehabilitation of the first offence until sufﬁcient time
for the second offence to be rehabilitated has gone by. This means that the
ﬁrst offence is not rehabilitated until the second offence is also
rehabilitated but that surely is preferable to simply saying ‘two strikes and
you are out’.
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 Mr Chisholm spoke about the labelling of a person as a ‘criminal’ or
as ‘convicted’ as being a self-fulﬁlling prophesy, and I wonder if he would
comment about whether the label of ‘rehabilitated’ could also become a
self-fulﬁlling prophesy.
John Murray, Inspector, Commonwealth Police Force.
I would like to comment on the Phibbs Report concerning the
exclusion of police from Aid Panels (or whatever other ameliorative
nomenclature they may be given if they do come into effect). I would also
support the comments made by Mr Lightfoot about the need and the
advantages of police cautions being given.
In regard to the ﬁrst, the Phibbs Report opposes the recommendations
of both the Holt Report and the recommendations of the Muir Report, and
the reportedly favourable practice of the South Australian system. I believe
that the exclusion of police could have a generally disadvantageous effect all
around. In the ﬁrst instance the presence of a uniformed police ofﬁcer
represents, in many cases, the only obvious display of authority and
awareness to the offender that his actions are coming within the due
processes of the law. There can be any number of people talking to him,
advising him, cautioning him, but unless he knows that there is someone
who can do something about his following behaviour he is not going to
take any notice. I know from my own experience, both in having spoken
to juveniles and in crirninological studies I have undertaken, that there are
many juveniles who claim that a caution from a uniformed ofﬁcer had a
greater deterrent effect than an appearance before a civilian oriented court.
To quote one of them: ‘You know that the cops in your area know about
you and you just can’t afford to be in the scene of any more trouble’. The
person who gives the caution is normally the inspector in charge of the area
where the offence is committed, and, in many cases, this is where the
person lives. I am not saying that cautions are going to prevent future
criminal behaviour by hardened offenders or by recidivists but for the ‘one
up’ or ‘twice up’ offender I believe it plays a great part.
Secondly the Phibbs Report states that the need for including on the
panel people conversant with the locality and circumstances of its residents
is important. Who better than a local police ofﬁcer? As a person who
works in the area at least eight hours a day he knows the conglomeration
of living conditions, the respective occupations of the area, the schooling
standards, the crime rate and the various accepted mores of the community.
He would have a far more intimate knowledge of the local standards and
‘hang-ups’ than a local resident who does not work in the area and would
only mix with peers of his own occupation or income.
Thirdly, I am sure police would appreciate being represented on the
panels to ensure not only that their views are heard but also to rebut any
assertion of cherubic innocence put over by known hoodlums. The mere
presence of a policeman might well inhibit some of the intricate fantasies
that these people are prepared to give to ‘the mug’s question’ of ‘Why did
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you do it?’ If there is a policeman on the panel he knows that at least one
person is not going to believe him and will probably have evidence of the
background to convince the others that he is not truthful.
These comments are not made as a reﬂection on or as an affront to
social welfare ofﬁcers, but I am equally convinced that in a professional
police force such as the one that operates in New South Wales there are
more effective psychologists and social workers than there are in specialized
departments, irrespective of the degree of academic attainment of many of
these people.
In conclusion, I would like to say that the police are not predelicted
to taking action against juveniles in order to get the matter over with.
There is so much voluminous paper work and report writing and research
work needed that perhaps police shy away from taking action against
juveniles. Perhaps, they exercise their discretionary powers more than would
be normally justiﬁed. I can assure you from my experience that the arrest
of any juvenile by the police is always deserved. Mr Justice Martin earlier
expressed some sort of surprise that the South Australia system operated
favourably despite the presence of a police ofﬁcer on the panel. I would
like to suggest that the reason the South Australia system works so well is
because of the inclusion of a police ofﬁcer.
Carolyn Simpson, Child Welfare Department, Department of Youth and
Community Services. Vice-President of the Council for Civil Liberties.
In contrast to Judge Martin, I started off being a very enthusiastic
supporter of Aid Panels, but I am now extremely lukewarm about them.
Partly, this is because I was able recently to sit in on a South Australian
Panel, and I was sorry to see that there was a great degree of moralizing at
children. I stress that I only saw one or two panels but each time the
children were lectured and were made to feel very guilty, not about what
they had done but the effect their behaviour was having on their parents. It
seemed to me that this was an extremely poor way to go about trying to
reform a child. In each case the offences charged were fairly trivial; much
more trivial than some of the things that we deal with in Children’s Courts
here.
1 am concerned about the idea of untrained people counselling
children and families, partly as a result of what I saw in South Australia
and partly as a result of some very well meaning but untrained people I
have seen attempting to counsel people in New South Wales. Recently I
read a report and spoke to a welfare ofﬁcer who had taken a very much
disturbed fourteen year old boy who was before the Court for stealing cars.
The boy was a State Ward because both of his parents had recently died
within ﬁve months of one another. The welfare ofﬁcer felt that one good
way of treating this child was to take him to the grave of his parents and
then in the same day take him to the local hospitals to see those less
fortunate than himself. The ofﬁcer was somebody who had had some
minimal training in welfare. I hate to think what well meaning but
untrained people might do who had even less training than this particular
person.
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I find the idea of having two or three people on a panel a fairly
oppressive thought for children, and I think the semi-formality of the
Children’s Court as it now exists in New South Wales might be much less
oppressive to a child and his family.
Secondly, it has been mentioned that community involvement would
'come through the Aid Panels. I am in favour of community involvement
but not when it comes to determining guilt, or determining punishment, or
determining treatment of children. Most people believe that they know best
about children and, of course, everybody claims to have the interest of the
child at heart. What people do not see is that the ‘best interests of the
child’, or what is seen as the ‘best interests of the child’, might differ from
person to person.
For example I was speaking to a paediatrician who is involved in a
child development unit in New South Wales who was concerned with an
eleven year old girl who was brought before the Court because she was seen
to be neglected. I think that there was no doubt that she was neglected.
However, when I asked what the child wanted I was told that nobody had
thought of asking her. This seems to me to be very strange from somebody
who is supposed to be vitally concerned with children’s welfare. It had not
occurred to him that there might be other views of the child’s welfare or
of the child’s best interests.
I ﬁnd the attitude of many social workers and welfare workers is
limited to the social milieu in which they move. Rather than bringing more
children before the court or bringing more social welfare agencies to bear
on the child, I would like to see society widen its area of tolerance of
children’s behaviour (and adults’ behaviour for that matter, too). I am
talking there about victimless crimes but, most particularly, in relation to
children’s offences.
Finally, we have been talking about punishment such as locking up or
ﬁning children. I think that we forget that some of the other orders made
by Children’s Courts can be seen as very punitive by the children
concerned. For example, the Children’s Court will release a child on
probation or on some other order on condition that he or she attends for
counselling, that he or she accepts certain supervision and guidance. We
forget that this can be seen as a punishment by the child, and indeed it is
a punishment to have to accept guidance by somebody whom the child
had no say in selecting, and who may have a straight personality clash with
the child.
Dr Ross Williams, Child Psychiatrist, Department of Child and Family
Psychiatry, Royal Alexandra Hospital for Children
As a medical man my idea of treatment is rather different from what
has been discussed here which has been the handling of children in legal
situations rather than the medical and social kind of treatment with which I
am associated.
115
 I would like to point out that in handling disturbed children it is now
widely recognized and accepted that dealing with the whole family is an
essential part of the process. Dealing with a child without attempting to
cope with his family at the same time is much less valuable, and therefore
any considerations for treating children in a legal sense which fail to allow
for the family to be included in the treatment in the medical sense is not
likely to be successful.
Secondly, and perhaps at the risk of contradicting myself to a certain
extent I would like to point out that in the past, and I hope not so much
in the future, the sentences or decisions affecting the disposal of children
who had been brought before courts seemed to depend more on what they
had done and was a punishment, rather than what they need in the way of
treatment or rehabilitation in the medical and psychological sense.
R. C. Chisholm
In reply to the objection by Peter Quinn and to some of the worries
expressed by Mr Purvis I think one important distinction is between
punishment on the one hand and coercion on the other. It seems to me
that what happens to children at the criminal end of my spectrum is much
the same as what happens to adults charged with crime and therefore I
have called that ‘punishment’. But I think that there is another element
which is also very difﬁcult and which we also need to bring judicial
processes to bear upon and that is ‘coercion’. It is quite true to say that
once you have punishment then you have a threat to people’s rights,
therefore you should look immediately at judicial processes and it is
dangerous to have uncontrolled executive processes. In so far as we are
punishing people, I agree that we ought to be doing it through a Court and
not through executive processes.
But we may also be using coercion in a non-punitive way. For
example, if we have the battered baby who is at real risk from its parents
we may want to coercively remove that child from the family, although in
no sense are we interested in punishment. There are also other situations
where we might want to call upon the force of the State to force people
to do things for non-punitive reasons. It has taken me a long time to
appreciate this. It seems to me that when we are talking about ‘coercion’,
as well as when we are talking about ‘punishment’, we need to think in
terms of people’s rights and the control of executive action. At both ends
of my spectrum you have got ‘coercion’, at one end punitive and at the
other end protective, but in both cases ‘coercion’, and at both ends you
need a judicial process. If I have not made that clear in my paper let me
make it clear now.
In the middle range of the spectrum some people have said that they
are very worried because I seem to be pushing people around, using coercion
without the protection of the judicial process. Looking again at my paper I
have not been very clear about this. The whole point of that middle
process is that I would remove the element of coercion from it. That is to
say if adolescents run away from home, go up to Kings Cross, sleep with
their boyfriends or whatever, unless we can persuade them in a non-coercive
way to accept the services we have to offer we are not allowed to touch
them. I appreciate that that is a bold position. There are some distressing
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 cases where a very strong argument can be made that we really ought to
force kids to accept our help, but it seems to me that after the ages of
about twelve or thirteen we should say that if our society is seriously
interested in helping these kids we have to sell our system of social services
to them, and until they buy it we cannot touch them, except when they
infringe the criminal law, in which case we can protect ourselves from them.
On the more particular matters that have been raised I do not have
much to say about ‘rotating magistrates’. I like the idea. It seems to me
there is a great dilemma here, and that is between people accumulating
experience and wisdom by learning the ropes on the one hand (and that
argues for not rotating them) and'on- the other hand people reaching the
stage where, as one speaker said, ‘familiarity is the thief of compassion’; I
think there is a truth in that. Like all proverbs it is both true and false.
The other side of the coin is that people do become entrenched in their
jobs, ingrained in their attitudes, insensitive to change and so on. I do not
know how to deal with that dilemma. Perhaps we ought to be looking at a
rotating scheme but among the people that we' choose to rotate we have to
be fairly selective.
I was asked about doli incapax and what it is. It is a rule that says
people under fourteen years are presumed not to be capable of mens rea
which is the mental element of crime. If I have to give an opinion,'then I
am inclined to think that it is an anachronism and it is not of much use.
My information and limited experience is that it is very seldom, if ever,
raised in practice. Colin Howard in his book on Criminal Lawlsaid it is a silly
rule because, by and large, crimes themselves contain a mental element; if
you are charged with stealing there is a mental element involved of
intending to steal, if you are charged with murder and so on. Howard says
that if the child is sufﬁciently mature to be able to form the intent
required for the crime then we should not have to go into the separate
examination of whether he is old enough to understand that what he is
doing is wrong. On the whole that appears to me to be persuasive so that
I am inclined to agree that doli incapax is an old rule that we do not
really need.
I have also been asked whether ‘rehabilitation’ is a self-fulﬁlling
prophecy. I remember I became very" excited when I first read about
labelling theory, and I am still fairly excited about it, but-I think it is very
difﬁcult to demonstrate in practice. It is very easy to say that you know
people respond to the labels that are attached to them, such as a criminal
or a sick person or whatever. A great deal of work has been done in
psychiatry in this field and it is very plausible andpersuasive to say that
people react like that. It is also very difficult to find hard data which
actually proves it. On the other hand I think that insofar as labelling is true
about terms like ‘conviction’, ‘criminal’, ‘delinquent’, and so on, it is likely
also to be true about ‘rehabilitated’. After all, the very term ‘juvenile
delinquent’ was originally invented as a way of removing the stigma from
the word ‘criminal’.
1. C. Howard Australian Criminal Law (2nd Edn) Law Book Co. Ltd. Melbourne
1970.
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SUMMARY
His Honour Judge A. G. Muir, Q.C.
The seminar has considered a submission that present knowledge of
the association of children with crime points obviously to the need for
effort to be directed to measures to lead to the detection of those children
at risk at the earliest possible age and, if possible, the institution of
methods to prevent the actual occurrence of unacceptable behaviour.
It is put that the single most predictive indicator of future adolescent
delinquency is a child’s relationship with his parents. Some situations
discussed in this regard have been:—
0 faulty methods of parental discipline;
0 poverty of parents;
0 broken homes;
0 deﬁnable psychiatric illness; genetic defects or organic disease;
0 the breach of what is called an implied contract — i.e. moving
from the parent responsibility for material efforts, warmth and
love, and from the child acceptance of rules and obligations
established by the parent.
The seminar appeared to accept that a young person who falls foul of
the law does so because he is the product of his hereditary family and
community environment and his offence is the result of a combination of
these educated forces.
Young people from the same environment, even the same family, and-‘
exposed to the same temptations, differ greatly in the degree of detected
delinquency. The young person who becomes a detected delinquent is the
persistent offender who is at risk and needs to be identiﬁed.
The seminar appeared to be prepared to accept that high-rise housing
called ‘concrete rabbit warrens’ give rise to many problems and are an area
requiring close attention. However, the question was not answered as to
whether these problems result from poor design or are the problems
brought to the area by those who live there.
The discussion of the association of children with crime highlighted
the responsibility of parents whose. children become delinquents. Leaving
aside those cases of clear disinterest and positive neglect there are a great
many parents who would welcome-help with their problems. An adoption
of the American social work programmes which have established group
treatment programmes within schools, where apparently no stigma is
attached and the success rate is indeed high, would appear worthy of
consideration.
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The seminar considered the protective provisions of the Law in New
South Wales for children ﬁrstly so far as they affected wardship. Present
recommendations before the Government did essentially two things:—
1. provide a system of review in reSpect of any order of wardship
and
2. establish temporary ‘guardianship’ as a possible alternative to
permanent guardianship.
Bearing these recommendations in mind, the question was raised to the
seminar as to whether the law and practice of the Department of Youth
and Community Services might not be revised to include voluntary
residential care by the Department where the child does not become a
ward. The suggestion discussed was that the Department might involve itself
to the extent of becoming a ‘good neighbour’ to those families who find
themselves in what is described as a temporarily impossible situation.
The seminar appeared to accept the view and support present
recommendations that some children and young persons should be dealt
with away from courts and in more appropriate circumstances where an
offence is alleged. The police warning system which has existed in the past
was supported, although it was pointed out that this system had not
progressively developed as one might expect. Having expressed some
reservations as to the need for experienced personnel the seminar supported
the establishment of a panel system, provided adequate legal advice was
available to the child and young person to avoid false admissions of guilt.
Questions were discussed as to the method by which a child or young
person should be directed to appear either before a Court or a panel. As
against the present recommendations that primarily this be resolved by a
Committee within the Department of Youth and Community Services, the
Scottish system of a reporter it was suggested would be a more satisfactory
approach.
The seminar considered present recommendations concerning the
expunction of records of children and young persons and the non-recording
of a conviction where the Court saw ﬁt. Further, it considered
recommendations that in such a case the child or young person should for
all purposes be deemed not to have appeared before the Court or panel.
The seminar appeared to approve these recommendations and indeed
discussed at some length the desirability of records not being made known
except in a very limited way, even where they are maintained and
convictions are recorded.
Finally, it is signiﬁcant to record one submission to the seminar which
pointed out the evidence seems to be that by late teens or early twenties a
great many of even our persistent young offenders have ceased offending.
This may lead to the conclusion that juvenile delinquency may be, to a
considerable extent, a problem of adolescence and of the short period
thereafter. This appears to suggest that a recognition of the child or young
l'v‘person of his own responsibility, together with appropriate treatment and
j guidance, will achieve the best results in the community.
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